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CASE NOTES
Antitrust-Fair Trade-When Goods Pass from Non-Signer Fair Trade
State to Free Trade State to Signer-Only Fair Trade State, McGuire Act
Does Not Protect the Transaction.-Corning Glass Works, a New York
manufacturer of trademarked cooking wares, utilized a form contract to
distribute its products to wholesalers in forty-five states and the District of
Columbia.' Under the terms of the contract, the wholesaler agreed to sell the
wares at prices set by Corning, and not to sell to resellers who refused to sell
at Corning's set prices. 2 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) argued that
the use of this contract was a restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
laws and not protected by the McGuire Act 3 when the wholesaler involved
was located in a free trade state (i.e., a state in which resale price maintenance agreements are prohibited) and was selling to a retailer in a fair trade
state (i.e., a state which has legislation permitting resale price maintenance
agreements). 4 The administrative law judge dismissed the complaint, but the
FTC reversed as to one count dealing with the customer restriction clause,
1. Corning Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293, 294 (7th Cir. 1975). The material concerning
the McGuire Act and resale price maintenance is extensive. Since this Case Note will deal with
the narrow issues raised in the Seventh Circuit's holding, the reader is advised to see, e.g., the
following material for the history and discussion of resale price maintenance: Revere Camera Co.
v. Masters Mail Order Co., 128 F. Supp. 457, 460-61, 463 (D. Md. 1955); 98 Cong. Rec.
4896-4956, 8819-73 (1952); 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2181-94 (1952); 1 R. Callmann, The

Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies §§ 22-25.1 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Callmann]; Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 Yale L.J. 967 (1955);
Cook, The Continuing Fair Trade Battle, 29 St. John's L. Rev. 66, 68-70 (1953); Fulda, Resale
Price Maintenance, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175, 175-79 (1954); Legislation, 27 St. John's L. Rev. 379,
388-90 (1953); Note, Fair Trade and the McGuire Act, 16 U. Pitt, L. Rev. 50 (1954).
2. 509 F.2d at 294. Compare Callmann § 22.1, at 772 ("Resale price maintenance is, of course,
price fixing and as such it technically runs afoul of the antitrust laws.') with General Elec. Co. v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 91, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (Sup. Ct.), vacated, 278 App. Div.
939, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 278 App. Div. 940, 105
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1951) (per curiam) ("The Fair Trade Law is, in effect, a general
statement of policy sanctioning vertical price fixing of commodities bearing the mark of the producer. It makes actionable in the courts, as unfair competition, any sales at prices below those
fixed in accordance with the Fair Trade Law.'). The type of contract Corning used is not
unusual. See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1953):
"The contract in question prescribes two resale prices, one wholesale and the other retail. The
only way in which plaintiff could maintain its existing distribution system, which channels
Sunbeam products to the retailer through the middleman distributor, and at the same time insure
that its minimum prices would be maintained by all retailers who sell Sunbeam products, was to
bind the vendee distributors with such a provision." Id. at 39. According to one author, the
McGuire Act permits customer restriction in manufacturer-wholesaler agreements through
wholesaler-retailer contracts, but not through manufacturer-retailer contracts. Comment, Customer Restrictions in Fair Trade Contracts, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 392, 397-402 (1969).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970).
4. 509 F.2d at 296.
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finding a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,- and issued a cease and
desist order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Corning Glass Works v. Federal
Trade Commission, 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975).
Although vertical price-fixing is a violation of the antitrust laws, two types
of vertical restrictions have been exempted from these laws under the McGuire
Act. 6 Under the terms of the Act, resale price agreements which require the
vendee to resell only at the vendor's set price and only to customers who agree
to resell at the set price are not restraints of trade if they are valid under state
law. 7 A number of states, termed "fair trade states," have enacted such laws.
Fair trade states
may be divided into two categories---"signer-only"8 and
"non-signer." 9 In signer-only states, only those who sign resale price agreements which restrict the resale price and the customers to whom a resale may
be made are covered by this exemption from the antitrust laws. In non-signer
states, all resellers are bound by these agreements as long as one reseller in the
state has signed such a fair trade contract. The remainder of the states,
termed "free trade states,"' 0 do not have laws legalizing resale price maintenance contracts. In these states, fair trade agreements, such as that utilized by
Corning, are illegal as restraints of trade under the federal antitrust laws.
The Seventh Circuit in Corning was faced with the question of which state
law governed an agreement such as Corning's-that of the wholesaler (vendee) or that of the wholesaler's customers. The principal question was
whether Coming could legally restrict a wholesaler in a free trade state to
selling solely to customers in a fair trade state who had agreed to follow
Corning's set prices. In concluding that such a customer restriction was
illegal, the court focused on the meaning of the word "resale"" in the
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). A violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act is a fortiori a violation of §
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970); see 509 F.2d at 294 & n.l.
7. That fair trade statutes within the states are not unconstitutional is well-settled. Old
Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Mkts. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788, 792, 793 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S 856 (1953);
General Elec. Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 863
(1954).
8. The signer-only states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and
West Virginia. 509 F.2d at 296 n.7.
9. The non-signer states are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, .Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at
295 n.5.
10. The free trade states are: Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Also free trade are the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id. at 259 n.4.
11. Id. at 298-300. But see Note, The McGuire Act and Discount House Sales into
Fair-Trade States, 43 Geo. L.J. 258, 269 n.46 (1955): "It may make no difference where the sale
takes place with regard to the actual claim for relief, which is based on a tort set in motion
outside the fair-trade state but felt within the fair-trade state."
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Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act which followed it. The "resale"
section of the McGuire Act now provides (the portions in the McGuire Act
that were not in the Miller-Tydings Act are underscored; the "vendee" and
"when lawful" clauses are italicized):
Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render
unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices, or
requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or agreements Prescribing minimum or

stipulated Prices, for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container
of which bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such
commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same
general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastatetransactionsunder any statute, law, or
public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be
transported for such resale. 13

Reasoning that under the Miller-Tydings Act, the word "resale" meant "the
first resale by a vendee, rather than to any subsequent resale by a purchaser
from the vendee, 1 4 the court concluded that if the word "resale" had the
same meaning under the McGuire Act as it did under the Miller-Tydings Act,
then the FTC's argument that the law of the wholesaler's state governed the
legality of Corning's customer restriction clause was correct. 15
Before deciding whether the word "resale" had the same meaning under
both Acts, the court considered "resale" to have two functions-one to
describe the type of agreement and the other to identify the state whose law
determines the agreement's validity. 16 In order to permit restrictions imposed
on both the first and second vendees, the court gave "resale" this double
meaning when applied to the price-fixing clause and the subsequent vendee
clause in the McGuire Act.' 7 Although it can be argued that "resale" should
also be given a double meaning (applying to both vendees' sales) in the "when
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). "It was the very purpose of the Miller-Tydings Act to allow a
manufacturer whose products meet the statutory requirements to fix the prices at which those
products would be resold to the public ...
"The language of the [McGuire Act ] which exempts from illegality contracts or agreements
'requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or agreements prescribing minimum .. .prices' was
merely a clarification of existing law, rather than a change." (footnote omitted) Sunbeam Corp. v.
Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1953). See also note 1 supra.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(2) (1970). In the "when lawful" clause, the disjunctive ("in which such
resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale") Is
redundant. If Miller-Tydings' meaning of resale determines the McGuire Act's meaning (and
Miller-Tydings only referred to the resale of the wholesaler), then the state in which the resale Is
made must be the state to which the commodity is transported for such resale. Even if the state in
which the wholesaler's resale is made is interpreted to be the retailer's state (see notes 29 & 31
infra and accompanying text), the state to which the commodity is transported for such resale will
be the same state.
14. 509 F.2d at 297-98.
15. Id. at 298.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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lawful" clause, the Seventh Circuit said such a reading would make "the
validity of a single agreement . . . depend upon the law of at least two
different states" since "[tihe price-fixing clause would be tested by the law
of the state where the wholesaler is located but the customer restriction clause
would be tested by the law of the state or states where the wholesaler's
customers are located." 18 Corning had argued that "such resale" in the "when
lawful" clause meant the first resale the first time the words were used and the
second resale the second time the words were used. 19 The Seventh Circuit
found this argument irrelevant, stating that the McGuire Act's "when lawful"
clause was identical to the Miller-Tydings Act's "when lawful" clause, which
referred only to the wholesaler's resale. 20 Moreover, there was no textual or
historical support in the congressional record for Corning's argument. 2' The
court concluded that:
It is only logical that the law of the same state should control the legality of the entire
fair trade agreement and, further, that the state be the one in which the vendee-in
22
this case the wholesaler-is to make the resales described in the contract.
The Seventh Circuit felt that its interpretation of the word "resale" not only
carried out the congressional purpose in passing both Acts to permit the states
to regulate their internal policies, but also respected the public policies of the
individual states. 23 Thus, in free trade states, Corning's contract is illegal
even if the wholesaler resold to a signing retailer in a signer-only state. In
signer-only states, Corning may contract with wholesalers and restrict their
retailer customers to those who sign (but Corning cannot restrain the free
trade wholesaler from selling to the non-signing retailer); in non-signer states,
Corning may continue its resale policy, and non-signing retailers, if they
purchased from free trade wholesalers without first contracting with Corning,
24
must continue to sell at fair trade prices within their own states.
Under the order issued by the FTC, which the court affirmed, Corning
must mail a copy of the order to all retailers in the fourteen non-signer states,
advise the signers in signer-only states that they can violate their contracts
with Coming because wholesalers in free trade states will no longer be bound
to sell only to retailers who sign with Corning, and stop using pre-priced
containers for its products and advertising its fixed prices in free trade areas
25
for three years.
18. Id. at 299 n.17.
19. Id. at 298-99 n.16.
20. Id. at 299 n.16. See generally 54 Mich. L. Rev. 431, 433 (1956).
21. 509 F.2d at 299 n.16. Of course, the court could find no textual support for Coming's
thesis because it had ascertained that the intent of the McGuire Act's "when lawful" clause was
the same as the Miller-Tydings' "when lawful" clause because they were identical. That there is
no historical support for Coming's thesis is evident, since the case is sui generis.
22. Id. at 299-300.
23. Id. at 300.
24. Id. at 301-02. This approach confirmed the FTC's interpretation. Coming Glass Works, 3
Trade Reg. Rep.
20,352, at 20,221, 20,230-31 (F.T.C. 1973).
25. 509 F.2d at 303. As a result of the Seventh Circuit's decision, Coming Glass Works has
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At the threshold, the Seventh Circuit never considered the question of how
Corning's contract could be illegal when it stipulated that it
shall apply solely to sales, offers or advertisements only when and where agreements of
the character of those therein contained shall be lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions under any statute, law or public policy . . .in the state in which such
resale is to be made .... 26

As one court has stated, in referring to whether or not a contract between a
car manufacturer and a dealer violated the antitrust laws: "It only obligates the
dealer if it is lawful for him to be obligated. If it is unlawful, no obligation'2 7is
assumed. If no obligation is assumed, no violation of law is contracted for."
Assuming, arguendo, that there is a way of interpreting a contract to be
illegal when it stipulates that it shall not be applicable where illegal, the court
has also misinterpreted the congressional intent underlying the McGuire Act.
That intent was to respect the states' internal policies, 28 which the Seventh
Circuit did not do in failing to consider what a state's policy is concerning
when a sale (or resale) occurs. If the state's policy is that a sale occurs at the
point when the goods are in another state, the sale cannot affect the internal
policy of the state whose policy determined that it occurred elsewhere. In
addition, when a free trade wholesaler sells to out-of-state retailers, the
internal policy of his state is unaffected by the price at which he sells and the
persons with whom he deals. Since the same wholesaler is unrestricted as to
price and customer within the free trade state, that state's internal freedom is
unimpinged by restricting his out-of-state sales. By omitting these two considerations in its opinion, the court has not really followed the congressional
purpose of adhering to states' internal policies.
announced it is ending its fair trade price maintenance contracts. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1975, at
46, col. 6.
26. 509 F.2d at 295 n.3. If Coming had attempted to enforce its contract where it was illegal,
the FTC should have sought an injunction against Corning's action, not proceeded against the
contract itself. Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W.2d 230 (1943) (violation of Texas
antitrust law by plaintiff's course of conduct, not by terms of contract).
27. Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 13, 175 S.W.2d 230, 235 (1943); cf. Adams-Mitchell
Co. v. Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1951) ("The parties to a contract are
presumed to contract in compliance with existing laws.") Consider the following comments
reflecting the divergent views on the subject: "(Plarties to a multi-state contract can agree as to
which state's law will govern, provided the state selected has a direct and substantial relation to
the transaction." General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681, 687 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957); "Plaintiffs contracts, in express terms, are limited to sales within
states where agreements prescribing minimum resale prices are lawful. Therefore, no illegality
exists as to the provisions of plaintiffs contracts wherein the party contracting with plaintiff,
whether wholesaler or retailer, binds himself to resell Sunbeam products at minimum prices
prescribed by plaintiff." Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31, 38 (N.D. Cal.
1953); "[An agreement executed in a nonfair-trade state is nonetheless valid if the resale Is to
occur in a fair-trade state." Callmann § 25.1, at 898; "It is conceivable that a fair trade contract
may be lawful in a state which has no fair trade act if such a contract is not unlawful under any
statute or the public policy of the state." 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
6114, at 9135 (1971).
28. See 98 Cong. Rec. 4926 (1952); note 32 infra.
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Although the Seventh Circuit was correct in interpreting the word "resale"
to mean the resale of the first vendee, it did not fully consider the implications
of this holding: the first vendee's state law might determine that the resale
occurred in the retailer's state.2 9 Thus, either by agreement between the
29. The first vendee's state law applies, not as to whether the contract is legal, but as to the
definition of resale. If the state determines that resale occurs within that state, and the state is
free trade, a resale price maintenance contract would be illegal. If, however, the state determines
that the resale occurs outside the state, and the receiving state is fair trade, the resale price
maintenance contract would be legal. But the court never asked what the internal policy of the
individual state was in regard to the definition of resale.
The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by the fourteen free trade states and the
District of Columbia. Uniform Commercial Code, Table 1, at xxv (1972). Section 2-106{1) of the
Code defines a sale (presumably, a resale would be subsumed under this definition) as consisting
of "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." See General Elec. Co. v. Masters
Mail Order Co., 145 F. Supp. 57, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957) ("Though defendant here is located in a non-fair trade jurisdiction,
its contacts with New -York permeate its every operation and, viewed as a whole, compel the
conclusion that defendant has made New York 'resales' within McGuire."); accord, U.S. Pioneer
Electronics Corp. v. District Sound, Inc., (App. Div., Mar. 11. 1975), in 173 N.Y.L.J., Mar.
21, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
Section 2-401 of the Code deals with the passing of title and states, in effect, that title passes
either in accordance with the explicit intent of the parties or at the time and place where the seller
delivers the goods if required to deliver to destination. In the General Electric case, supra, the
Second Circuit reversed because it found the intention of the parties to be that title passed in the
non-fair trade jurisdiction. General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681, 685 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957). "The intent of the parties governs the passage of title
between them, although statutes and case law provide guides for ascertaining such intent. Here
the predominant interest of both the seller and buyers was to take advantage of the absence of
resale price maintenance legislation in the District of Columbia." Id. The court felt that even
where the customer did not pay for the goods until their arrival, the intent of the parties was for
title to pass in Washington, D.C. Id. In answering Judge Waterman's criticism of the use of title
to determine resale, see id. at 688 (Waterman, J., concurring), and his preference for using the
retailer's situs to determine place of resale, Judge Clark stated: "The title approach . . . adds
precision to the statutory term by drawing upon precedents from the law of sales ....
"[T]he parties ... are limited in their choice of law as to the passage of title, and cannot elect
to be governed by the law of some jurisdiction with which they have no connection." Id. at
686-87 (citations omitted). He concluded by stating: "[Ilt seems most likely that uniformity
will come about as the state courts read the title concept into their statutes to make them agree
with the federal act from which their validity is derived." Id. at 687; cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Masters, Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 185, 153 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. CL 1956), in which the court fined defendant $250 for contempt of a temporary restraining order by offering in New York products its
sister corporation in Washington, D.C. would sell at below fair trade prices to New York
consumers. The court felt that consideration of the place of sale and the relationship of defendant
to its sister corporation was unnecessary in finding a violation since defendant was offering for
sale products below the fair trade prices. Contra, Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail
Order Co., 140 F. Supp. 165, 171 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1957), noted in 57
Colum. L. Rev. 292 (1957). "The decision in the instant case represents a bitter pill to advocates
of fair trade since it would allow mail-order vendors in non-fair trade states to advertise and
compete at lower prices than retailers in fair trade states as long as technical title to the goods
passes to consumers in the non-fair trade jurisdiction." Id. at 295. The General Electric case
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parties (manufacturer-wholesaler, wholesaler-retailer, manufacturer-retailer)
that title is to pass in the retailer's state, or that the seller's performance is
completed by delivery to the buyer's destination, the law of a free trade state
could determine that the sale occurred in the fair trade state. 30 Then, because
the law of the first vendee's (the wholesaler's) state determined that the resale
occurred in the retailer's state,
the law of the retailer's state would govern the
31
validity of the agreement.
The McGuire Act was intended to be merely an enabling statute-to permit
those states which wished to have fair trade laws to utilize resale price
maintenance contracts in interstate sales without violating the antitrust
laws. 32 The principal aims of the McGuire Act were to protect the retailer
from the large discount houses which could undersell him and drive him out
undermines the Eastman Kodak case according to the court in Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, Inc.,
157 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also U.S. Pioneer Electronics Corp. v. District
Sound, Inc., supra (dismissed fair trade plaintiff's suit against free trade defendant who had
signed fair trade agreement with plaintiff; resale occurred where title passed-in the free trade
state).
30. See note 29 supra. Regarding the law governing resale, Corning's statement in its contract
that New York law governs the agreement is only effective as to its sale to the wholesaler. 509
F.2d at 295 n.3.
31. "Interests in a chattel are not affected by the mere removal of the chattel to another state.
Such interests, however, may be affected by dealings with the chattel in the other state." 2
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 247 (1971). These dealings may encompass the seller's
delivery to a retailer's destination so as to pass title in the retailer's state, which is the place of
subsequent resale.
32. "That it is the purpose of this Act [amending this section I to protect the rights of States
under the United States Constitution to regulate their internal affairs and more particularly to
enact statutes and laws, and to adopt policies, which authorize contracts and agreements
prescribing minimum or stipulated prices for the resale of commodities and to extend the
minimum or stipulated prices prescribed by such contracts and agreements to persons who are
not parties thereto. It is the further purpose of this Act to permit such statutes, laws, and public
policies to apply to commodities, contracts, agreements, and activities in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce." Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, § 1, 66 Stat. 631-32. In debating the bill,
Representative McGuire stated: "The McGuire bill is merely permissive. It says to the States, in
effect, that the Congress recognizes the rights of the States to enact and make effective policies
respecting unfair competition. That is all the McGuire bill does and that is all it is intended to
do." 98 Cong. Rec. 4901 (1952); Representative Dolliver stated: "This recognizes the rights of the
States to control their businesses and the business enterprises in their States as they see fit. It is
merely permissive." Id. That the McGuire Act is "just an enabling act" merely permitting the fair
trade states to conduct interstate commerce utilizing resale price maintenance was noted by
Representative Patman. Id. at 4939. That the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act was not
accompanied by the thoughtful debate concerning the McGuire Act is evident in Senator Morse's
remark: "It is interesting to recall that the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 was rushed through as a
rider to a District of Columbia appropriation bill. President Roosevelt denounced the MillerTydings Act at the time although he felt he had to sign the appropriation bill." Id. at 8833. Since
it restricts a free economy, according to the Court, the McGuire Act must be strictly construed.
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956). See also Callmann § 22.3, at
797.
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of business, 33 and to maintain the public's respect for certain tradenames and
the manufacturer's good will. 34 While there was no federal law per se
permitting resale price maintenance contracts, 35 Congress permitted (a) nonsigners to be bound to obey resale prices of which they are aware in states
permitting non-signer fair trade agreements; 36 and (b) manufacturers to bind
wholesalers and their vendees in other states when both states permitted fair
trade contracts. 37 Although by passing the bill Congress was reacting to a
Supreme Court decision, 38 it did not consider the problem raised in Comwing
33. 98 Cong. Rec. 4896 (1952) (remarks of Representative Madden), id. at 4898 (remarks of
Representative Reed). See also Department of Justice Release, Summary of the Attached
Testimony of Thomas E. Kauper on Repeal of the Federal Enabling Legislation for Fair Trade
Laws 2 (Feb. 18, 1975); Callmann § 22.4, at 801-02.
34. See General Elec. Co. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 91-92, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440,
445-46 (Sup. CL), vacated, 278 App. Div. 939, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Ist Dep't) (per curiam),
appeal dismissed, 278 App. Div. 940, 105 N.Y.S,2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1951) (per curianm). The
statute is evidently in the spirit of Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183, 194-95 (1936) (state fair trade laws held constitutional) because it permits states to
utilize fair trade in interstate transactions.
35. "[Tlhe Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission clearly indicates that, in his
judgment, the McGuire bill does not direct, authorize, or empower the Commission to proceed
against those who violate State fair-trade laws where interstate commerce is involved. The
McGuire bill adds no new powers to the Federal Trade Commission Act." 98 Cong. Rec. 4900
(1952) (remarks of Representative McGuire). Discussing a section of the McGuire bill, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(4), Senator Schoeppel said: "This provision does not establish a Federal fair-trade policy."
98 Cong. Rec. 8869 (1952).
36. In a non-signer state, even if plaintiffs wholly-owned subsidiary sold goods to defendant
retailer at below the listed wholesale price, the defendant still had to sell at the fixed retail price.
General Elec. Co. v. Veeds Television & Appliances Co., 129 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1954). In
fact, New York, a non-signer fair trade state, will enforce a fair trade contract executed in
Indiana, a signer-only state, against a non-signing seller. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Walk-Up Inc.,
28 IMfisc. 2d 965, 215 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup. CL 1961). But see note 42 infra.
37. "[I]f New York and Pennsylvania have similar laws concerning fair trade, this bill
permits business to extend across the State line and permits the contracts made in compliance
with the laws of those two States to be enforced in interstate commerce. That is all it does." 98
Cong. Rec. 4906 (1952) (remarks of Representative Rogers). Accord, Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co.
v. Masters Mail Order Co., 140 F. Supp. 165, 176 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 684 (4th Cir
1957); ("[Tlhere was at least a very strong doubt that the McGuire Act applied to transactions
.'). Compare Note, The McGuire Act and
between fair-trade and free-trade jurisdictions ...
Discount House Sales Into Fair-Trade States, 43 Geo. L.J. 258, 264 (1955) (-It is abundantly
clear that the McGuire Act was not intended to cover an interstate transaction between a
free-trade and a fair-trade state.") with Note, The McGuire Act and the Mail Order VendorCommerce Clause Limitations on Anti-Fair Trade State Policies, 30 Ind. L.J. 502, 504-05 (1955)
("[Ilt does not seem that enforcement was intended to be limited to actions against violators
located in fair trade states."). For the apparent reason behind Congress' failure to plan for the
problem at issue in the Coming case, see note 39 infra and accompanying text.
38. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (holding that the
Miller-Tydings Act did not extend to non-signers. Congress was also reacting to Sunbeam Corp.
v. Wenling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), vacated in light of Schwegmann Bros., supra, 341 U.S.
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of the consequences
of a three-state transaction, in which the middle state was
39
free trade.
Until Congress repeals the McGuire Act, the policies of fair trade states, as
well as free trade states, should be respected in interstate transactions. The
above analysis of the possibility of a free trade state's determining that a
resale occurred in a fair trade state does not violate the internal policy of a
free trade state because the transaction would not affect its retailers and
consumers. Retailers in a free trade state will still be able to choose from
among competing wholesalers because the latter will not be bound to sell at
fixed prices within their state. The public interest in competitive prices will
also be served because the retailers in a free trade state will not be bound to
enter into resale price maintenance contracts with the manufacturer in a fair
trade state before purchasing from wholesalers in their free trade state. The
internal policy of a free trade state will therefore be safeguarded because
resale price maintenance contracts will still be illegal within the state.
The effect of the Seventh Circuit's holding is to circumvent the internal
944 (1951) (Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act held inapplicable to Pennsylvania retailer who sold or
advertised to out-of-state customers). For discussions of Schwegmann, see Rahl, Resale Price
Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust Laws: Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 46 Il1. L. Rev. 349 (1951), and Comment, The Schwegmann Case and Fair
Trade: An Obituary?, 61 Yale L.J. 381 (1952). See also 98 Cong. Rec. 4954 (House debate on
Cole amendment, discussed in note 39 infra); id. at 8869 (remarks of Senator Schoeppel).
39. Probably, this problem was not discussed (or regarded as important) because, at the time,

forty-five of the forty-eight states had fair trade legislation. The probability was remote that a
manufacturer would have the problem that occasioned the suit under discussion. It is evident
from debates concerning the Keogh bill, H.R. 6925, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), and the Cole
amendment, 98 Cong. Rec. 4952 (floor amendment), that Congress did not envision any problem
with free trade states. In discussing the proposed Keogh bill which, unlike the McGuire bill,
would have created a federal cause of action, Representative Dolliver said: "[The Keogh bill)
undertakes to deal with a problem with which perhaps the McGuire bill does not effectively deal.
That is the problem of interstate violations of fair-trade practices. Maybe the time will come
when this omission will have to be dealt with. But it may transpire that the three States not
having fair-trade laws may soon pass them. That will solve the problem." 98 Cong. Rec. 4938
(1952). Representative Patman had the same expectation. Id. The Cole amendment proposed that
a fair trade retailer could sue for unfair competition a non-fair trade mail order house that
shipped lower-priced goods into the fair trade state. Representative Patman characterized the
amendment as "an attempt to anticipate a great injury, a bad loophole." He further stated: "I do
not think it will ever occur. You [Mr. Cole] are anticipating exceptions, and you are trying to
make arrangements to take care of an exception that will probably never happen. It will probably
never occur. So let us pass the bill like it is, and then if we should discover something that Is
badly needed, if it is needed, later on we can take care of it." Id. at 4954. Representative
McGuire asked: "Is it not true that the State legislatures could correct the situation raised in the
Wentling decision?" Id. Representative Patman replied: "Yes. The other States will probably pass
a law, and there will be no necessity for this. You are anticipating a situation that will probably
never exist in the world, and in the administration of this law, if you discover evils, if you
discover loopholes, if you discover things that will happen that should not happen, we will come
back to the Congress with that, and if there is a bad loophole in connection with this legislation
or if there is a great injury, we can correct it later on." Id.
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Retailers in the

third (fair trade) state in the Corning situation can now buy from underselling
wholesalers in a free trade state. If the third state is a signer state, the

retailers in that state can sell those products below the prices of their fellow
retailers who bought from wholesalers within the state and are bound to sell

at fixed prices. The retailers in the third state will therefore hurt both their
fellow retailers (who bought from that state's wholesalers) by underselling

them, and hurt that state's wholesalers because, due to competitive pressure,
no retailer will buy from them when he can get the goods cheaper from the

free trade wholesalers. If the third state is a non-signer state, the retailers
could not undersell their competitors 4 ' but the wholesalers in the third state

would still suffer from competition by wholesalers in free trade states. By
permitting the wholesaler in the free trade state to ignore the policy of the

third state (while his actions have no effect on the internal policy of his free
trade state since he is not selling there), the Seventh Circuit has in effect
"legislated" the fair trade law of the third state out of existence. In doing so,
the court is following a popular movement against resale price maintenance
contracts. 4 2 But, until each of the fair trade states decides to repeal its law
40. To a great extent, free trade discount houses have had this effecL But, analogizing to
mail-order discount house cases, where the resale was held to occur in the free trade jurisdiction
(note 29 supra), is inapt because the purchaser in the fair trade state was a consumer, not a
retailer intending to resell in the fair trade state. If the purchaser had been a retailer, he would be
bound to obey the set prices within his state. Thus, in Mead Johnson & Co. v. G-E-X, Inc., 37
Misc. 2d 491, 235 N.Y.S.2d 951 ( Sup. CL 1963), plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction
because defendant's licensee in New York sold below the minimum resale price. The fact that the
licensee was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Maryland corporation doing business in the
free-trade jurisdiction of Washington, D.C. from whom the licensee bought plaintiff's products
was irrelevant. It still resold in New York. Accord, Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order
Co., 128 F. Supp. 457, 462 (D. Md. 1955) (Maryland's Fair Trade Law related only to offering
for sale, advertising or selling goods which were to be resold after entering the state). See also 54
Mich. L. Rev. 431 (1956).
What neither case discusses is the situation in Coming where the resale price maintenance
contract is entered into in a different state from the retailer's and deals not only with the retailer's
sale, but also the wholesaler's sale (which, according to the analysis suggested in the text, may
still occur in the retailer's state).
41. The non-signing retailers would still have to sell at the fixed price as long as one retailer
had signed a resale price maintenance contract and the other retailers were given notice.
Cailmann § 24.3(b), at 858-63.
42. There are proposals for repeal of the McGuire Act in Congress and of various state fair
trade laws in state legislatures. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1975, at 35, col. 1; id., Apr. 3, 1975, at 41,
col. 1; id., Feb. 19, 1975, at 57, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1975, at 10, col. 1; 173 N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 1; 33 Cong. Q. 385-86 (Feb. 22, 1975). Senator Edward W. Brooke and
others announced that they could not find anyone willing to testify publicly against repeal of the
McGuire Act. 33 Cong. Q. 385 (Feb. 22, 1975). The proposal is in both the Senate (S. 408) (id.)
and in the House (H.Rt 2390) (173 N.Y.L.J., Mfar. 5, 1975, at 4, col. 2). The estimated cost
to the consumer per year of fair trade laws is $2.1 billion. 33 Cong. Q. 386 (Feb. 22, 1975).
Moreover, prices for goods sold in both fair and free trade states are about 20% higher in
the former states 173 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 1975, at 4, col. 2. Thomas Kauper, Assistant
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permitting intrastate resale price maintenance or until Congress repeals the
McGuire Act permitting interstate resale price maintenance, the courts should
respect the law of the first vendee's state in determining the place of resale. If
the resale, through passage of title by intent of the parties or by delivery to
destination, occurs in a state other than the first vendee's, that is, in a fair
trade state, a contract such as Corning's should not be declared illegal as an
act of unfair competition, because the policy of the place of resale is to
recognize such contracts.
Laura D. Millman

Antitrust-Robinson-Patman Act-"In Commerce" Jurisdiction Requirement Not Satisfied by Sales of Asphalt Within One State for Use
in Interstate Highways.-Plaintiffs, manufacturers and distributors of asphaltic concrete, sought an injunction and treble damages against three major
oil companies and two subsidiary companies, charging violations of various
antitrust laws' in the sale and marketing of liquid asphalt and asphaltic
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, detailed other deleterious effects of fair trade. Department
of Justice Release, Testimony of Thomas E. Kauper on Repeal of the Federal Enabling
Legislation for Fair Trade Laws 9-14 (Feb. 18, 1975). These other effects are: prevention of
competition at the manufacturer level which in effect creates horizontal price-fixing by the
adoption of identical vertical agreements; informal adoption of price lists by retailers in free trade
states; lack of response to differing costs in particular markets; increases in advertising which
force retail prices upward; supporting the inefficient wholesaler and retailer; and blocking the
entry of new competitors.
"In recent years resale price maintenance has lost favor ....
Therefore, the alternative of
maintaining resale prices by refusing to deal with price-cutters has become increasingly important." Callmann § 22.2, at 781. If the McGuire Act is repealed, manufacturers will not be able to
enforce their resale prices in interstate transactions (or in intrastate transactions if their state is
free trade) because of the illegality of price fixing. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). They will be forced to rely on the doctrine of refusing to deal, which
Callmann said "is either dead or dying." Callmann § 22.2, at 783. Early cases modifying or
enunciating the doctrine are: FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1922)
(refusing to deal not a violation of Sherman Act); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252
U.S. 85, 99 (1920) (manufacturer has right to specify prices and refuse to deal with those who fall
to maintain them); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (manufacturers are
free to refuse to sell provided there is no intent to engage in monopolistic practices); cf. Frey &
Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1921) (wholesaler's refusal to sell to
retailers pursuant to plan or course of conduct might be violation of Sherman Act). See also
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 851-57
(1955). New York repealed its fair trade law. See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1975, at 30, col. 3.
As it struck down the non-signer provision of the Kentucky Fair Trade Act as unconstitutional
under the constitution of Kentucky, a Kentucky court stated: "Fixing prices constitutes a restraint
on trade, never a favorite of the law. Free and unrestricted competition is as American as the
Boston Tea Party, as essential to our way of life as are our rights to individual liberty." General
Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Cooperative, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. T 68,341, at 71,519-20 (Ky.
Cir. Ct.), aff'd, 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958).
1. The complaint in the district court alleged unlawful price fixing and monopolization,
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concrete. The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
all claims involving asphaltic concrete on the theory that there was a failure
to comply with the Robinson-Patman 2 and Clayton Act 3 jurisdiction requirements insofar as the product did not move across state lines in interstate
commerce, and that Sherman Act 4 jurisdiction also was not satisfied because
the local activities of the defendants with regard to asphaltic concrete did not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 5 On interlocutory appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that jurisdiction did exist because "the
production of asphalt for use in interstate highways rendered the [defendant]
producers 'instrumentalities' of interstate commerce ...."6 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that as a matter of law the nexus between the interstate highway
system and interstate commerce made sales of asphaltic concrete the equivalent of sales made in interstate commerce. 7 The Supreme Court, limiting its
grant of certiorari to the question of jurisdiction under the Robinson-Patman
and Clayton Acts, 8 reversed, holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the "in
commerce" requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act because defendants'
allegedly discriminatory sales within California, though to interstate highway
contractors, did not qualify as sales in interstate commerce. 9 The Court also
ordered dismissal of the Clayton Act claims because the complaint failed to
Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970); price discrimination in sales to plaintiffs'
customers and competitors, Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970); exclusive
dealing agreements with customers of the defendants, Clayton Antitrust Act § 3, Is U.S.C. § 14
(1970); and an anticompetitive stock acquisition, Clayton Antitrust Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970).
2. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
3. Clayton Antitrust Act §§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1970).
4. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
5. The Sherman Act applies to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce as well
as those that cross state lines. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1q67) (per curiam); see Uniform
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 400 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1968). Further proceedings were
necessary for claims involving liquid asphalt because that product, unlike plaintiffs' asphaltic
concrete, was sold across state lines. Copp Pavipg Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,013 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
6. Copp Paving Co. v. Gulf Oil Co., 487 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd. 95 S. Ct. 392
(1974).
7. Id.

8. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 415 U.S. 988 (1974). The Robinson-Patman Act
applies only to price discrimination committed by any person "engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly.., where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce .... Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970).
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce [tomake tie-in sales or enter exclusive-dealing
arrangements, the effects of which] . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) reads- "No
corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . .[stock or assets of any other] corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly-"
9. 95 S. CL at 400.
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establish that any local sales of asphaltic concrete could have an adverse
effect on interstate commerce. 10 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S. Ct.
392 (1974).
With the enactment in 1936 of the Robinson-Patman amendments to the
Clayton Antitrust Act," Congress prohibited from interstate commerce certain price discrimination practices by which competition is injured when a
seller offers to sell like commodities at different prices to two or more
buyers.1 2 The original Clayton Act of 191413 sought to regulate price discrimination committed by the large trusts of that era. The Robinson-Patman
amendments were considered necessary to strengthen the Clayton Act principally because in its former version an unconditional exemption existed for
quantity discounts between seller and buyer-a provision that made the FTC
powerless in dealing with abuses by national chains that threatened the
existence of small retail stores. 14
10. Id. at 402. Mr. Justice Marshall expressed no opinion on the Clayton Act issue. Id. at 403
(Marshall, J., concurring). The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, in which Mr. Justice
Brennan joined, id. at 406 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting), is discussed at note 40 infra and
accompanying text. The focus of this Case Note is on the Court's Robinson-Patman Act holding.
11. Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1970).
12. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1969); see FTC v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1960); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 36-37, 124-40 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rowe]. Section 2(a) cases are cited and classified by
type of price discrimination in A. Sawyer, Business Aspects of Pricing Under the RobinsonPatman Act 89-112 (1963).
From an economic point of view, price discrimination is not necessarily undesirable and may
indeed promote competition among multi-product firms. See Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the
Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 Yale L.J. 70 (1967). "[The statute itself spells out the
conditions which make a price difference illegal or legal ...." FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
supra, at 550; see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). A basic objection to the Robinson-Patman Act has
been that it seeks price uniformity, in conflict with other antitrust legislation that sees uniform
pricing as generally undesirable. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953).
Furthermore, commentators have criticized the economic judgment of the statute. E.g., Bowman, supra, at 76 ("[H]avoc [has been] wrought on the competitive process . . . "); Dam, The
Economics and Law of Price Discrimination: Herein of Three Regulatory Schemes, 31 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 57 (1963) ("[T]he FTC [has not] shown any notable degree of understanding of the
phenomenon of economic discrimination.'). See generally Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission's Administration of the Anti-Price Discrimination Law-A Paradox of Antitrust Policy, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 415 (1964).
For the view that Robinson-Patman primary-line injury should be evaluated by a Sherman Act
"predatory pricing" standard, see Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 726-28 (1975). For a general
discussion of predatory pricing, see Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study,
4 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 105 (Summer 1971); Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the
Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 506, 515-23 (1974).
13.

Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).

14. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620, 625 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 557 (1939) (FTC without power to order discontinuance of price differentials reasonably
based on quantity); see Rowe 6-7.
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The Robinson-Patman amendments include jurisdictional language not on
its face coextensive with that of the earlier Clayton Act, in that section 2(a)
price discrimination is barred only if "either or any of the purchases involved
in such discrimination are in commerce." s That Congress would place this
special limitation on the scope of a statute whose overall purpose was to
augment FTC power has led some to read this language of limitation as
intended only to bar attack on the constitutionality of the Act on grounds that
Congress had exceeded its power under the commerce clause.' 6 In practice,
however, the courts have preferred a literal interpretation of the phrase that
makes a simple inquiry into the plaintiffs substantive allegations determinative on the issue of jurisdiction. Just as section 2(a) price discrimination
requires a showing of two sales of like goods at different prices,' 7 in virtually
all cases under the statute, jurisdiction has been found to exist only if
plaintiffs claim also satisfied the "state-line" test-that one of the sales in
question allegedly was transacted across a state line. '8 The narrow jurisdictional reading is supported in the Act's legislative history by the fact that the
Conference Cofnmittee deleted from the Patman bill's original text an additional provision prohibiting price discrimination by any person " 'whether in
commerce or not.' "19
Delivering the opinion of the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 20

15.

Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
16. The Robinson-Patman amendments were enacted just after the Supreme Court, in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). declared unconstitutional
parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act that attempted to prohibit certain unfair practices
"in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." National Industrial Recovery
Act, ch. 90, § 3(f), 48 Stat. 197 (1933); see Note, The Commerce Requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1250-51 (1971); 86 Harv. L. Rev. 765, 769-72
(1973). Thus, an argument for broad Robinson-Patman jurisdiction is that Congress theorized
that a less restrictive commerce requirement would jeopardize the constitutionality of the Act.
17. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947).
18. Rowe 79, cited in Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4. 9 (5th Cir),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). For example, in Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972), gasoline dealers who bought from Texaco brought suit
claiming that another of Texaco's customers was charged lower rates and thereby was enabled to
undercut the dealers' resale prices. Because none of Texaco's sales crossed a state line, the
requisite jurisdiction did not exist. Id. at 178. Similarly, in Food Basket, Inc. v Albertson's,
Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967), several Utah branches of an interstate supermarket chain
were able to discriminate in pricing and eliminate a local competitor without violating the ActThe Utah stores purchased their merchandise from a local wholesaler, so that no interstate -in
commerce" transaction existed. Id. at 787-88. For recent examples of the strict Robinson-Patman
§ 2(a) jurisdictional requirement, see, e.g., Scranton Constr. Co. v. Litton Indus. Leasing Corp.,
494 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. CL 774 (1975); Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v.
General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Kane
v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Kintner &
Mayne, Interstate Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 58
Geo. L.J. 1117, 1119-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kintner & Mayne; note 28 infra.
19. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S.Ct. 392, 401 (1974), quoting H.R_ 8442, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (emphasis deleted); see Rowe 78.
20. 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974).
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Mr. Justice Powell endorsed the state-line test of "in commerce" jurisdiction
developed for the Robinson-Patman Act by the lower federal courts. 21 The
Court cited the Conference Committee's omission of the broader jurisdictional
provision in support of its restrictive holding, although the Court did concede
the possibility that Congress may have limited itself to "in commerce"
that to do otherwise would have
language solely by virtue of a conviction
22
exceeded its constitutional power.
The Gulf Oil Court reasoned that given the clear language of section 2(a)
and the silence of Congress in the face of consistently narrow construction by
the lower courts, considerations of the arguably ambiguous legislative history
did not warrant an interpretation of Robinson-Patman jurisdiction that would
enable federal
law to reach local activities hitherto left to state and local
23
regulation.

Because the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act have been held to
apply only to price discrimination transactions that cross a state line, a
corporation that does business in several states can insulate itself readily from
the sanctions of the Act. 24 Had the Court in Gulf Oil wished to interpret the
21.
22.

Id. at 400-01.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.

23. 95 S. Ct. at 401. In its Supreme Court brief, defendants Union Oil Co. of California and
Industrial Asphalt, Inc. argued that California law does not forbid the acts allegedly committed
by them "not because of oversight or inaction but because California has deliberately rejected tile
social or economic policy on which Robinson-Patman rests." Brief for Petitioners at 26, Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974). The California Unfair Practices Act, Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code §§ 17000-17101 (West. 1964), contains provisions barring "locality discriminations,"
id. §§ 17031, 17040, but not discrimination in sales to different buyers in the same location.
Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 413 P.2d 139, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1966).
See generally McCarthy, Whatever Happened to the Small Businessman?-The California
Unfair Practices Act, 2 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 165 (1968).
24. Even though a seller's goods originate out of state, he can escape the coverage of § 2(a) if
they are held to have "come to rest" within the local area before reshipment to retailers. Food
Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 788 (10th Cir. 1967); see Belliston v. Texaco,
Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 179-80 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co.,
50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943). Jurisdiction under other sections of the Act is not so readily
avoided. See, e.g., Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1964) (section 2(d)). See generally Kintner & Mayne.
Raw materials shipped into a state that are substantially altered in the manufacturing process
similarly are no longer counted as interstate elements of an otherwise local operation. Thus, for
example, crude oil shipped across state lines to refineries for the production and sales of gasoline
within one state do not alter the local nature of the operation for Robinson-Patman purposes.
Bacon v. Texaco, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,358 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3528 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1975).
Under the state-line test, a manufacturer can virtually insure against Robinson-Patman liability
by deploying franchised distributors or bona fide independent subsidiaries within individual
states. "[A]ny price differentials made by an autonomous local [entity] solely as between
customers within the state would arise from a sale on the part of the intrastate distributor or
subsidiary rather than of the supplier, [and thus would be] beyond the commerce criteria of the
Act." Rowe 81. For example, in Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964), a dairy
manufacturer and processor, through its district chairmen, delegated " 'broad managerial respon-
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Act more liberally, it could have looked to dictum in its earlier RobinsonPatman decision, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. 5 In Moore a New Mexico
baker was driven out of business by the price discrimination practices of
Mead's, one of several corporations that employed interlocking ownership and
management to maintain plants in two states. The corporations set relatively
high prices in two states while cutting prices in the plaintiff's locality. Since
Mead's New Mexico plant sold bread in Texas, a transaction did occur across
a state line for purposes of a state-line test of jurisdiction. However, in
holding the defendant liable, the Court stated:
[T]he treasury used to finance the warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as local,
sources ....If this method of competition were approved .... [t]he profits made in
interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns. No
instrumentality of interstate commerce would be used . . . . [b]ut the opportunities
afforded by interstate commerce would be employed to injure local trade. Congress, as
guardian of the Commerce Clause, certainly has power to say that those advantages shall not attach to the privilege of doing an interstate business. 261
Thus, the Moore dictum suggested that the Court construed section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act to embody a congressional intent to outlaw wholly
local acts of price discrimination if financed by the treasury of a corporation
that operates in more than one state. 27 However, the circuit courts, 2 8 and
now the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,2 9 have
preferred to reject this interpretation of the Moore dictum, applying instead
30
the stricter state-line test.
In Guy' Oil, the facts were ideally suited to a test of whether section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act applies to local price discrimination activities of
wealthy interstate corporations. Because the hot asphaltic concrete in question in Gulf Oil was of low value and great weight, it could be sold profitably
only within 35 miles of its production site-in this case, entirely within
California. Yet, the plaintiffs claimed that purchases of the material inside
the state were "incommerce" in the sense that the asphalt was used in the
sibility' " to local plant managers including responsibility for setting prices. Id. at 954. Allegedly
discriminatory sales at one such plant were held not "in commerce." Id. at 955; cf. Rosemound
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1972); Abramson
v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
25. 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954).
26. Id.
27. E.g., Note, The Price Discrimination Provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Forthcoming Clarification of the Jurisdictional Requirements?, 5 Loyola L.J. 562, 566 (1974). But cf.
95 S. CL at 401 n.17.
28. E.g., Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 209 (5th Cir.
1969); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967); Willard Dairy
Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934
(1963); Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
29. 95 S. Ct. at 401 n.17.
30. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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construction and maintenance of interstate highways. 3 1 This nexus with an
instrumentality of interstate commerce was found sufficient by the Court of
principally by analogy to decisions under the
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
32
Fair Labor Standards Act.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court emphasized that nothing in the
Federal Highway Act 33 or other legislation evinces a congressional intention
to apply the antitrust laws to local businesses that supply material for local
segments of the interstate highway system simply by reason of the formal
nexus to interstate 'commerce. 34 Thus, even under a reading of the
Robinson-Patman "in commerce" requirement that is broader than the stateline test ultimately endorsed by the Court, 35 the Ninth Circuit's approach
31. Respondents' Brief Opposing Certiorari at 18-19, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95
S. Ct. 392 (1974).
32. Copp Paving Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 487 F.2d 202, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 95 S. Ct.
392 (1974). The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970), governs wages paid by employers to employees who are "engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or ...employed in an enterprise engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1970). For
purposes of the FLSA's commerce test, the courts must look to the "practical considerations" of
whether the work is "so directly and vitally related to the functioning of an instrumentality or
facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it ...." Mitchell v. C.W.
Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955) (FLSA § 7: employees constructing a Louisiana section
of the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway "engaged in commerce"); see Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.,
318 U.S. 125 (1943). The Court has held that production of road surfacing materials within
Pennsylvania for use on Pennsylvania segments of interstate roads is within the "production of
goods for commerce" requirement, though no goods cross state lines. Alstate Constr. Co. v.
Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 15 (1953).
33. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
34. 95 S. Ct. at 399-400.
35. The Court refused to find the jurisdictional language of the Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(a),
"where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce," 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), satisfied by acts of price discrimination within one state even if they were
alleged to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In endorsing the rigid state-line test,
see note 18 supra and accompanying text, the Court referred to principles of statutory interpretation set forth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350-51 (1941). In
the absence of explicit language in the statute aimed at regulating purely local activity, the Bunte
Court refused to find in a statute "radiations beyond the obvious . . . language unless otherwise
the purpose of the Act would be defeated." Id. at 351.
In Gulf Oil, the absence of local sales having even a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce made it unnecessary for the Court to decide whether jurisdiction under Clayton Act
§§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1970), might exist where an interstate effect was present. Six members
of the Court, however, characterized the proposition that local activities that could be shown to
have a substantial effect on commerce would satisfy the jurisdiction of Clayton Act §§ 3 & 7 as a
"radical expansion" of the statute on "doubtful" authority. 95 S.Ct. at 402. But see United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 336 n.12 (1963) (Clayton Act § 7 applies to merger of
two Pennsylvania banks: "banking is . ..commerce.'). Mr. Justice Marshall concurred in Gulf
Oil for the purpose of expressing no opinion on the Clayton Act issue. 95 S.Ct. at 403 (Marshall,
J., concurring). The Court will have the opportunity to decide the question if it wishes in United
States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 1974-1 Trade Cas.
74,876 (C.D. Cal. 1973), prob.
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would be rejected because the talisman of a nominal connection with an
instrumentality of interstate commerce "would in no way be anchored in the
economic realities of interstate markets, the intensely practical concerns that
underlie the purposes of the antitrust laws." 36 The Court went on to explain
that, unlike many other regulatory statutes in which37Congress has defined
specific persons and activities that affect commerce,
[the jurisdictional inquiry under general prohibitions like these [Robinson-Patman and
Clayton Antitrust] Acts and [section] I of the Sherman Act . . . [turns] on the

circumstances presented in each case and [requires] a particularized judicial determination .... 38

One might accuse the Court of not fulfilling its own ideal of "particularized
judicial determination" in an opinion that endorses the hallowed practice in
the circuit courts of applying to Robinson-Patman questions the mechanical
state-line test. Though the state-line test is adequately grounded in the
language of the statute, the impression remains that the judiciary's attraction
to the state-line test might well be that the need for any particularized
determination of effect on commerce is dispensed with. Given the facile
state-line test, determination of whether Robinson-Patman jurisdiction exists
39
calls for a much simpler inquiry than that which the Sherman Act requires.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented primarily to
state that the Court unfairly reached the merits of the plaintiffs' case when
juris. noted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1975) (No. 73-1689). in which the district court
granted summary judgment, holding the FTC without Clayton Act jurisdiction over a merger
that tended to monopolize sale of janitorial services only within the state of California despite an
alleged effect of the merger on interstate commerce.
The Bunte Bros. test will be more difficult to apply to Clayton Act § 7 because the literal -in
commerce" language of that Act, see note 8 supra, is offset by Congress's intention to "arrest in
their incipiency restraints or monopolies in a relevant market which ...appear at the time of suit
likely to result from [a corporate stock] acquisition ....
" United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957). Section 3 similarly was designed to supplement the
Sherman Act. Standard Fashion Co. v. slagrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922)1
Arguably, to these ends Congress exercised its constitutional commerce clause power to the fullest
extent despite the choice of words. See Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors,. 20b F.2d
163, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). Ironically, one possible reason favoring a
narrower reading of section 7 is that the revision of 1950 did not strengthen the wording of the
commerce phrase though Bunte Bros. arguably had put Congress on notice that i[wlhen in order
to protect interstate commerce Congress has regulated activities which in isolation are merely
local, it has normally conveyed its purpose explicitly." 312 U.S. at 351.
36. 95 S.CL at 400, citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co.. 332 U.S. 218, 231 (1947). This
apparently is the foundation on which rests proper application of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). See, e.g., United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc.. 509 F.2d 1256 t7th Cir. 1975);
Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
950 (1973).
37. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tiL I, §§ 201-04, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-3 (1970); see
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); cf. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The
Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 271 (1973).
38. 95 S. CL at 399 n.12.
39. See notes 5 & 35 supra.
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defendants' motion challenged only the jurisdiction of the Court. 40 Although
the dissent contended that Copp might have had the opportunity at trial to
adduce proof of violations of antitrust law not apparent at this preliminary
stage, the majority made it clear that the summary judgment inquiry was
the interstate commerce question as a genuine
appropriate here to resolve
41
issue of material fact.

The Court's opinion in Gulf Oil states that the language and history of the
Robinson-Patman Act do not justify an extension of the sanctions of that Act
to local activities that have been left to state and local regulation. 42 The
state-line test is sound law, and it enables courts to judge readily whether
jurisdiction exists. It should be understood, however, that with this holding,
interstate corporations can continue to structure their dealings43 in such a
manner that Robinson-Patman liability is not a serious threat.
Richard J. Klein

Banking Law-New York State Savings Banks Are Without Authority
to Offer Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Accounts.-In May,
1974, a Buffalo savings bank advertised a new form of savings account with
withdrawal features similar to a checking account.I Unlike regular savings
accounts, NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts were not interest
bearing 2 and withdrawal was made by negotiable instrument, which, similar
40. The dissent found the Ninth Circuit's analogy to the Fair Labor Standards Act appropriate in its broad definition of Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act "engaged in commerce"
criteria, stating that any further inquiry into the degree of adverse effect on commerce would
prematurely reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims. 95 S. Ct. at 406 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). Given the dissent's position that Clayton Act §§ 3 & 7 are as broad as the Sherman
Act, establishing jurisdiction was for them an easier task. The dissent did not indicate whether it
agreed with the majority that the sanctions of the Robinson-Patman Act only apply where a
transaction crosses a state line, apparently because the jurisdictional issue was considered closely
linked to the merits. See id. at 408 n.10 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
41. 95 S. Ct. at 402 n.19. The only asphaltic concrete claims that currently survive in Gulf
Oil are the claims under the Sherman Act. Interestingly, the Court recites that the district court
ordered full discovery as to jurisdiction over Copp's asphaltic concrete claims. 95 S. Ct. at 396.
Copp's version is that defendants "telescoped ... discovery with a stipulation 'that more than a
de minimus quantity of the asphaltic concrete delivered by Copp and their competitors is
delivered for use on interstate highways.' " Respondents' Brief Opposing Certiorari at 6, Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S. Ct. 392 (1974).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 401.
43. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
1. New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 46 App. Div. 2d 269, 270, 361 N.Y.S.2d 949,
951 (4th Dep't 1974), motion for leave to appeal granted, No. 177, Ct. App., Feb. 21, 1975. By
August 1, 1974, twenty-four savings banks in New York State were offering this service. Brief
for Plaintiff at 4, New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 46 App. Div. 2d 269, 361 N.Y.S.2d
949 (4th Dep't 1974).
2. 46 App. Div. 2d at 270, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 951. Interest-bearing NOW accounts are
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to a check, could be delivered to third parties in payment of debts. NOW
accounts, nevertheless, were regarded as savings accounts since the bank3
could impose a sixty-day notice requirement before repayment of deposits.
After the bank's initial announcement of this service, the Superintendent of
Banks issued regulations governing the use of these accounts. 4 The Superintendent had determined that NOW accounts were authorized by section
238(6) of the Banking Law, 5 which permits, "[s]ubject to any regulations and
restrictions prescribed by the superintendent," accounts without passbooks,
provided there is other appropriate evidence of deposits. 6 Subsequently, the
New York State Bankers Association, along with certain commercial banks,
sought a declaration that savings banks were without authority to offer NOW
accounts and, therefore, that the Superintendent's regulations in connection
therewith were null and void. 7 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
prohibited by federal statute, except in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. 12 U.S.C. § 1832
(Supp. 111, 1974).
3. N.Y. Banking Law § 238(2) (McKinney 1971). While in one frame of reference the court
may have equated NOW accounts with checking accounts, see text accompanying note 8 infra, it
noted that "[ilt is significant that such 'NOW' accounts (like savings accounts) are subject to the
statutorily imposed 60-day notice of withdrawal .... 46 App. Div. 2d at 271, 361 N.Y.S. 2d at
951 (citation omitted). All parties involved in the litigation agreed that NOW accounts were
savings accounts. Brief for Plaintiffs at 6, and Brief for Defendants Erie County Say. Banks and
Buffalo Sav. Bank at 2, New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 46 App. Div. 2d 269, 361
N.Y.S.2d 949 (4th Dep't 1974); see 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.1 (1974) (regulation promulgated by
defendant Superintendent of Banks); note 38 infra and accompanying text. See also Comment,
The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account: "Checking Accounts" for Savings Banks?,
14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 471, 486 (1973). Under FDIC and Federal Reserve System
regulations NOW accounts are clearly savings accounts because of the notice requirement. See 12
C.F.R. § 329.1(e)(1)(ii) (1974) (FDIC); id. § 217.1(e)(2) (Federal Reserve System); Kaplan, Federal Legislative and Regulatory Treatment of NOW Accounts, 91 Banking L.J. 439, 444 (1974).
4. E.g., 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.3 (1974) (advertising); id. § 301.4 (disclosure); id. § 301.7
(reserve requirements).
5. Submission of Controversy, Exhibit E at 4, New York State Bankers Ass'n v.Albright, 46
App. Div. 2d 269, 361 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1974) (Statement of Superintendent of Banks) (hereinafter
cited by exhibit as Submission of Controversy].
6. N.Y. Banking Law § 238(6) (McKinney 1971).
7. 46 App. Div. 2d at 271, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 951. Although beyond the scope of this Case
Note, the question of plaintiff Association's standing to maintain this action is an important one.
Standing depends upon "whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him
injury in fact, economic or otherwise," Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970), and "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably %-ithinthe zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.. in question."
Id. at 153; see Columbia Gas, Inc. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 117, 123,
268 N.E.2d 790, 793, 320 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61-62 (1971). Mere economic competition does not
usually establish the necessary economic injury. See, e.g., Our Lady of Good Counsel v. Ball, 45
App. Div. 2d 66, 70, 356 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (2d Dep't 1974). Moreover, arguing that savings
banks do not have the power to offer NOW accounts is to assert that such action is ultra vires.
Plaintiff Association is not one of those parties empowered to maintain an action in this regard,
See N.Y. Banking Law § 9-a (McKinney 1971); cf. Jaffe Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Brooklyn
Union Gas Co., 51 Mfisc. 2d 1083, 1085, 275 N.Y.S.2d 24, 28 (Sup. Ct. 1966). aff'd mem., 29
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agreed that in view of the historical distinction between savings banks and
commercial banks and the legislative intent regarding authorization of nonpassbook savings accounts, " 'NOW' or checking account authority by savings banks [could not] be sustained." 8 New York State Bankers Association v.
Albright, 46 App. Div. 2d 269, 361 N.Y.S.2d 949 (4th Dep't 1974), motion for
leave to appeal granted, No. 177, Ct. App., Feb. 21, 1975.
Originally, savings banks and commercial banks had distinctly different
functions. 9 Savings banks were chartered "as philanthropic depositories for
the savings of workingmen." 10 Commercial banks, on the other hand, provided "working capital" for business and "were not designed to serve households."'" With the diminished growth of demand deposits in the mid-1950s,
however, commercial banks turned to the consumer savings deposit market as
a source of capital and have vigorously competed for individuals' savings.12
Their success has been attributed primarily to the effective exploitation of the
ability to offer a broad range of services to the public. 13 Customers acquiesce
App. Div. 2d 1051, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd mem., 26 N.Y.2d 851, 258 N.E.2d
93, 309 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1970).
Nevertheless, the court found that the " 'interest sought to be protected . . . was within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.' " 46 App. Div. 2d at 271, 361
N.Y.S.2d at 951-52. The Albright court may have been influenced by the public significance of
the issue. See id., 361 N.Y.S.2d at 952, citing National Org. for Women v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974) (alleged discrimination against
women in newspaper help wanted classifications an issue of "great public significance," sufficient
to establish standing even though question mooted by discontinuance of practice).
8. 46 App. Div. 2d at 273-74, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 954. Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3222(a)
(McKinney 1970), the parties filed a Submission of Controversy "containing a statement of the
facts upon which the controversy depends, and a statement that the controversy is real and that
the submission is made in good faith ...." When such submission is entered in the supreme
court, the appellate division may hear the case. Id. § 3222(b)(3).
9. "We can distinguish a savings bank very clearly by this 'hallmark':-If it receives money
not subject to check, but payable on presentation of passbook and due notice, which passbook by
its terms constitutes the contract of deposit, and invests the funds in mortgage loans and certain
legalized bonds, collateral and personal loans, it is a savings bank; if, on the other hand, it
discounts commercial paper, handles checking accounts, loans on notes of hand-in short, does a
'commercial' business, it is not a savings bank." W. Kniffin, The Savings Bank and Its Practical
Work 25 (4th ed. 1928).
10. L. Lapidus, S. Cutler, P. Kildoyle & A. Castro, Public Policy Toward Mutual Savings
Banks in New York State: Proposals for Change 34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lapidus]; see
notes 47 & 48 infra and accompanying text.
11. M. Eggers, Savings Banking in New York State-A Reexamination of a Traditional Role
10 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Eggers].
12. Lapidus 17; A. Teck, Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations: Aspects
of Growth 102-03 (1968).
13. Hearings on H.R. 13118, H.R. 13718 Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1967). "The most significant increase in financial needs has
been in the growth of financial services for the average household. Checking accounts are now
widely used by households.... With very few exceptions, these business opportunities have been
exploited solely by, and the new needs filled solely by, commercial banks." Eggers 12; see Report
of the President's Commission on Financial Structure & Regulation 40-41 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Hunt Commission].
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in the commercial bank's slightly lower interest rate on savings deposits for
the inducement of one-stop banking convenience, 14 since commercial banks
are able to offer, for example,
checking services and personal and commercial
5
credit under one roof.'
Savings banks, however, have been restricted to their historical function of
promoting thrift through savings and committing the accumulated deposits to
long-term investments for the mutual benefit of all depositors. 1 6 Nevertheless,
savings banks not only have had a decreasing share of the savings deposit
market 17 but also have suffered heavy deposit outflows at times when
"[i]ndividuals withdraw their savings to invest directly in higher yielding
[short-term] market instruments .. .. "18 Commercial banks have not been so
affected by these periodic increases in short-term interest rates.' 9 It has long
been advocated, therefore, that the concept of savings bank service must
expand so as to be more adaptable to the fluctuations of the economic
system. 20 Consequently, savings banks have sought in recent years to expand
21
their services.
Prior to Albright, only four courts had considered the general issue of
14. Lapidus 204; see New York State Banking Dep't, Report of the Superintendent's
Advisory Committee on Financial Reform 29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committe].
"[W]hether it is possible to have a checking account under the same roof plays an important part
in determining where households put their thrift deposits and savings shares." Staff of Subcomm.
on Domestic Finance of House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong.. 1st Sess., Report
on Financial Institutions: Reform and the Public Interest 87 (Comm. Print 1973) (hereinafter cited
as Subcomm. Report]. Another inducement is "to be associated with the institution in case of
need for its services at some later date." P. Nadler, The Future of Savings Banking in New York
State 36 (1961). While the difference in interest rates favors savings banks, see Lapidus 108,
"most bank customers are relatively insensitive to small differences in interest rates
. ." Id. at
232.
15. One-stop banking includes such conveniences as checking accounts. easy transfer of funds
between savings and demand deposits, credit cards, personal loans, and commercial credit. See
Advisory Committee 29.
16. Eggers 5, 10; see Subcomm. Report 87. The preponderance of long-term investments are
in mortgage loans. In New York, over 76 percent of the total assets of savings banks are in
mortgages. Lapidus 42, Table 2.4; see Hunt Commission 34; U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1974
Statistical Abstract of the United States 455, Table No. 731. Checking accounts are deemed too
volatile and, therefore, disruptive of a savings bank's historical function. See notes 32, 69-71 infra
and accompanying text.
17. National Ass'n of Mutual Savings Banks, Mutual Savings Banking Annual Report 9-10
(1974).
18. Lapidus 18; see National Ass'n, supra note 17, at 9.
19. See National Ass'n, supra note 17, at 10-I1.
20. See id. at 18; Eggers 74; Nadler, supra note 14, at 36; note 84 infra and accompanying
text. The Hunt Commission recommendations were based on the consideration that savings
banks could not cope adequately with inflation. Allen & Bartlett, The Hunt Commission Report,
29 Bus. Law. 497, 508 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Androscoggin County Say. Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858, 859 (.le 1971);
New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 46 App. Div. 2d 269. 274, 361 N.Y S.2d 949. 954
(4th Dep't 1974), motion for leave to appeal granted, No. 177, Ct. App., Feb. 21, 1975, Riordan.
Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal, 30 Bus. Law. 151, 151-52 (1974) (attempted expansion in
Massachusetts).

1048

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

whether savings banks could offer an account subject to withdrawal by
negotiable instrument. 22 Two of the courts specifically considered whether
savings banks could offer checking accounts. 23 In Hudson County National
Bank v. Provident Institution for Savings, 24 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that savings banks were entitled to maintain accounts subject to
withdrawal by check under a banking statute authorizing them " 'to receive
money on deposit . . . according to the usual custom of savings banks.' "25 The
court focused its analysis on whether "the usual custom of savings banks"
included maintenance of checking accounts. 26 While only a minority of
savings banks in New Jersey had engaged in the practice, it had existed in the
state since the turn of the century and state banking authorities had acquiesced in it. 27 As a result, the court imputed to the legislature
an intention
' 28
to include such demand deposits as a "usual custom.

In Androscoggin County Savings Bank v. Campbell,29 the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court reached a different result. The court distinguished the Hudson
County decision on the grounds that New Jersey had a long history of savings
bank checking accounts while the Androscoggin County Savings Bank was
the first such bank in Maine to offer checking account service. 30 Basic to the
court's analysis was the opinion that, even though savings banks were no
longer small nor their depositors poor, a "fundamental difference between
savings banks and commercial banks" existed. 3 1 The court found that checking accounts required a large reserve of liquid funds, which was antithetical
to the savings banks' function of thrift encouragement and long-term investment of depositors' funds.3 2 Consequently, the court rejected the contention
that the statutory authorization of" 'all such powers as are reasonably incidental to the business of a mutual savings bank' -33 included a checking account
34
service.

22. Of the 17 states that charter savings banks, Lapidus 34 n.2, nine permit checking or
NOW accounts. Riordan, supra note 21, at 151-52 n.5. Of the 494 savings banks chartered, all
but twenty operate in the eleven New England and Atlantic states. Lapidus 34.
23. For purposes of this analysis, checking accounts are distinguished from savings accounts
in that they are not subject to a notice of withdrawal requirement. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
§ 217.1(a) (1974) (Federal Reserve definition of checking account); id. § 329.1(a) (FDIC definition); note 3 supra.
24. 44 N.J. 282, 208 A.2d 409 (1965) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 283, 208 A.2d at 410, quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:9A-26 (1963).
26. 44 N.J. at 284, 208 A.2d at 410-11; see the lower court's opinion, 80 N.J. Super. 339,
356, 193 A.2d 697, 706 (Super. Ct. 1963).
27.
44 N.J. at 283-84, 208 A.2d at 410.
28. Id. at 284, 208 A.2d at 411.
29. 282 A.2d 858 (Me. 1971).
30. Id. at 864.
31. Id. at 861. The court noted that: "Savings Banks have always been regarded ... as not

having any of the attributes of a commercial banking business and to be of a special character
devoted exclusively to receiving and safeguarding the deposits of the public, not entering into any
sort of a general banking business as carried on by commercial banks ....
Id. at 862.
32. Id. at 863.
33. Id. at 862, quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 443(2)(E) (1964), as amended, id. (Supp.
1974).

34. 282 A.2d at 863. But see Hudson County Nat'l Bank v. Provident Instit'n for Say., 80
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The remaining two courts considered the same issue confronted in
Albright-whether savings banks could offer savings accounts subject to
withdrawal by negotiable instrument.35 Reaching an affirmative conclusion in
Savings Bank v. Bank Commissioner, 36 the Maryland Court of Appeals
emphasized both the long-standing practice of offering such accounts in the
state and the acquiescence of the Bank Commissioner. 37 Although these were
nominally checking accounts and bore no interest, the court reasoned that
because of a thirty-day notice of withdrawal limitation, they were savings
accounts 38 and the check was merely another mode of withdrawal. As the
court concluded:
If... a depositor of the Bank, on making a withdrawal, has the option of requesting
cash, or a treasurer's check, or of purchasing a money order, it seems abundantly clear
to us that according him a fourth option of drawing a check on his own [non-interest
bearing] account,
whether or not he presents his passbook, is a distinction without a
39
difference.
This approach was also adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Consumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks.4 0 The plaintiff
savings bank sought a declaratory judgment confirming its power to offer
interest-bearing savings accounts subject to withdrawal by negotiable order."'
Massachusetts lav permitted savings banks to prescribe the mode of withdrawal in their bylaws; the Consumers Savings Bank provided for withdrawal" 'by presentation of deposit book.., or other written instrument, by
the depositor, his legally appointed representative or another on a written
order.' ",42 The court concluded that to distinguish withdrawal by negotiable
order of withdrawal from withdrawal by passbook was a " 'distinction
without a difference.' "43
The court in New York State Bankers Association v. Albright 44 .considered
N.J. Super. 339, 356, 193 A.2d 697, 706 (Super. CL 1963), aff'd, 44 N.J. 282, 203 A.2d 409

(1965) (per curiam).
35. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
36.

248 Md. 461, 237 A.2d 45 (1968).

37. A checking account was first offered by a Maryland savings bank in 1869. and the state
banking authorities had been officially aware of the practice at least since 1932. Id, at 465-66, 237
A.2d at 47.
38. Id. at 475, 237 A.2d at 53; see note 3 supra.
39. 248 Md. at 475, 237 A.2d at 53. "Conceptually, every time a customer makes a cash

withdrawal in the form of a check or money order to a third party, there is a third party
payment." Allen & Bartlett, The Hunt Commission Report, 29 Bus. Law. 497, 509 (1974).
40.

-

Mass. -

, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972).

The court found "most persuasive" the

language of the Maryland court quoted in text accompanying note 39 supra. -,

Mass. at

282 N.E.2d at 417.
41. Mass. at , 282 N.E.2d at 416; see Riordan, Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal,

30 Bus. Law. 151, 151-52 (1974) for a discussion of the background of this case.
42.

-

Mass. at -

, 282 N.E.2d at 417. Generally, Massachusetts permits deposits to be

withdrawn "in such manner as the by-laws [of the bank] direct." Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 168, § 26
(Supp. 1974).
43. Mass. at, 282 N.E.2d at 417, quoting Savings Bank v Bank Comm'r, 248 Md.
461, 475, 237 A.2d 45, 53 (1968).
44. 46 App. Div. 2d 269, 361 N.Y.S.2d 949 (4th Dep't 1974). motion for leave to appeal
granted, No. 177, CL App., Feb. 21, 1975.
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these decisions inappropriate in view of "the evolutionary framework of
banking institutions in New York. '45 Clearly, the issues presented in each of
these cases differed in some respects from the issues in Albright. Both the
Maryland and New Jersey decisions may be regarded as inapposite because of
the history of savings bank practices in those states. The Maine decision is
distinguishable because it involved checking accounts. Even though the
Massachusetts court considered NOW accounts, its decision was based on the
narrow question of whether a NOW account constituted such " 'other written
instrument' " of withdrawal as was permitted by law. 4 6 Nonetheless, the
Maryland and Massachusetts decisions are relevant in that they considered
withdrawal from savings accounts by negotiable instrument. Unlike Albright,
both decisions gave weight to the practicality of this method of withdrawal.
47
The conservative, philanthropic origin of savings banks is indisputable.
The act incorporating New York's first savings bank in 1819 had a stated
purpose "of encouraging in the community habits of industry and economy,
by receiving and vesting ... such small sums of money as may be saved from
the earnings of tradesmen, mechanics, labourers, minors, servants and others;
thereby affording the twofold advantage of security and interest . . . . ,,48 This
distinctive function has been preserved as the banking law has evolved. 49 In a
45. Id. at 274, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
46. See Mass. at , 282 N.E.2d at 417. The Massachusetts decision is of special
significance because three-fifths of all chartered savings banks holding three-quarters of all
savings banks deposits are located in New York and Massachusetts. Lapidus 34.
47. "The reason . . . for the savings bank is twofold: First, to afford the poor and those of
small means a safe depository for their savings; second, to enable them by combining small sums
to invest them safely and profitably." Kniffin, supra note 9, at 71 (emphasis deleted). Jeremy
Bentham proposed a " 'frugality bank' " so that those with limited means could "save systematically and be rewarded with interest earned by investing the collected funds." Teck, supra note
12, at 6; see Benston, Savings Banking and the Public Interest, 4 J. of Money, Credit & Banking
133, 142-43 (1972); Comment, supra note 3, at 473-74.
48. Act of March 26, 1819, ch. 62, [1819] N.Y. Laws 42d Sess. 66 (to incorporate the Bank
for Savings). At the time, the governor stated that the bill was passed " 'to cherish meritorious
industry, to encourage frugality and retrenchment, and to promote the welfare of families, the
cause of morality, and the good order of society.' " Kniffin, supra note 9, at 16. "[Tjhe Bank for
Savings' first annual report indicate[d] [that], of the 1,527 depositors at the end of the first year,
the largest occupational category was domestic servants (143), followed by clerks (65), cooks (35),
seamstresses (34), and so on, with only a handful of merchants and professional men. Of the
2,443 deposit accounts opened during the first year, 821 were under $5, over half were under $10,
and approximately 85 percent were under $50." Teck, supra note 12, at 11 n. 14. Early American
savings banks merely emulated their English predecessors, which were adapted to the requirements of the working class. A. Scratchley, A Practical Treatise on Savings Banks xi (1860).
49. The comprehensive banking law enacted in New York in 1914 preserved the distinction.
Compare the law's definitions of "bank" and "savings bank": "The term, 'bank,' . . . means any
domestic moneyed corporation, other than a trust company, authorized to discount and negotiate
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; to receive deposits of
money and commercial paper; to lend money on real or personal security; and to buy and sell gold
and silver bullion, foreign coins or bills of exchange." Act of April 16, 1914, ch. 369, § 2, [19141
N.Y. Laws 137th Sess. 1240. "The term, 'savings bank,'.., means a corporation authorized by
the laws of this state only to receive money on deposit in such sums, to invest the same in such
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1937 opinion, the New York Attorney General rejected the contention that
savings banks could pay the depositor's bills on a monthly basis by retaining
his passbook. 50 The opinion pointed out that savings banks had only "limited
and restricted powers," that their purpose was "encouragement of thrift," and
that consequently they could not justify performing commercial bank services. 51 In response to a somewhat similar proposal three years later, the
Attorney General concluded again that a bill-paying service was a commercial
bank function and that checking
accounts were not compatible with the thrift
52
policy of savings banks.

The New York courts have also long recognized the unique status of
savings banks. For instance, the Court of Appeals has pointed out that
commercial banks are "profit-making" corporations responsible to their stockholders, while the "fundamental purpose" of savings banks is to protect small
depositors by means of cautious and conservative investment of the common
fund.5 3 As a result, statutory restrictions are imposed upon savings bank
investment and services. 54 In order to insure a competitive equilibrium with
securities, obligations and property, and to declare, credit and pay from its earnings such
dividends, as may be prescribed by law." Id. at 1241. For a similar result, compare N.Y.
Banking Law § 96 (McKinney 1971) (general powers of commercial banks) with id. § 234
(McKinney Supp. 1974) (general powers of savings banks). The Albright court cited the
"evolutionary statutory enactments pertaining to commercial banks vis-a-vis savings banks..
evidencing the functional distinctions and purposes of savings institutions ....
46 App. Div. 2d
at 271, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (citations omitted).
50. [1937] N.Y. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 304. The Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC
recently proposed a rule permitting banks to offer a new service whereby a customer could
authorize in advance the payment of bills out of a savings account. Proposed Fed. Res. Reg. §
217.5, 40 Fed. Reg. 16685-86 (1975); Proposed FDIC Reg. § 329.5, 40 Fed. Reg. 16219 (1975).
51. [1937] N.Y. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 305-06.
52. [19401 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 385. But see Brief for Defendants Erie County Say.
Bank and Buffalo Say. Bank at 43, New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 46 App. Div. 2d
269, 361 N.Y.S.2d 949 (4th Dep't 1974) (Attorney General stated that the 1937 and 1940 opinions
were no longer authoritative "insofar as they might be construed to say that savings banks may
not offer NOW accounts.').
53. People v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 305 N.Y. 453, 461, 113 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1953). rev'd on
other grounds, 347 U.S. 373 (1954). The Albright court, 46 App. Div. 2d at 271-72, 361
N.Y.S.2d at 952, found authority for its position in Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880), in which the
Court of Appeals noted that "[s]avings banks are not organized as business enterprises. They
have no stockholders, and are not to engage in speculations or money-making in a business sense.
They are simply to take the deposits, usually small, which are offered, aggregate them, and keep
and invest them safely, paying such interest to the depositors as is thus made, after deducting
expenses, and paying the principal upon demand." Id. at 78. This view of the limited function of
savings banks is widely held. See Androscoggin County Say. Bank v. Campbell. 282 A.2d 858.
862 (Me. 1971); In re Commissioner of Banks, 241 Mass. 346, 351, 136 N.E. 269, 270 (1922); In
re Howard Say. Instit'n, 32 N.J. 29, 39, 159 A.2d 113, 118 (1960); Hudson County Nat'l Bank v.
Provident Instit'n for Say., 80 N.J. Super. 339, 343, 193 A.2d 697, 699 (Super. Ct. 1963), aff'd,
44 N.J. 282, 208 A.2d 409 (1965) (per curiam); see cases cited in 46 App. Div. 2d at 272, 361
N.Y.S.2d at 952; cf. State v. Vars, 154 Conn. 255, 262, 224 A.2d 744, 748 (1966).
54. See Lapidus 35-36. For regulation of their investment powers, see N.Y. Banking Law
§ 235 (McKinney Supp. 1974). See also N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:9A-174 to -183 (1963). as amended,
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:9A-175 to -182.3 (Supp. 1974).
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commercial banks, however, savings banks may offer higher interest rates on
tax advantages, 56 and they are subject
deposits,"5 they enjoy certain federal
57
requirements.
to lower reserve
However, the nature of banking has changed over the years. Savings banks
are no longer small; their depositors generally are no longer the poor persons
whose thrift savings banks were meant to encourage. 5 8 In response to these
changes, some states, including New York, have expanded periodically the
investment and lending powers of savings banks. 9 In fact, of those courts
previously considering NOW-type accounts, only Maine found the historical
nature of savings banks to operate as a constraint. 60 This evinces an apparent
readiness to consider new powers for savings banks and an unwillingness to
impose the historical function limitation.
The Albright court, however, employed the historical function analysis and
found that NOW accounts "constitut[ed] such a drastic change" that consideration of legislative intent as to section 238(6) of the Banking Law was
warranted. 6 ' This section provides that:
Subject to any regulations and restrictions prescribed by the superintendent of banks,
a savings bank may accept deposits without the issuance of a passbook ... and may
issue such other evidences of its obligation to repay such deposits as may 6be
2
appropriate to safeguard the interests of the depositors and of the savings bank.

From the face of the statute it is not clear whether NOW accounts are
authorized or proscribed. The only documented expression of intent in the
55.
See Lapidus 108. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 329.6 (1974) (commercial bank interest rates) with
id. § 329.7 (savings bank interest rates).
56. Comment, supra note 3, at 491. But see Advisory Committee 46 ("[Slome mutual savings
banks . . . pay more Federal taxes in proportion to their earnings than some large commercial
"); Lapidus 201 ("Federal income tax provisions still favor MSBs [mutual savings
banks .
banks] . . . . However, State and local franchise taxes are much higher for MSBs than CBs
[commercial banks]. Taking the two income-type taxes together, MSBs pay a greater share of
income than CBs.").
57. See Advisory Committee 32-34; Lapidus 36.
58. Androscoggin County Say. Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858, 861 (Me. 1971).
59. See, e.g., Hudson County Nat'l Bank v. Provident Instit'n for Say., 80 N.J. Super. 339,
344, 193 A.2d 697, 699 (Super. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 44 N.J. 282, 208 A.2d 409 (1965) (per curiam);
Lapidus 40 (New York). "[Tihere is, so to speak, an economic evolution going on; it has stepped
up in its tempo ....
There are some who have publicly suggested that within the next 50 years, if
not earlier, [commercial banks and savings banks] will be the same." Hearings, supra note 13, at
43 (Statement of Hon. J. Home, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
60. See Androscoggin County Say. Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858, 863 (Me. 1971),
discussed in text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
61. 46 App. Div. 2d at 272, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
62. N.Y. Banking Law § 238(6) (McKinney 1971). Section 238(6) is one of three exceptions to
the general requirement that "a savings bank shall not pay, nor shall a depositor ... be entitled
to receive any dividend, interest or deposit, or portion of a deposit, unless the passbook of the
depositor be produced and the proper entry be made therein at the time of the payment." Id.
§ 238(3). The two other exceptions to passbook withdrawal are accounts of the Christmas Club
variety, id. § 238(4) (deposits made at regular intervals), and payroll savings accounts, id. §
238(5) (deposits made by employer or an employee group).
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state legislature was an introductory memorandum recognizing that the use of
a passbook may be "unnecessary and inconvenient." 63 The memorandum
explained that the purpose of the bill was to "enable the savings banks to
increase the flexibility of their savings account services" through adoption of
non-passbook savings. 64 The court considered this to indicate that the bill
was intended to reform "savings account services" and not to introduce NOW
65
accounts.
The court found stronger support for plaintiffs position in a Banking
Department memorandum to the governor in connection with the proposed
statute.66 That memorandum outlined the impetus for the reform. There had
been "considerable demand" for non-passbook savings accounts from customers such as corporate fiduciaries and certain individual depositors who found
it inconvenient, because of volume or distance, to use passbooks. 67 In
addition, savings banks were at a competitive disadvantage with commercial

banks, which could offer non-passbook savings accounts. However, the
memorandum pointed out that the bill contained "no express limitations which
would prevent non-passbook accounts from being operated as checking
accounts ... 6.
68 The Banking Department argued that checking accounts
were not in accord with savings banks' historical thrift function, and presented a danger to their financial structure in that checks require a large
liquid reserve. 69 A 1974 study shows, however, that the liquidity crises
arising from precipitate withdrawal of interest-bearing savings deposits in
times of rapidly rising short-term interest rates presented more of a problem
than did demand deposits. 70 The study found that demand deposits were
generally small and were not intended for speculative investment. 7 1 Without
benefit of the hindsight that would have been available in 1974, the Banking
Department's 1965 memorandum concluded that the Superintendent had
authority under the proposed statute " 'to issue regulations to prevent the
misuse of non-passbook savings accounts for checking purposes.' ",72 Apparently, the appellate division considered this statement dispositive, and thus
63. 1965 N.Y. State Legis. Ann. 154 (Memoranda of Sen. Bloom), cited in 46 App. Div. 2d
at 273, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 953. Passage of the bill showed no evidence of controversy or debate. See
N.Y. Assem. Jour., 188th Sess. 4073 (1965) (135 votes affirmative, only 6 negative); N.Y. SenJour., 188th Sess. 2073 (1965) (no negative votes recorded).
64. 1965 N.Y. State Legis. Ann. 154 (Memoranda of Sen. Bloom).
65. 46 App. Div. 2d at 273, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 953. It was believed that non-passbook savings

accounts would promote efficiency, particularly by permitting the use of computer technology,
thus creating better customer service. Savings Division, American Bankers Ass'n, No Passbook
Savings: A Guide for Analysis by Individual Banks Interested in No-Passbook Savings 8-9 (1961).
66. 46 App. Div. 2d at 273, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 953-54.
67.

Submission of Controversy, supra note 5,

Exhibit D at 2 (1965 "Banking

Dep't

Memorandum on Bill Before the Governor for Executive Action").
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 3-4.
70. Lapidus 247.
71. Id.
72. 46 App. Div. 2d at 273, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 954, quoting Banking Dep't Memorandum
(reproduced in Submission of Controversy, Exhibit D).
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concluded that section 238(6) was not intended to authorize savings banks to
offer NOW accounts. Moreover, since, in the court's view, such a "drastic"
expansion of power could only be accomplished by legislative fiat, the
regulations with respect to
Superintendent of Banks could not promulgate
73
unauthorized savings bank activities.
Significantly, the only indication that NOW accounts were considered a
misuse of non-passbook withdrawal was raised in the Banking Department
memorandum. It appears that the legislature did not consider the question of
section 238(6) as authority for offering NOW accounts. 74 The question arises,
therefore, whether the Superintendent can validly promulgate interpretive
regulations that contradict his position at the time of passage of the statute in
question.
It is well established that the interpretation of a statute by those charged
with its execution is entitled to great deference absent compelling indications
that it is wrong. 75 If the construction of the statute by 7the
agency is neither
uphold it. 6

irrational nor unreasonable, the courts will
The Superintendent is responsible for the enforcement of the Banking
Law. 77 There is no express proscription of NOW accounts in section 238(6).
Rather, an enabling provision subjects non-passbook accounts "to any regulations and restrictions prescribed by the superintendent of banks. 7 8 The
Banking Law further provides in pertinent part: "Whenever. . . the superintendent is authorized but not required to take any action . . . the taking of
such action . . . shall be within his sound discretion. ' 79 This discretion is to
73.

46 App. Div. 2d at 273-74, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 953-54; see [1940] N.Y. Att'y Gen. Ann.

Rep. 385, 386.
74. See note 63 supra.
75. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974) (upholding Veterans Administration
determination that a conscientious objector could not avail himself of veterans' educational
benefits), citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379,
388, 298 N.E.2d 651, 656, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502, 509 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974)
(upholding addiction treatment program's refusal to supply photographs of certain patients); see
Thompson Water Works Co. v. Diamond, 44 App. Div. 2d 487, 490, 356 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (4th
Dep't 1974) (upholding Dep't of Health determination of drinking water standards).
76. People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379, 389, 298 N.E.2d 651, 656, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502, 509
(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974); Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 271 N.E.2d
528, 529, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685-86 (1971) (upholding Social Service agency in its determination
that a welfare recipient's loss of clothes and furniture by burglary did not constitute a "catastrophe" and therefore the agency was not required by law to replace the lost items).
77. See N.Y. Banking Law §§ 9-b to 10 (McKinney 1971), as amended, N.Y. Banking Law
§§ 9-b, -d (McKinney Supp. 1974).
78. Id. § 238(6) (McKinney 1971).
79. Id. § 12(3); see State Bank v. Bell, 277 App. Div. 924, 925, 98 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (3d
Dep't 1950) (per curiam) (discretion in Superintendent to authorize opening of a particular bank
branch); Tooker v. Albright, 71 Misc. 2d 619, 621, 336 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(permitting a savings bank to open a branch office in the same county as its principal office was
within the discretion of the Superintendent and "was not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful"). But
see Hudson-Harlem Valley Title & Mortgage Co. v. White, 256 App. Div. 393, 395, 10 N.Y.S.2d
346, 348 (3d Dep't 1939) (per curiam) (no discretion in Superintendent when legislature imposes a
duty to act).
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be exercised after due consideration of public policy. 80 When issuing regulations for NOW accounts, the Superintendent identified the public policy
sound savings banks and to
considerations as the need to maintain safe and
8
sustain a viable residential mortgage market. '
The Superintendent based these regulations on the recommendations of an
Advisory Committee he had appointed to study the matter.8 2 The Committee
found that savings banks were experiencing sharp and persistent deposit
losses, 8 3 which not only affected the safety and soundness of savings banks,
but also reduced their ability to provide residential mortgages. s The
Superintendent reasoned that NOW accounts "would represent an additional
service by which savings banks could attract and retain deposits," would
provide consumers with convenience, and would foster competition.8 " This
conclusion is consistent with those of a number of studies.8 6 Also consistent
with these studies, the Superintendent sought to balance any newly found
competitive advantage for savings banks by invoking reserve requirements
funds equal to those mandated for state-chartered commerfor NOW account
87
cial banks.
80. N.Y. Banking Law § 12(3) (McKinney 1971). In New York, it is declared "public policy"
that "the business of all banking organizations shall be supervised and regulated through the
,
banking department in such manner as to insure the safe and sound conduct of such business.
to eliminate unsound and destructive competition ... and thus to ... protect the public interest
and the interests of depositors, creditors, shareholders and stockholders." Id. § 10.
81. Submission of Controversy, Exhibit E at 4 (Statement of Superintendent of Banks) The
fostering of competition between commercial banks and savings banks has also been advanced as
an important public policy goal. Advisory Committee 3; Lapidus 229; Subcomm. Report, supra
note 14, at 87; Benston, supra note 47, at 138.
82. Submission of Controversy, Exhibit C at I (news release announcing the Superintendent's
issuance of regulations for NOW accounts).
83. Advisory Committee 29 ("When short-term interest rates rise above deposit rate ceilings
the ability of thrift institutions to attract new funds and hold existing funds is severely impaired
as increasing numbers of sophisticated savers withdraw their funds in favor of more attractive
money market investments." (emphasis omitted)); see Hunt Commission 37; Subcomm. Report
10.
84. "When market rates rise, the ability of thrift institutions to attract funds is limited and
their ability to lend additional mortgage money is diminished." Dep't of the Treasury, Recommendations for Change in the U.S. Financial System 1 (1973) (reprint of then Pres. Nixon's
message to Congress of Aug. 2, 1973, concerning reform of banking laws).
85. Submission of Controversy, Exhibit E at 3 (Statement of Superintendent of Banksh see
Advisory Committee 30; Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 84, at 17; Lapidus 248.
86. Advisory Committee 30-31; Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 84, at 11; Hunt Commission 40; Lapidus 229; Subcomm. Report 91; Benston, supra note 47, at 191-9287. 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.7 (1974). The imposition of equal reserve requirements was viewed
as a necessary concomitant to the recommended savings bank diversification. See, e.g., Lapidus
259-60; Waage, The Need for Uniform Reserve Requirements, 91 Banking L.J. 499, 504 (1974).
Under the principle that "institutions providing the same services should compete under the same
conditions," the Hunt Commission believed that NOW account and other powers should only be
granted to savings banks "under conditions of equality with commercial banks in taxation.
ceilings on interest rates for time deposits, reserve requirements, and regulatory supervision."
Hunt Commission 40.
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An administrative agency, "faced with new developments or in light of
reconsideration of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past
interpretation and overturn past administrative rulings and practice." 88
Therefore, the validity of the Superintendent's action should not be affected
because such action is contrary to the 1965 position. 89
The authorization of NOW accounts was based on an evaluation of
supervening economic conditions.9" In the absence of a legislative proscription, the Superintendent should have been permitted to take whatever steps
were reasonable in the protection of the public interest. By requiring the
Superintendent's actions to conform to the historical philanthropic function of
savings banks, the court effectively reduced the Superintendent's ability to
respond to economic conditions adversely affecting the banking system. 91 The
court took a narrow, perhaps myopic view. It might better have considered
whether the Superintendent's actions were reasonable in view of their impact
on other banking institutions. 92 It is hoped that the Court of Appeals, in
reviewing this case, will not limit the discretion of the Superintendent in the
regulation of savings banks to their historical function, which is no longer
attuned to the dynamics of the modern economy.
Finbarr J. O'Neill
88. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967)
(ICC, faced with explosive growth of "piggyback" trailer on flatcar service, could alter or
overturn past rulings on the subject). "Regulatory agencies [generally] do not establish rules of
conduct to last forever; they are supposed, within the limits of the law and of fair and prudent
administration, to adapt their rules and practices to the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing
economy. They are neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the future within
the inflexible limits of yesterday." Id.; see Check Cashers Ass'n v. Dentzer, 38 App. Div. 2d
697, 328 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam) (Superintendent permitted to change
check-cashing regulations in view of the changing nature of the business).
89. Interestingly, Mr. F. Wille, who was Superintendent of Banks in 1965, has testified
before Congress in his capacity as Chairman of the FDIC that he favored NOW-type accounts for
savings banks. See Hearings on S. 892, S. 1008, S. 1256 and S. 1257 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 28-29 (1973).
90. The Hunt Commission found that up to 1965 conditions were generally favorable to
savings banks. After 1965, however, conditions were adverse-so much so, in fact, that the
Commission warned: "Without changes in their operations,' there is serious question about the
ability of deposit thrift institutions to survive." Hunt Commission 37.
91. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
92. One commentator has concluded that "it appears doubtful that the NOW account alone
will cause much of a drain on commercial bank customers." Comment, supra note 3, at 489. On
the other hand, it has been argued that NOW account power combined with interest rate
superiority-the Superintendent's regulations not affecting the savings banks' interest rate
advantage-would have a "devastating" competitive effect on smaller commercial banks. See
Hearings, supra note 89, 102-03; note 87 supra.
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Constitutional Law-Retroactivity-Equal Protection Decision Mandating Equal Access to Juvenile Court System Given Retroactive Effect
Under Linkletter Balancing Test.-Petitioner Radcliff was convicted in an
adult criminal proceeding of crimes committed when he was seventeen years
old. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit decided Lamb v. Brown, I which held
that a state statute2 extending the benefits of juvenile court proceedings to
women under the age of eighteen but limiting such proceedings to men under
the age of sixteen violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 3 Radcliff petitioned in district court for a writ of habeas corpus,
asserting that Lamb should be applied retroactively to his conviction. The
court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of the petition, 4 holding
that Lamb was to be given complete retroactive application inasmuch as the
purpose served by the equal protection ruling outweighed in importance the
potential burdens on law enforcement and on the judicial system arising
from retroactivity. 5 Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974),
petitionfor rehearing denied en banc, id. at 1096 (10th Cir. 1975), petitionfor
cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-1061).
The traditional common law view was that judicial decisions generally
received complete retroactive effect 6 That is, new interpretations of substantive law were held to apply not only to the litigants in the announcing
decision but also to all defendants in the same position whose adjudication
had terminated prior to the announcing decision, whether or not the time for
1. 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972), noted in 1 Fordham Urban L.J. 286 (1972). Defendant Lamb
had been tried in an adult proceeding for the crime of burglary.
2. Delinquent, Dependent, Neglected Children Act ch. 282. §§ 101 CL seq., 119b8l Okla.
Sess. Laws 444. The present statute is codified at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101 (Supp. 1974).
3. U.S. Const amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1094 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for rehearing
denied en banc, id. at 1096 (10th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-1061).
5. In Lamb, the Tenth Circuit had stated expressly that its ruling "shall not apply retroactively." Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972). Other decisions announcing new rules
of constitutional criminal law have declared that their holdings should be applied prospectively.
E.g., Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971) (per curiam), acquiesced in, Wainwright v.
Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam). See also United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, 503
F.2d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1975);
Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 64-65 & n.32 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Mishkin]. The Radcliff court correctly treated the Lamb court's statement as obiter dictum, since
the issue of retroactivity was not properly before the panel in Lamb. 509 F.2d at 1096.
6. The common law view relied heavily on Blackstone's theory that the court's duty was not
"to pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one." 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *69. Thus, a judicial decision was considered merely to state what the law always
had been and, for this reason, necessarily applied retroactively. See Linkletter v Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965); J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 222 (2d ed. 1921);
Friedmann, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29 Modern L. Rev 593
(1966); Mishkin 58-60; Note, Retroactivity of Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 Iowa L. Rev.
1309-13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Procedure Decisions].
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bringing direct appeal had expired. 7 The Supreme Court did not always
adhere to this approach, however, explaining that because the Constitution
does not mandate retroactivity, "[a] state in defining the limits of adherence to
precedent may make a choice ... between the principle of forward operation
and that of relation backward."
The Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 9 which denied
retroactive effect to Mapp v. Ohio, 10 established prospective application of,
constitutional decisions dealing with criminal procedure as a justifiable
principle of decision-making." More than any other decision, Linkletter
marked the conscious change in the role of the courts from interpreters to
promulgators of law.' 2 Thus, not unlike a legislature setting the date on
which a new statute will take effect, ' 3 the Court announced an "accepted rule"
to be that "in appropriate cases the Court may in the interest of justice make
[a decision] prospective.' 1 4 In order to evaluate the "interest of justice," it set
forth a balancing test' s involving three considerations: whether retroactive
7. Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations,
19 N.Y.L.F. 289, 290 n.8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ostrager]; Criminal Procedure Decisions
1311; cf. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566 (1913) (Federal Employers' Liability
Act of 1906 was unconstitutional and had no effect on either prior or subsequent transactions);
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) ("An unconstitutional act is not a law; It
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.'); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 376 (1880) ("An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.').
8. Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). The Court continued:
"It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for
intermediate transactions." Id.; accord, Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371 (1940); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
9. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), noted in 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 422 (1966).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment),
overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1967). Full prospectivity allows tile
announcing decision to apply only to cases not yet in the judicial system, excluding even the
present litigants. In practice, however, courts have termed decisions "prospective" when they
have applied the new constitutional criminal rule to the present litigants and even to other
defendants whose cases were on direct review. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
12. See Criminal Procedure Decisions 1309-13. See generally J. Gray, The Nature and
Sources of the Law 218-35 (2d 3d. 1921).
13. Commentators have justified non-retroactive holdings in new constitutional criminal
decisions as a means of encouraging the judiciary to be creative, reasoning that if all announcing
decisions were given complete retroactive effect, courts would hesitate before making sweeping
changes in the law that might instigate mass releases from prisons and flood the courts with
petitions to revive old cases. Criminal Procedure Decisions 1318; see Friedland, Prospective and
Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking, 24 U. Toronto L.J. 170, 171-72 (1974).
14. 381 U.S. at 628.
15. Id. at 636; accord, Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679-85 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Jackson v. United States, No. 74-1615, at 2 (10th Cir., Feb. 10, 1975) (per
curiam); Friedland, supra note 13, at 173; Note, Retroactivity, 4 Memphis St. U.L. Rev. 521,
522 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Retroactivity]. Although this test originally was propounded in
Linkletter, some opinions cite the test to Stovall v. Denno, supra. E.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 95
S. Ct. 704, 705 (1975) (per curiam).
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application would advance or retard the intended purpose of the new constitutional rule;1 6 the degree of reliance courts and law enforcement officials
had placed on the prior rule;1 7 and the effect on the administration of justice
of giving the new rule retroactive effect.' 8
In holding that the Mapp rule would not be applied to judgments that had
become final prior to its date of announcement, t9 the Linkletter Court
identified the purpose of the rule to be "the enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule [of evidence] within
its rights" 20 by deterring unreasonable police conduct. It characterized the
principal focus of this purpose as an attempt to preserve the integrity of
individuals' constitutional guarantees. 2' Noting that "the ruptured privacy of
the victims' homes and effects [could not] be restored" by retroactive application of Mapp, 22 the Court further explained that the states had been fully
justified in relying on the rule that Mapp overturned.2 3 Finally, the Court
determined that retroactivity would "tax the administration of justice to the
with stale and missing evidence
utmost" because of the difficulties of dealing
24
and unavailable or forgetful witnesses.
In discussing the reliance of the element of the Linkletter test, courts have
focused on reliance both by courts and by law enforcement officials. Thus, in
StovaU v. DenZw, 25 which held non-retroactive the rule requiring counsel at
16. E.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1973) (retroactivity would not further
purpose of rule requiring that reasons for increasing sentence after retrial be based on objective
information contained in record); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249-50 (1969) (retroactivity would not enhance the purpose of fourth amendment evidence exclusion rule dispensing with
need to show physical intrusion in electronic eavesdropping cases). See also United States v.
Butler, 504 F.2d 220, 223 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (purpose and importance of new
standards of effective assistance of counsel strongly favor retroactive application); text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
17. E.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634 (1968) (per curiam) (new rule extending
right to jury trial to lesser offenses held non-retroactive, partly due to good faith reliance by states
on prior, narrower rule); Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975) (prior reliance on view that a Special Agent's Report is
not a discoverable Jencks Act statement held to be partial justification for non-retroactive
application of newer, contrary view); Ostrager 296.
18. E.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 682-85 (1973); see United States ex rel.
Matthews v.
Johnson, 503 F.2d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S.
Feb. 25, 1975) (retroactive application of rule requiring jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter in murder prosecutions would have profound adverse effects on judicial administration);
Ostrager 296.
19. 381 U.S. at 636-40.
20. Id.at 636.
21. Id.at 637.
22. Id.But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private right of
action for fourth amendment violations).
23. See 381 U.S. at 636-37.
24. Id.at 637-38. Furthermore, the Linkletter Court regarded Mapp as a restraint on forum
shopping between federal and state courts, but held that this purpose would not be furthered by
the retroactive application of Mapp. Id. at 637.
25. 388 U.S. 293 (1967), noted in 32 Albany L. Rev. 198 (1967).
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pre-trial lineups, the Court explained that law enforcement officers in all fifty

states had "fairly relied on.. . virtually unanimous weight of authority" that

did not require the presence of counsel at pre-trial lineups. 26 Similarly, courts

relying on this prior authority had treated the matter as one running to the
27
credibility, rather than the admissibility, of the eyewitness identification.

The third, or administrative and practical burdens, element of Linkletter
refers to the impact on the criminal justice system of retroactive application of

the announcing decision. In this connection, courts have evaluated the
problems of requiring a significant number of rehearings or retrials and of

dealing with the unavailability and diminished perceptions of witnesses. For

example, in Gosa v. Mayden, 28 which denied retroactivity to a decision guar-

anteeing civilian trials to military personnel accused of non-service related
crimes, the Court found that a vast number of criminal convictions obtained
under the previous interpretation of military court jurisdiction would be
involved. 2 9 In addition to retrials, the Court noted the difficulties presented
by administrative problems involving "witnesses, particularly military ones,
[who] no longer may be readily available, [and whose] memories may have
faded, [as well as the fact that] records may be incomplete or missing, and

physical evidence may have disappeared.

' 30

Moreover, it was clear that

courts eventually would have been faced with controversies
concerning back
3
pay, veterans' benefits, retirement pay and pensions. 1
It has been said that the "purpose" element is the dominant consideration in

the Linkletter balancing test. 32 The Linkletter Court, after setting forth and
balancing the elements, asserted that in those areas in which it previously had
granted retroactivity, 33 the purpose served by the new constititional criminal
rule "went to the fairness of the trial-to the very integrity of the fact-finding
process." 34 From this statement, two lines of cases have developed: one line
consists of cases in which the purpose of the new constitutional rule was
26. 388 U.S. at 299-300. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 418 (1966),
the Court withheld retroactivity from a new rule prohibiting adverse comment on a criminal
defendant's failure to testify despite reliance by only six states upon the former view. The gravity
of the impact, rather than the number of states affected, was the Court's main concern respecting
reliance.
27. 388 U.S. at 299-300.
28. 413 U.S. 665 (1973); see 59 A.B.A.J. 1182 (1973). The lower court opinion, reported at
450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), was noted in 40 Fordham L. Rev. 939 (1972).
29. 413 U.S. at 683.
30. Id. at 685; see text accompanying note 24 supra.
31. 413 U.S. at 683.
32. Mishkin 94; Criminal Procedure Decisions 1322.
33. 381 U.S. at 628-29 n.13, 639 & n.20. These areas included: the right of an indigent to a
free transcript on an appeal, Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); the right of an indigent charged with a felony to counsel, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and the right of a defendant to a prior determination of the
voluntariness of his confession, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
34. 381 U.S. at 639; see Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1973); Krilich v. United
States, 502 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975);
Mishkin 82-86; Ostrager 295.
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found to affect "the integrity of the fact-finding process;" the other, as in

Linkletter,35 includes cases in which the purpose affected the "integrity of the
individual." 36 When courts have found that the purpose fits within the "in-

tegrity of the fact-finding process" classification, they have applied the announcing decision retroactively without more than cursory analysis of the
other two Linkletter balancing elements. 37 On the other hand, when the
purpose has been found to affect only the "integrity of the individual," courts

have engaged in an attempt to balance the individual's interest against the
interests of society as reflected in the "reliance" and "administrative burden"

elements. 38 An examination of these cases reveals, however, that courts
seldom, if ever, have accorded complete retroactivity upon a balancing of
interests. 39 Rather, it appears that the only crucial question has been whether
the purpose involved integrity of the fact-finding process: if so, as a practical

matter, inquiry proceeds no further and retroactivity is granted;40 if not,

application of the balancing test seems to be applied ritualistically to justify
41

denial of retroactivity.
The Court's treatment of the "integrity of the fact-finding process" classification is exemplified by Ivan V. v. City of New York. 4 2 In Ivan the Court was
confronted with the question of the retroactivity of In re Winship,4 3 which
35. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
36. See Criminal Procedure Decisions 1323.
37. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 251 (1969) ('[Wle have relied heavily on the factors
of... reliance and [administrative burden] ... only when the purpose of the rule in question did
not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity."); see Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679
(1973); Retroactivity 522. But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 573-74 (1974) (records of
prison disciplinary hearings should not be expunged retroactively). See generally Donivan v.
Henderson, 506 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1975) (on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en
banc), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1975) (No. 74-1072) (retroactivity
applied to ruling that Federal Magistrates Act did not absolve federal judges of responsibility to
conduct evidentiary hearings personally in habeas corpus cases).
38. E.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966); Krilich v. United States, 502
F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975); Criminal
Procedure Decisions 1323-24; Retroactivity 523. See also Joe v. United States, 510 F.2d 1038,
1041-43 (10th Cir. 1975).
39. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 61-62 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Criminal
Procedure Decisions 1323; Retroactivity 528. There have been exceptional cases in which the
Court has held announcing decisions retroactive while holding the Linkletter test inapplicable.
These exceptions may be categorized as instances in which the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973) (double jeopardy clause prevents court
of general jurisdiction from hearing charges against a defendant after court of limited jurisdiction
has entertained lesser-included offense arising out of same incident), and in which the conduct
involved could not constitutionally be punished in the first instance, United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 723 (1971) (privilege against self-incrimination may be
asserted as valid ground for failure to comply with gambling tax laws: held retroactive).
40. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
41. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 62 (1973) (Marshall. J., dissenting); Retroactivity
528.
42. 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam).
43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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held that due process in a juvenile delinquency proceeding mandated the
"reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Winship characterized this standard as
"a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
error," 44 and further noted that such a standard " 'impresse[d] on the trier of
fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in
issue.' ,,45
Ivan held that the major purpose of Winship-guaranteeing to
juveniles the "reasonable doubt" standard-substantially affected the factfinding process and, consequently, accorded that decision complete retroactivity without any
discussion of the other two elements of the Linkletter
46
balancing test.
The Supreme Court's approach to the "integrity of the individual" classification is illustrated by Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott.4 7 In Tehan,
the Court considered retroactive application of a case 48 prohibiting, as a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, adverse comment on a
criminal defendant's failure to testify. Tehan found that the "Fifth Amend' 49
ment's privilege . ..[was] not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth,
and that the basic purposes behind extension of the privilege were not to
protect an innocent person from conviction but rather to assure that the
prosecution "shoulder the entire load" before an individual is convicted.5 0
Moreover, it characterized a further purpose of the privilege as the "Constitution's concern for the essential values represented by 'our respect for tle
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life." ' "51 Thus, because the
purpose of the announcing decision focused on the "integrity of the individual," the Court applied the Linkletter
balancing test-the result of which was a
52
holding of non-retroactivity.
In Radcliff v. Anderson, 53 the majority found that "[t]he purpose of Lamb
44.

Id. at 363.

45. Id. at 364, quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, I
Family L.Q. No. 4, at 1, 26 (1967). In fact the trial judge conceded that he might not have made
the finding of guilt had he adhered to the "reasonable doubt" standard rather than the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. 397 U.S. at 367.
46. 407 U.S. at 204-05, relying on Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)
("Where the major purpose of the new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the
criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions
about the accuracy of the guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete
retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance . . . nor severe impact on the administration of
justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.').
47. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
48. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
49. 382 U.S. at 416.
50. Id.at 415.
51. Id. at 416, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
52. 382 U.S. at 416-19.
53. 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for rehearing denied en banc, id. at 1096 (10th
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-1061). "Majority
opinion" and "court" are used to refer to the panel's opinion written by Judge Breitenstein, Id.,
from which Judge Seth dissented perfunctorily. Id. at 1096.
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was to end sex discrimination in juvenile proceedings. ' '5 4 The court held that
this purpose, although of constitutional dimension, raised no issue as to the
integrity of the fact-finding process. The consequence of this determination is
that the crucial finding for granting of retroactivity under Linkletter was not
met. 55 The majority asserted that this finding did not prevent application of
the balancing-of-elements approach to Linkletter.5 6 In this connection, the
court noted that the youths who had been denied access to the juvenile courts
under the statute struck down in Lamb were deprived of significant benefits
not available in adult criminal proceedings. 7 These included the form of
petition, of custody and of temporary detention as well as provisions for
private hearings and certification for adult proceedings only after an initial
determination by the juvenile court not to exercise jurisdiction. "8 Drawing
from two recent Supreme Court decisions to identify the underlying considerations in retroactivity analysis, 5 9 the court characterized the purpose
60 of the
Lamb decision as insuring "basic fairness" and "essential justice.
The court found that, since the defective statute had been in effect for only
thirty-eight months before the Lamb decision declared it unconstitutional,
reliance on the law was of minimal significance. 61 Without considering the
administrative burden element at all, 62 the court concluded that the individual interest in "basic fairness" and "essential justice"-as represented by
the benefits of juvenile treatment withheld from the petitioner--outweighed
63
the detriments to society and granted complete retroactivity to Lamb.
The Radcliff court found support for its holding in the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Woodall v. Pettibone.64 Woodall dealt with the retroactivity of a
decision that had voided, on equal protection grounds, a Maryland law
denying juvenile proceedings to youths who resided within the city of
Baltimore while allowing such treatment for persons of the same age residing
elsewhere in the state. This disparity had deprived the Baltimore youths of
the opportunity to plead the defense of "diminished responsibility," which was
available in juvenile, but not in adult, court. 65 Unlike the Radcliff court, the
Fourth Circuit held this deprivation "so fundamentally unfair as to impeach
54.
55.
56.
57.
Gault,

Id.
See
509
509
387

at 1095.
text accompanying notes 34 & 37 supra.
F.2d at 1095; see text accompanying notes 15-18, 38-39 supra.
F.2d at 1095-96. The court also cited Justice Black's concurring opinion in In re
U.S. 1, 59 (1967).

58.
59.
60.

509 F.2d at 1095.
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
509 F.2d at 1096.

61.

Id. at 1095-96. The majority opinion calculated the reliance period from January 13,

1969, the effective date of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. § 1101 (Supp. 1969), to March 16, 1972, the

date of the decision in Lamb. But see note 72 infra.
62.
impact
63.
64.

65.

The majority stated only that the record demonstrated nothing to indicate any significant
on the administration of justice. 509 F.2d at 1095.
Id. at 1096.
465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).

Id.at 52.
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the validity of the 'adult' proceedings and render unreliable the guilty verdicts
obtained.. .,",66 thus fitting the case within the "integrity of the fact-finding
process" line of cases and obviating the need for the balancing approach.
Thus, applying different methods of Linkletter analysis to nearly identical
situations because of differing interpretations of the purpose of the equal
protection rule involved in the announcing decisions, the Woodall and
Radcliff courts reached consistent conclusions.
Judge Seth, dissenting vigorously in Radcliff, urged that the court was
required to deny retroactive application to Lamb because "integrity of the
fact-finding process" was found not to be at issue. 67 This contention clearly
mistakes the practice of courts dealing with retroactivity-to deny retroactive
effect unless the purpose of the new constitutional rule runs to the "integrity of
the fact-finding process"--with the balancing of elements rule announced in
Linkletter and reiterated in nearly all succeeding cases. 68 Indeed, it was
incumbent upon the Radcliff court to grant retroactivity if it found that the
purpose of the rule, in this case the individual's interest in "essential justice"
and "basic fairness," outweighed the "reliance" and "administrative burden"
elements set forth in Linkletter.
Judge Seth also accused the majority of taking its standards of "essential
justice" and "basic fairness" out of the context in which the Supreme Court
had used them.69 He noted that the phrases had been employed in the course
of discussions concerning the "integrity of the fact-finding process," and contended that the majority had misapplied the words to a case involving the
"integrity of the individual." 70 However, it seems clear that the majority did
not misuse the phrases, but rather intended them to denote the basic
71
considerations of retroactivity analysis.
The majority's decision in Radcliff rests on the accuracy of the court's
weighing of the interests of the individuals affected against the interests of
society as evidenced in the "reliance" and "administrative burdens" elements.
If the court's calculation of the reliance period grossly underestimated the
66. Id. (footnote omitted). The Maryland courts have not adopted the Woodall court's
interpretation. Wiggins v. State, 22 Md. App. 291, 302, 324 A.2d 172, 177 (1974) (holding
non-retroactive the same announcing decision that Woodall held retroactive).
67. 509 F.2d at 1097, 1098 (Seth, J., dissenting). The "dissenting opinions" discussed are

those of Judges Seth and Barrett, dissenting from the court's en banc denial of rehearing. Id. at
1096 (Seth, J.,dissenting); id. at 1099 (Barrett, J.,dissenting).
68. See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text.
69. 509 F.2d at 1098-99 (Seth, J.,dissenting); see notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
70.

509 F.2d at 1098-99 (Seth, J., dissenting).

71. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text. In a scholarly dissent, Judge Barrett
analyzed the development of the Supreme Court's approach to retroactivity. His attack on
the majority's reasoning, however, seems to misapprehend the fact that the majority applied the
Linkletter balancing approach rather than the single element method used in "integrity of the
fact-finding process" cases. Inasmuch as Judge Barrett stressed the administrative burdens
attendant upon releasing and/or re-trying all persons affected by a retroactive application of
Lamb, he believed that even under a balancing test, Lamb should not be granted retroactive
effect. 509 F.2d at 1099-1101.
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72
or if
impact of the Lamb decision as the respondents in Radcliff contended,

the burdens on the judicial system in fact are heavy, 73 the balancing of the
elements-and consequently the retroactivity holding-would be unsupportable under the court's approach to the Linkletter test.
It can be argued, however, that the Fourth Circuit's approach in Woodall
resolves on a better basis the issue of whether retroactivity should be accorded
to an equal protection decision granting juveniles the opportunity to be tried
within a judicial system calculated to protect the particular needs of younger
persons. In Woodall, the court concluded, without extensive discussion, that
unequal access to the juvenile courts actually impeached the validity of the
adult proceeding and rendered unreliable the guilty verdicts. 74 Although it
cannot be gainsaid that adult criminal procedures have been developed to a
high level of reliability through extensive safeguards against erroneous or
unfair verdicts, the "ultimate fact" to be determined in adult proceedings is
different from, and is determined by a different procedure than, that at issue
in juvenile proceedings. 75 Thus, the question in an adult adjudication is
whether a defendant is guilty of a specific "crime," for example rape, burglary
or manslaughter, whereas in a juvenile proceeding a guilty defendant is
adjudged a "juvenile offender" or a "juvenile delinquent. '76 Rules of evidence, of procedure and of punishment and detention are vastly different
depending, for instance, on whether a person accused77of setting fire to a
building is tried for arson or for juvenile misconduct.
The focus of juvenile proceedings, which derive support from the parens
patrzae concept, 78 is entirely incompatible with that of adult criminal trials.
72. The respondent calculated the applicable reliance period from the 1941 amendment to the
then existing statute which created the present age disparity between male and female, Ch. 5a,
§ 1, [1941] Okla. Sess. Laws 20. 509 F.2d at 1099 (Seth, J., dissenting); id. at 1101 (Barrett, J.,
dissenting).
73. The two dissenting judges mentioned the government's data demonstrating extensive
reliance by law enforcement officials and the consequent heavy burden on the administration of
justice. 509 F.2d at 1099 (Seth, J., dissenting); id. at 1101 (Barrett, J., dissenting). For example,
the government contended that there were at least 2,173 convictions accounted for under the
condemned procedure. Id. (Barrett, J., dissenting).
74. 465 F.2d at 52; see text accompanying note 66 supra.
75. For example, under the juvenile proceeding at issue in Woodall, a juvenile could plead
"diminished responsibility" as a defense to the charge, a standard clearly less stringent than the
insanity test applied in adult proceedings. 465 F.2d at 52; see text accompanying note 65 supra.
See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law §§ 37, 38 (1972) (insanity standards in adult
trials).
76. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 75, § 7, at 34; see S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles: The
Juvenile Justice System § 1.02, at 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Davis).
77. "[The end result of a declaration of delinquency is significantly different from and less
onerous than a finding of criminal guilt." In re Tern', 438 Pa. 339, 349, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970),
aff'd sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (emphasis deleted).
78. Bayh, Juveniles and the Law: An Introduction, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.8 (1974); see
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally III: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 945,
956-57 (1959) ("Under [parens patriae,] the sovereign has both the right and the duty to protect
the persons and property of those who are unable to care [for) themselves because of minority or
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the Supreme

. Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare

philosophy rather than in corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as civil rather
than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of
the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are
to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.80

The relevant statute in Radcliff provided that a child charged with having
violated any state statute or municipal ordinance should be tried in a juvenile
proceeding rather than in a criminal action. Only after a full investigation and
preliminary hearing could the juvenile court certify to criminal court a child
charged with delinquency for an offense that would be a crime if committed
by an adult.81 Thus, Radcliff and others in his position were denied the initial
statutory right to have a juvenile court determine whether they should be
treated within the juvenile system. Had the juvenile court retained jurisdicmental illness.'). See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-31 (1967) (procedural due process
safeguards afforded to youths in juvenile proceeding); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575,
585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wang, The Continuing Turbulence Surrounding the Parens Patriae
Concept in American Juvenile Courts (pts. 1 & 2), 18 McGill L.J. 219, 418 (1972) [hereinafter
cited by part as Wang]; Note, Due Process and the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in
Civil Commitment Adjudications, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 611, 615-17, 621-23 (1974); 12 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 209, 214-17 (1974).
79. D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. §§ 11-1501 et seq. (1966).
80. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (footnotes omitted); see Davis § 1.02,
at 2-3. For a discussion of the goals of a juvenile offender system of justice see Ketcham, The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 Crime & Delinquency 97, 101 (1961); Wang (pt. 1), at
230 n.33. One criticism of the juvenile court system, that states hesitate to accord juvenile
treatment to youths who have committed acts that otherwise would be criminal offences, see
Davis, The Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Juvenile Court, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 195, 196-99 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Dilemma]; Wang (pt. 1), at 232, has been partly solved by the
Uniform Juvenile Court Act (reprinted in Davis, App. A., at 191, 213) which allows the juvenile
court to certify youthful offenders to adult criminal courts upon a finding that they would not
benefit from juvenile treatment. Accord, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (Supp. 1974). See
generally Davis v. State, 297 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1974); In re Bullard, 22 N.C. App. 245, 248-49,
206 S.E.2d 305, 307-08 (1974). Another criticism, that juveniles were not receiving adequate due
process protections, has been answered by stricter judicial standards to protect minors in such
proceedings. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). But cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (trial
by jury not required in state juvenile court proceedings).
81. Delinquent, Dependent, Neglected Children Act ch. 282, §§ 112(a), (b) [1968] Okla. Sess.
Laws 448. The present statute, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1112(a), (b) (Supp. 1974), provides
detailed guidelines before the juvenile judge may certify the case to an adult criminal court and
also requires that criminal courts must transfer all cases to juvenile court for initial determinations of jurisdiction. Id. § 1112(a); see Davis § 2.12, at 30; cf. Jackson v. United States, No.
74-1615 (10th Cir., Feb. 10, 1975); notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
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tion, Radcliff would not have been adjudged a criminal. This underlines the
critical dichotomy between a crime and a delinquent act:
[T]his distinction operates to give the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over all
delinquent acts committed by children; the superior court does not have jurisdiction
over crimes committed by children, since, when committed by a child, such an act is
not a crine but a delinquent act. Only if the juvenile court waives jurisdiction and

transfers the child to superior court should the superior court ever acquire jurisdiction
over a child accused of committing an offense. 82
Under the "integrity of the fact-finding process" line of cases, it is submitted
that Radcliff's adjudication was fatally tainted by the arbitrary and unconstitutional exclusion of his case from the juvenile court process. In short, the
verdict in the adult criminal proceeding8 3is unreliable simply because the
wrong question may have been decided.
Thus, under a broad reading of the "integrity of the fact-finding process,"
the Radcliff court could have reached the same conclusion that it did under
the Linkletter balancing-of-the-elements test. It is argued that the more direct,
"integrity of the fact-finding process," approach is the sounder basis for the
decision. Public policy and the rationale for creating a juvenile justice
system 8 4 strongly militate in favor of judicial decisions that accord to
juveniles the full panoply of rights and privileges designed to protect them
from their indiscretions. In the words of former Chief Justice Warren:
After all, what we are striving for is not merely "equal" justice for juveniles. They
deserve much more than being afforded only the privileges and protections that are
applied to their elders. A niggardly and indiscriminate granting of concepts of justice
the growth of the Juvenile Court and handicap the progress
applied to adults will stunt
85
of future generations.
Howard Justvig
82. Jurisdictional Dilemma 209 n.52; see Davis § 2.13, at 32-33.
83. It is no answer to petitioner's claims that the Oklahoma juvenile courts could have
waived jurisdiction and transferred to the adult criminal courts, for if the juvenile "can show that
juvenile jurisdiction should not be waived by the court, he is not subject to the usual adult penal
sanctions." Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1970); Davis § 2.14, at 34-35; see
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966). But cf. In re Trader. 272 'Md. 364, 325 A 2d 398
(1974) (limiting immediate review of waiver orders in only one county does not violate equal
protector clause).
84. "Treatment as a juvenile is not a statutory bounty which can be withdrawn lightly. 'It is
implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal treatment is to be the rule-and the
adult criminal treatment, the exception which must be governed by the particular factors of
individual cases.' " Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1965). quoting Harling
v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see authorities cited in note 80 supra.
85. Address to the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, reprinted in Wang (pt. 2), at
460; see United States v. Shaver, 506 F.2d 699, 701 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Courts-Fifth Circuit Holds that Supreme Court Has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Appeal from Three-Judge District Court's Denial of
Motion to Intervene.-After striking down a Texas legislative reapportionment plan as violative of the equal protection clause and the "one person-one vote" principle,' a three-judge district court approved Plan C, one
of two plans submitted by the original plaintiff. 2 The Supreme Court affirmed
the three-judge court's holding that the statute was unconstitutional, but held
that Plan C deviated from state policy. 3 The Court held that Plan B should
have been adopted because it more closely conformed to Texas legislative
policy, and remanded the case to the district court.4 At this point appellants
moved for leave to intervene, 5 claiming that the adoption of Plan B denied
equal protection and the right to vote to black citizens in one of the proposed
election districts. The three-judge district court denied the motion as untimely. Appellants appealed the denial of the motion to both the Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit. After the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
"for want of [an] appealable order,"' 6 the court of appeals also dismissed,
holding that the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal.
Weiser v. White, 505 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1975) (No. 74-1240).
Since the original suit in Weiser sought to enjoin state officials from
enforcing state law on constitutional grounds, it required the empaneling of a
three-judge court. 7 In such cases the district judge notifies the chief judge of
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 provides in part: "The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen . . . by the People of the several States.
...
The Supreme Court has
construed this to mean that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election
is to be worth as much as another's." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
2. The Supreme Court granted the Secretary of State a stay of the order pending appeal.
Bullock v. Weiser, 404 U.S. 1065 (1972).
3. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 796-97 (1973).
4. Id.
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Rule 24(a) provides intervention of right "(1) when a statute of the
United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."
Rule 24(b) provides permissive intervention "(1) when a statute of the United States confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common."
The three-judge court in Weiser did not determine whether the intervention sought was as of
right or permissive but concluded that in either case it should be denied as untimely.
6. Washington v. White, 416 U.S. 964 (1974) (mem.).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides in pertinent part "An interlocutory or permanent
injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining
the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute .. . shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of
such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three
judges .... "
Other instances where a three-judge court is required include suits seeking to enjoin the
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the circuit who convenes the three-judge panel to hear the action. s A party
may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from an order of a three-judge
court. 9 The court in Weiser concluded that since appeals on the merits lay
directly to the Supreme Court,' 0 an appeal of the denial of intervention
should also be taken there. " In making this decision the court faced questions
of the scope of the direct appeal statute, the general appealability of denials of

intervention, and the correct forum for such appeals when they are allowed.
The direct appeal provision applicable to three-judge courts, 28 U.S.C.
section 1253, specifically provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.'In an effort to restrict its burgeoning caseload,' 3 the Supreme Court has
4
strictly construed this statute.'
We have stressed that the three-judge-court legislation is not "a measure of broad
social policy to be construed with great liberality," but is rather "an enactment
technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." . . . Thus this

Court's jurisdiction under that legislation is to be literally construed."

Consistent with this policy, the Supreme Court has held that no direct ap-

16
peal is available where a three-judge court grants or denies declaratory relief,

enforcement of federal statutes as unconstitutional (28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970)) and suits seeking to
restrain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1970))
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970).
9. Id. § 1253 (1970); see text accompanying note 12 infra.
10. The Supreme Court had already heard appeal on the merits and had affirmed in part and
reversed in part. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); see text accompanying note 4 supra.
11. Weiser v. White, 505 F.2d 912, 913 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3540 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1975) (No. 74-1240). The petition is for review of another issue decided.
although barely discussed, in Weiser.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).

13. Ammerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They Run!. 52 F.R.D. 293. 303 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Ammerman]; Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972. 58 A.B.A J
1049 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Burger].
14. Note, The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review. 49 Va. L. Rev- 538, 546
(1963); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 431 (1970) (per curiam); Goldstein v. Cox,
396 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) (no direct appeal from interlocutory order denying permanent injunction); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 378 (1949) (three-judge court provisions
held inapplicable to territory of Hawaii); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246. 250-52 (1941)
(no direct appeal where statute is challenged on grounds other than unconstitutionality). See also
Thorns v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478, 480 (2d Cir. 1973) ("resolve all reasonable doubts against
direct appealability of a judgment to the Supreme Court"), vacated, 418 U.S. 908 (1974) (on
merits). See generally NTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4442 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975),
15. Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 431 (1970) (per curiam), quoting Phillips v. United
States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). But cf. Chapman v. Meier, 95 S. Ct. 751. 759 (1975).
16. Gerstein v. Coe, 417 U.S. 279 (1974) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427
(1970) (per curiam); Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, Inc., 397 U.S. 820 (1970) (per

curiam).

1070

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

or dissolves itself for lack of jurisdiction, 17 or where a single judge refuses to
convene a three-judge court.18 This policy of strict construction is most
evident, however, where the Supreme Court from time to time dismisses
appeals from orders of three-judge courts actually granting or denying injunctive relief. 19 Although such cases appear to come within the literal language
of the direct appeal statute, the Court will not grant review if it determines
that a three-judge court should not have been convened to hear the case. 20 In
this circumstance appeal lies to the court of appeals. 21 The Court also has
refused review in cases which do not present the danger Congress intended to
foreclose by means of three-judge court procedure, "[the] improvident
22
statewide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy."
17. Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 393 U.S. 83, 84 (1968) (per curiam); Wilson
v. City of Port Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 (1968) (per curiam). These cases involve situations where
three-judge courts have dissolved themselves after determining that they never should have been
convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). In the past the Supreme Court had granted direct
appeal where three-judge courts dissolved themselves due to lack of standing (Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968)) or lack of case or controversy (Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960)). More recently, however, in Rosado v. Wyman, 395 U.S. 826
(1969), the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction where the three-judge
court dissolved itself due to mootness. 304 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d
Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (on merits). Professor Moore argues that the Supreme Court
will no longer directly review cases in which the three-judge court dissolves itself for whatever
reason. 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice
110.03[3], at 77-78 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited by
volume as Moore].
18. Wilson v. City of Port Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 (1968) (per curiam); Schackman v.
Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427 (1967) (per curian). In this situation appeal now lies to the court of
appeals; under the old rule the only remedy was mandamus from the Supreme Court. Ammerman 303.
19. E.g., Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project, 404 U.S. 541 (1972); Moody v.
Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
20. E.g., Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project, 404 U.S. 541, 545 (1972); Moody v.
Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 104 (1967). The reasoning behind these decisions is that since the statute
only requires direct appeal to the Supreme Court of actions "required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges," 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), where a
three-judge court is not required, the statute does not apply. 9 Moore
110.03[3], at 81. For
discussions of when it is proper to convene three-judge courts see Ammerman 298-302; Currie,
Appellate Review of the Decision Whether or Not to Empanel a Three-Judge Federal Court, 37
U. Chi. L. Rev. 159 (1969); Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under
Section 2281, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 299 (1963); 42 Fordham L. Rev. 466 (1973).
21. Due to the uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court will hold that a three-judge court
was correctly empaneled, Professor Moore suggests that, as a procedural safeguard, parties
should appeal to both the Supreme Court and the court of appeals if the slightest doubt exists. 9
Moore 110.03[3], at 83. He also points out that in recognition of the problems involved in the
area, the Supreme Court, if it holds that it does not have jurisdiction, will regularly vacate the
lower court judgment and remand for entry of a new judgment so that a timely appeal may be
taken to the court of appeals. Id.; see, e.g., Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1970)
(per curiam); Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, Inc., 397 U.S. 820 (1970) (per curiam);
Stamler v. Willis, 393 U.S. 407 (1969) (per curiam).
22. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941); see Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97,
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The Supreme Court has never decided whether a denial of intervention by
a properly convened three-judge court is directly appealable to it under
section 1253.23 In light of the historically strict construction of the statute,
and indications that the Court is moving toward an even more strict interpretation, 24 it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will accept jurisdiction in
such cases. Professor Moore observes:
[Recent] cases strongly suggest that the Court is moving toward the position that a
direct appeal will lie to it only when a three-judge court finds a substantial federal
constitutional question, proceeds to decide it, and grants or denies an injunction. 2 -

In another context, however, the Supreme Court has regularly accepted
direct appeal of denials of intervention. When appeal on the merits lay
26
directly to the Supreme Court under the former Antitrust Expediting Act,
27
the Court accepted jurisdiction over appeals from denials of intervention.
The Court merely assumed that such procedure was intended by the Act:
[U]nder the Anti-Trust Act, an appeal by one who was permitted to intervene, like an

appeal by one of the original parties, must be taken direct to this Court. . . . The
purpose of Congress to expedite such suits would obviously be defeated if . . . an
appeal lay to the Court of Appeals from a denial of a motion for leave to intervene.25
101 (1967); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1949); 9 Moore 110.03131,
at 85. Several commentators argue that many of the policy reasons behind the creation of the
three-judge courts no longer exist. The severe drain that three-judge court procedure causes on
the federal judiciary system, and the small likelihood of a federal district judge indiscriminately
invalidating state statutes, have led to calls for the abolition or at least the severe curtailment of
three-judge court jurisdiction and direct appeal. Id. at 83-85; Ammerman 304-10; Burger 1053;
Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555 (1960). Congress seems to be moving in this direction since it has
eliminated the use of the three-judge court and direct appeal as of right under the Antitrust
Expediting Act. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
23. "Whether such persons are 'any party' within the meaning of § 1253. so far as
unsuccessful intervenors are concerned, seems not to have been decided by this Court." Oregon
State Elks Ass'n v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1972) (Douglas, J.. dissenting).
24. 9 Moore 110.0313], at 71, 83. A good example of the lengths to which the Court will go
to avoid jurisdiction is provided in Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471 (1970). There, a three-judge
court denied a motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The Supreme Court
denied review even though such an action comes under the literal language of the statute. The
Court based its decision on an earlier version of the statute which explicitly allowed direct appeal
only from final judgments granting or denying permanent injunctions and interlocutory orders
granting or denying preliminary injunctions. The Court held that the present version of the
statute was not intended to enlarge the scope of the earlier one. Id. at 477-78.
25. 9 Moore
110.03[3], at 78-79.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970), as amended Pub. L. No. 93-528, §§ 4-5 (Dec. 21. 1974) providedi
"In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under any of said Acts.
wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court
will lie only to the Supreme Court."
27. E.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 386 U.S. 129, 131-32
(1967); Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); Allen Calculators, Inc. v.
National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944).
28. United States v. California Coop. Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 559 (1929).
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By parallel reasoning, the same result should obtain under section 1253.29
Several factors militate against this, however. First, while the Court has
repeatedly stressed that Congress intended section 1253 to be strictly construed, 30 it never indicated that such a policy existed with respect to the
Expediting Act. In fact, although the Court repeatedly complained that such
direct review under the Expediting Act severely overcrowded its docket, it
concluded that it had no choice but to follow the congressional mandate. 3'
Secondly, recent amendments to the Expediting Act render the analogy
obsolete. Under the amended Act direct appeal is left completely to the
Court's discretion, and then only after the district judge determines that the
case is of such importance that the Supreme Court should hear the appeal
directly. 32 Finally, even under the former Act, the Court indicated that it
intended to limit direct appeal of intervention denials. In Shenandoah Valley
Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 33 the Supreme Court denied direct review of an
application for enforcement of license provisions of a consent decree. Regarding the scope of the Expediting Act the Court concluded:
The purpose of the Act is to expedite litigation of "great and general importance"
where the Government is the aggrieved party .... The controversy which is disposed
29. The court in Weiser drew such an analogy. 505 F.2d at 915; see text accompanying notes
56-64 infra. This approach was also taken by the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Turner, 488 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), discussed in notes 40-45 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 13-22 supra and accompanying text.
31. E.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151 (1972): "Both the Court and
various individual Members have on occasion commented that '[w]hatever may have been the
wisdom of the Expediting Act in providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of Its
enactment in 1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory,' for '[d]irect appeals not only place a great
burden on the Court but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of Appeals.' "Id.
at 169, quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.l (1963). "Further, in light
of the present size of our docket, direct review 'seldom results in much expedition'. . . ." 409 U.S.
at 169, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962). "Our action today
should not be construed as a retreat from these previous remarks. . . . Yet, despite all of these
criticisms, our personal views ... are, of course, no basis for disregarding what we are bound to
recognize as the plain and unaltered intent of Congress to require that appeals in Government
civil antitrust cases be taken . . . only to this Court." 409 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted).
Since the Court seems acutely interested in limiting its docket, it seems unlikely that it would
extend the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) to include denials of intervention. In fact, Chief
Justice Burger has called for the total elimination of the three-judge court statutes on account of
their direct appeal provisions. Burger 1053.
32. Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5 (Dec. 21, 1974) provides in pertinent part: "(a) Except as
otherwise expressly provided by this section. .. any appeal from a final judgment entered in any
such action shall be taken to the court of appeals . ...
(b) An appeal . . . shall lie directly to the Supreme Court if . . . the district judge who

adjudicated the case enters an order stating that immediate consideration of the appeal by the
Supreme Court is of general public importance in the administration of justice .... The Supreme
Court shall thereupon either (1) dispose of the appeal and any cross appeal in the same manner as
any other direct appeal authorized by law, or (2) in its discretion deny the direct appeal and
remand the case to the court of appeals.
33. 375 U.S. 39 (1963) (per curiam).
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of by the District Court's order is entirely between private parties and is outside the

mainstream of the litigation in which the Government is directly concerned.- 4
Professor Moore argued, on the basis of Shenaadoah, that in all cases where
appeal on the merits lies directly to the Supreme Court (whether or not
pursuant to the former Expediting Act)
the argument may now be made that the denial of intervention, while concededly a
final order, should be considered an ancillary order "outside the mainstream" of the
direct appeals statute, and thus should be appealed to the Court of Appeals . . ..
Prior to the Weiser decision only two other circuits had considered whether
the scope of section 1253 includes appeals from denials of intervention. The
first of two such cases considered by the Eighth Circuit was Benson v.
Beens. 36 In that case the State Senate of Minnesota had filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court after a three-judge court had struck down that state's apportionment statute. Appellants' motion to intervene, on the grounds that their
interests would not be protected by the Senate in the appeal, was denied. The
court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the Supreme Court, which
had already accepted jurisdiction of the appeal on the merits under section
1253, also had exclusive jurisdiction over the intervention appeal. 7 While
glossing over the question of whether the case came within the scope of
section 1253,38 the court concluded that in the interests of "[o]rderly judicial
administration" the court hearing
the main appeal should also hear the appeal
39
from a denial of intervention.
In Doe v. Turner,40 the Eighth Circuit was again faced with an appeal
from a three-judge court denial of a motion to intervene. Plaintiffs were
denied injunctive but granted declaratory relief by the three-judge district
4
court in their attack on the constitutionality of an Iowa abortion law. 1
Appellants' motion to intervene was denied by the three-judge district court.
Without citing Benson, 42 the court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the
34. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
35. 3B Moore 24.15, at 24-572 to -573. Professor Moore notes that Shenandoah did not
involve a routine intervention but argues that the analogy is close. Id. at 24-572. But see Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), where the Supreme Court
allowed direct review of an intervention denial under the Expediting Act without discussing
Shenandoah.
36. 456 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 245.
38. The court's only reference to section 1253 was the statement that while the Supreme
Court narrowly interprets that statute, it does decide subsidiary questions when it hears appeals
on the merits under the Act. Id. The cases cited by the court, however, (Swann v. Adams, 385
U.S. 440 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)) involved situations where the Supreme
Court, while invalidating state apportionment statutes, decided some subsidiary questions before
it. Neither denials of intervention, nor separate appeals not on the merits were involved.
39. 456 F.2d at 245.
40. 488 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
41. Doe v. Turner, 361 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa), appeal denied, 488 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.
1973) (per curiarn).
42. In Benson, at the time of the intervenors' appeal the Supreme Court had already agreed
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denial of the motion, holding that since the Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction over an appeal on the merits, 43 it also should have jurisdiction
over the intervention appeal. 44 The court did not discuss the scope of section
1253, but instead relied solely on cases in which the Supreme Court
had
45
accepted jurisdiction over such appeals under the Expediting Act.
In Petuskey v. Rampton, 46 the Tenth Circuit took a different view. There,
the three-judge court denied intervention (to challenge a reapportionment
plan not otherwise before the court) and then dissolved itself.47 Equating this
situation to cases in which the three-judge court dissolves itself for lack of
jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit applied the rule 48 that appeal in such cases lies
to the court of appeals. 49 While the dissolution presented the Tenth Circuit
with an avenue not available in the Eighth Circuit cases, the Petuskey court
did express its belief that the Supreme Court would not accept the appeal. 50
In Weiser v. White,-" the Fifth Circuit undertook the first in-depth analysis
of the problem. Without discussing the merits of other circuits' handling of
the question,5 2 the court offered several arguments to justify its holding that
jurisdiction of the appeal should lie to the Supreme Court.
The first reason given was that in order to determine the merits of the
appeal of the intervention denial, it was necessary to construe the Supreme
Court's mandate to the district court. 53 The court believed that this would
violate the principle that the court issuing a mandate should correct mistakes
in construction of it.5 4 The applicability of that principle to this case is

doubtful, s5 and if it were the sole basis of the holding, it would limit Weiser
to hear the appeal on the merits. In Turner, however, no appeal had been taken on the merits.
Possibly, the Turner court did not cite Benson because it believed the case could be distinguished
on this basis. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
43. While plaintiffs were only granted declaratory relief (see note 16 supra and accompanying
text) it seems probable that they could have appealed directly to the Supreme Court since their
request for injunctive relief was denied. See 9 Moore
110.03[3], at 80-81 n.50.
44. 488 F.2d at 1135.
45. Id. Several factors indicate that such reliance is not well founded. See notes 29-35 supra
and accompanying text.
46. 431 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971).
47. Id. at 380.
48. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
49. 431 F.2d at 382.
50. Id. at 381.
51. 505 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. Apr. 1,
1975) (No. 74-1240).
52. The court did note its awareness of the previous decisions. Id. at 914.
53. Id. at 915. See text accompanying note 4 supra. The court reasoned that if the Supreme
Court ordered the adoption of Plan B, intervention could not possibly be granted, but if the
question of which plan was to be adopted were still open, then an issue existed as to whether the
district court abused its discretion in denying intervention. 505 F.2d at 914-15. The court could
have evaded this problem by holding that there was no abuse of discretion. Then, regardless of
whether the Supreme Court had ordered the adoption of Plan B, no intervention would be
possible.
54. 505 F.2d at 915.
55. The cases that the Weiser court cited (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas
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to its facts. The Weiser court, however, developed an alternative rationale,
an analogy between appeals under the former Expediting Act and section
1253.56 The court noted that the Supreme Court had broadly construed its
jurisdiction under the Expediting Act and had accepted appeals in cases
apparently falling outside the language of the statute, including appeals from
denials of intervention. The court noted that:
The Supreme Court seems to recognize that some issues are so dependent upon the
controlling issue in a case and are so involved with the purpose behind the direct
appeal provisions, that, for proper
review, all issues should go to the court with
57
jurisdiction over the main issue.
However, in drawing this analogy the court overlooked several important
factors, most notably the extremely strict construction the Supreme Court has
given to section 1253.58 While the Supreme Court saw the Expediting Act as
a broad congressional mandate for direct review, 9 it has pointedly refused to
go beyond the literal language of section 1253.60 Nor did the court in Weiser
discuss the Supreme Court's frequently reiterated desire to limit its docket.
There is no indication that the Supreme Court itself views the policy of
bringing all appeals before the court having jurisdiction over the merits as
paramount to the felt need to reduce its overcrowded docket. In fact, the
reverse seems true. 6' Finally, the court in Weiser made no mention of the
amendment 62 of the Expediting Act which eliminates direct appeal as of
right. 63 This congressional recognition of the Court's own complaints on the
matter 64 weighs against any broad interpretation of the direct review provisions.
In holding that the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the
Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969) and In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895)) involved
the construction of the Court's mandate for the purpose of determining whether it had been
carried ouL In Weiser, the Supreme Court's mandate would be construed only on the ancillary
question of whether intervention should be allowed, a situation not presented in the court's
precedents.
56. 505 F.2d at 915.
57. Id.
58. See notes 13-22 supra and accompanying text. Strangely, the court in Weiser concluded
that except in cases where three-judge courts dissolve themselves or where a single judge refuses
to empanel a three-judge court, the Supreme Court has given no direction as to which orders of
three-judge courts should be reviewed by courts of appeals. 505 F.2d at 915. Such reasoning
ignores the large number of cases where the Supreme Court has denied direct review of
three-judge court orders. See 9 Moore 11110.03[3], at 68-83.
59. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 24 supra.
61. See Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 375 U.S. 39, 40 (1963) (per
curiam), discussed at notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text. Chief Justice Burger has noted:
"[Slomething must be done to arrest the constant increase in docketed cases in the Supreme Court
or the quality of the Supreme Court's work [will] become impaired ....
Burger 1053. See also
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98, & n.16 (1974).
62. Pub. L. No. 93-528, §§ 4-5 (Dec. 21, 1974).
63. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
64. E.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 169-70 (1972).
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appeal, Weiser faced the problem of exl~laining why that Court had previously dismissed the same appeal. Ironically, this prior dismissal by the
Supreme Court provides the best argument that jurisdiction of the appeal of
the case rests with the high Court.
The Weiser opinion reasoned that the Supreme Court's dismissal did not
stop at the jurisdictional question, but rather was a decision on the merits. 65
This interpretation is consistent with the state of the law regarding the
appealability of denials of motions to intervene. Generally, since an order
granting intervention-whether as of right or by permission 66-is not a final
order within section 1291,67 nor one of the interlocutory orders from
which appeal may be taken under section 1292,68 it is not appealable. 69 On
the other hand, determination of the appealability of a denial of the motion
can only be made after an examination of the motion's merits. 70 Summarizing
the jurisdictional rule the Supreme Court has said:
Our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying intervention thus
depends upon the nature of applicant's right to intervene. If the right is absolute, the
order is appealable and we may judge it on its merits. But if the matter is one within
the discretion of the trial court and if there is no abuse of discretion, the order is not
appealable and we lack power to review it. In other words, our jurisdiction is
identified7 by the necessary incidents of the right to intervene in each particular
instance. '
Thus, if either intervention as of right or an abuse of discretion is involved,
the appellate court will not only assume jurisdiction over the appeal of the
denial but also will reverse the lower court unless the motion to intervene was
is involved, the appellate court lacks
untimely.7 2 If neither of these situations
73
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The court in Weiser, noting that the Supreme Court's dismissal was for
"want of [an] appealable order" rather than for "want of jurisdiction,"
concluded that the Supreme Court had made a determination on the merits
that the lower court's denial of intervention was not of the type from which
appeal is allowed. Thus, the court in Weiser concluded that the Supreme
74
Court had not determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the case.
65.

505 F.2d at 916.

66.
67.

See note 5 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).

68.

Id.

§

1292 (1970).

69. 3B Moore 24.15, at 24-561; see Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 748 n.121 (1968).
70. 3B Moore
24.15, at 24-565; Shapiro, supra note 69, at 751.

71.

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1947).

72.

505 F.2d at 916.

73. This rule has been criticized as anomalous since the appellate court can only decide the
jurisdictional question by reaching the merits of the appeal. It has been suggested that denials of
intervention should always be appealable, regardless of the absence of intervention as of right or
an abuse of discretion. 3B Moore 1 24.15, at 24-564 to -565; Shapiro, supra note 69, at 751; 11
Okla. L. Rev. 80 (1958). The Second Circuit seems to have adopted this approach. See Ionian
Shipping Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1970).
74. 505 F.2d at 916. In Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 371 U.S. 540
(1963) (per curiam), the appeal of an intervention denial was dismissed "for want of jurisdiction."
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Such reasoning would also lead to the conclusion that not only had the
Supreme Court not eschewed jurisdiction but also that it had affirmatively
accepted jurisdiction. Under the present state of the law, the Supreme Court
could not reach the appealability question without assuming jurisdiction over
the appeal.7s The court in Weiser, however, did not carry its reasoning so far.
The court simply concluded that since in its view the dismissal was based
on an examination
of the merits, it therefore was not a repudiation of
76
jurisdiction.
The Weiser conclusion that the Supreme Court's dismissal "for want of [an]
appealable order" went to the merits of the issue appears to be completely at
odds with another Supreme Court opinion, NAACP v. New York.7 That
case, which went unnoticed by the Fifth Circuit, dealt wvith the right of
appeal of a three-judge district court's denial of a motion to intervene made in
an action brought under section 4 of the Voting Rights Act.7 8 The Court there
held that the would-be intervenor's appeal was properly before the Court, but
that intervention was untimely. In so holding, the Court stated:
[T]he unsuccessful intervenor's § 4(a) appeal is directly here and not to the Court of
Appeals.

. . . [S]upport for this result is supplied when one contrasts the specific appeal
provision of § 4(a) with 28 U. S. C. § 1253 .

. .

. That section provides that "any

party" may appeal here except "as otherwise provided by law." Section 4(a) does not
incorporate or refer to § 1253. The former relates to "any appeal"; the latter speaks
only of "any party." The 79
difference is obvious, and the broader purport of Congress
under § 4(a) is manifest.
Unless the Court chooses to repudiate this dictum, there appears to be little
support for the Weiser holding. A would-be intervenor is by definition seeking
to become a party;80 it would require a rather extravagant judicial sleight of
When appeal was later taken to the court of appeals, the Second Circuit concluded that the
dismissal was based on an examination of the merits and also dismissed concluding that the
Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal. United States v. ASCAP, 317 F.2d 90.
91-92 (2d Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court reversed and held that its earlier dismissal meant that
appeal properly lay to the court of appeals. Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP,
375 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1963); see 3B Moore 24.15, at 24-572 to -573. This supports the Weiser
court's view that had the Supreme Court dismissed the present case "for want of jurisdiction" it
would have clearly been holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction. 505 F.2d at 916.
75. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
76. 505 F.2d at 916.
77. 413 U.S. 345 (1973).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970).
79. 413 U.S. at 355-56 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emph,sis added).
80. See generally 9 Moore 110. Of course, when a party appeals the granting or denying of
an injunction, and a would-be intervenor is also seeking to appeal a denial of his motion to
intervene, it remains open as to whether the Supreme Court will hear the intervenor's appeal. It
is submitted that the Court should, since to do otherwise would create the anomalous situation of
the Supreme Court considering the merits as regards the parties while a circuit court concurrently
is examining the merits in order to decide the intervention issue. See notes 36-50 supra and
accompanying texL
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hand to find that one who seeks to be a party is a party. Given the plain
meaning of the language in section 1253, the Court's apparent desire to
narrowly construe the section and lighten its caseload, and the clear language
of NAACP v. New York, one can only conclude that the Fifth Circuit
misconstrued the law.
Ignatius J. Melito

Federal Courts-Federal Common Law Determines Lessor's Duty to
Convey Possession to Government Standing as Lessee.-Keydata and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) each leased space in
the same building in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from the Wyman Street
Trust (Wyman). NASA sought to expand its facilities at the same time
Keydata decided to move to another location. An agreement was reached, in
two separate lease amendments with Wyman, whereby NASA would lease
Keydata's premises directly from Wyman.' The parties agreed that the
government would assume possession on January 1, 1969. Since Keydata had
not vacated by that date, the government rescinded the agreement. After a
refusal by Wyman to bring suit against the government, Keydata obtained a
judgment ordering Wyman to assign its rights in the case. Keydata then
brought suit against the government in the Court of Claims, arguing that the
rescission was illegal because Wyman had performed its obligations as
landlord. 2 On cross-motions for summary judgment, 3 Keydata urged the
court to apply the Massachusetts law which requires only that the landlord
convey the right to possession. The court, however, chose to apply, as a
matter of federal common law, a rule requiring the landlord to deliver actual
possession of the premises. Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115
(Ct. Cl. 1974).
1. Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115, 1117 (Ct. Cl. 1974). The agreement was
arrived at by the use of two lease amendments, one between Wyman and Keydata, the other
between Wyman and the government, because the government did not want a sub-lease
embodying certain restrictive provisions in Keydata's lease. Id. at n.2.
2. Id. at 1117-18. Keydata also claimed that the government was estopped by the conduct of
its agents from claiming that Keydata had an obligation to vacate by January 1. Id. at 1118. On
the government's motion for summary judgment, this claim was remanded to the trial division to
determine the facts. Id. at 1124.
3. The government argued that "Wyman's assignment of its rights . . . violated the
Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970), and [was] therefore void," id. at 1118, and
that even if the assignment were valid, Wyman, the original lessor was not sufficiently injured by
the government's refusal to pay and therefore was not competent to bring the present action. Id. at
1120. The court refused to accept either of these arguments. First, it held this case came within
one of the numerous exceptions to the Assignment of Claims Act because the assignment was
ordered by the Superior Court of Massachusetts in an adversary proceeding and would not
"frustrate the Congressional objectives." Id. at 1119. Second, the court ruled that "Wyman was
not absolved of all responsibility or liability by its agreement with Keydata" and therefore had
suffered sufficient legal injury to be a party to the action. Id. at 1121.
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The Court of Claims was created in 1855 with original jurisdiction to
hear and determine all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with
the government of the United States . ...4
Congress gradually expanded the court's jurisdiction over the years,5 and the
court can now decide any claim against the United States arising under the
Constitution, federal statutes or government contracts, as well as claims
against the United States for damages in cases not sounding in tort. 6 It is
now settled 7 that the Court of Claims is vested with the judicial power of the
8
United States pursuant to article Ell of the Constitution.
Like other article III courts, the Court of Claims is governed by the Rules
of Decision Act, which provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. 9

The leading construction of this statute' 0 is Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
held that

which

4. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612.
5. E.g., Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 StaL 505 (allowed suits, except those sounding in
tort, for all claims, set-offs and counterclaims against the United States and conferred concurrent
jurisdiction upon the district court).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. I, 1972); see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-53
(1962). For discussions of the history of the Court of Claims see C. Wright, Federal Courts §§ 5,
22 (2d ed. 1970); Cowen, Symposium-Part I-The United States Court of Claims, Forward. 55
Geo. L.J. 393 (1966). For general discussions of the court see Ellison, The United States Court of
Claims: Keeper of the Nation's Conscience for One Hundred Years. 24 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 251
(1956); Kipps, A Unique National Court: The United States Court of Claims. 53 A.BA.J. 1025
(1967).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1970). Congress added to this section an express denomination of the
Court of Claims as an article III court in Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253. § 1. 67 Stat. 226 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1970)). The Supreme Court had earlier held that the court was not an article
III court. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). The Williams Court disapproved of
contrary expressions in earlier cases, e.g., Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373. 386 (1902)
(dictum); United States v. Union Pac. tR, 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1879) (dictum). The Supreme
Court ended the debate and upheld § 171 in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. 370 U.S. 530, 552-58 t1962).
declaring that Congress' "creation of the Court of Claims can be viewed as a fulfillment of the
design of Article III."Id. at 558.
8. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 provides in part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, In
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; ... to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;--to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States
. " See
generally C. Wright, Federal Courts §§ 8, 11 (2d ed. 1970).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970) (originally enacted as § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 92).
10. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev 693. 698-99 t1974).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
in any case is the law of the State . . . .There is no federal general
law to be applied
2
common law. '

The case was decided within the framework of diversity jurisdiction, 13 but
there is support for its applicability to non-diversity situations. 14 On the same
day Erie was decided, however, the Supreme Court made clear that a
specialized federal common law is not precluded in appropriate circumstances. 15
It is clear that federal common law controls many questions other than
those arising directly under federal constitutional or statutory provisions. Problems often arise that are within the general scope of a particular federal
16
statute but are not expressly dealt with by the legislation. In such cases,
federal courts may fashion relief to fill the interstices of the legislation, but
they do so with a view to congressional intent as to the applicability of state
law when such application is not constitutionally mandated.1 7 Congressional
intent is also an important consideration when the case involves a federal
12. Id. at 78. Erie also reached constitutional dimensions. "Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts." Id.; see C. Wright, Federal Courts,
§ 56 (2d ed. 1970); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 390-91 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
13. 304 U.S. at 74-75. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
14. Witchita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1939) (national bank in
Texas sued another Texas bank to recover on promissory note; Texas law applied to the dispute);
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956)
(trademark infringement); Friendly 408-09 n.122.
15. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)
(interstate riparian rights dispute); see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465-75
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring); Friendly 408 n.119. See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts
§ 60 (2d ed. 1970); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption,
67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024 (1967); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Mishkin]; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512
(1969); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1084 (1964); Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Eric,
74 Yale L.J. 325 (1964).
16. See Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry., 365 U.S. 160, 161 (1961) (validity of releases under
Federal Employers' Liability Act is federal question); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of
America, 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959) (question of whether annuities were securities under Securities Act
of 1933 one of federal law, not state insurance law); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements governed by federal
law); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1949) (definition of negligence under Federal
Employers' Liability Act is a federal question); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. I11,
123-24 (1944) (construction of term "employees" in National Labor Relations Act a matter of
federal law); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940) (legal consequences of act
prohibited by National Bank Act is question of federal law). See also Note, Exceptions to Erie v.
Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1946).
17. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-57 (1957); Friendly 410.
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8

interest tied to no particular statute.' Thus when a need exists to protect
broad federal policies from state interference, or when application of the
different rules of different states will unduly burden a particular federal
program, federal common law will control. 19
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States2 0 was the first definitive statement,
after theEiie decision, concerning what law applies in this type of nondiversity situation. The government brought an action against the Clearfield Trust
Company, which had cleared a fraudulently endorsed check issued by the
government. The Supreme Court refused to apply the law of Pennsylvania,
where the bank was located, but instead held that the need to promote
uniformity throughout the country concerning the rights and duties of the
United States in respect of its commercial paper mandated the application of
federal common law. 2' This concept of uniformity has become one standard
which federal courts employ in deciding whether to apply existing state law or
a separately2 3 developed federal doctrine22 in "matters of essentially federal
character. ,
This interest in uniformity has resulted in the general rule that suits arising
out of government contracts are governed by federal common law. 4 This
approach arises from the felt need for a single body of law to which the
government can refer easily in numerous contract cases. There are exceptions
18. See note 30 infra.
19. Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1526-31 (1969).
20. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). Clearfield has been widely discussed. See 18 Tul. L. Rev. 152 (1943).
See generally Friendly 409-11; Note, Clearfield. Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53
Colum. L. Rev. 991 (1953).
21. 318 U.S. at 367. See also Mishkio 801 & n.19. This case arose before the Uniform
Commercial Code was adopted by 49 states. The Code now supplies, as a matter of federal
common law, the uniformity which the Clearfield Court desired to achieve. See generally United
States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1971) (suits under Farmer's Home Administration
loan program; UCC applied as federal common law); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360
F.2d 674, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1966) (delay and non-delivery not excused by practical impossibility;
UCC applied as federal common law).
22. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (federal common
law governs mineral reservations in land acquired by federal government under Migratory Bird
Conservation Act); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Nos. 73-1797, 73-1798, 73-1799,
at 16-19 (10th Cir., Jan. 27, 1975) (federal common law in helium conservation program); United
States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974) (protection of wildlife production areas question
of federal common law); United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967) (federal farm loan
program requires federal law); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964) (federal common law governs suit for conversion of security for FHA
loan).
23. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). Standard Oil extended
Clearfield's uniformity doctrine to tort cases.
24. Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (liquidated damage dause;
general contract law applies); Sam Macri & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 313 F.2d 119, 124 n.l
(9th Cir. 1963) (construction of facilities for the Air Force); United States v. Cisco Aircraft, Inc.,
54 F.R.D. 181 (D. Mont. 1972) (contract for aerial spraying); Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp.
1163, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (Navy enlistment contract controlled by federal common law).
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to this general rule, however, in cases in which courts decide that the
25
necessity or appropriateness of uniformity is overborne by other factors.
26
This was made explicit in United States v. Yazell. There, the government,
contrary to Texas law, attempted to enforce a Small Business Administration
security agreement, jointly executed by a married couple domiciled in Texas,
against the wife's individual property. The Supreme Court noted that the
application of a uniform federal rule to such "an individualized, negotiated
2 7
contract [would override] the intensely local interests of family property,
a result which should be reached "only where clear and substantial interests
of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with
respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is
applied. ' 28 Although the Court refused to depart from Texas law, it left open
the question of whether 29
Texas law applied ex proprio vigore or as a matter
of federal common law.
Cases decided under the exceptions to the rule requiring a uniform approach to government contracts rely on two basic principles. 30 The first is
25. Originally these exceptions were based on the Erie doctrine, applied to non-diversity
cases. Alameda County v. United States, 124 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1941) (specific performance);
United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1940) (contract between Denver
milk company and Denver army hospital). The courts abandoned the Erie rationale in such cases
after Clearfield. See Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960) (validity of chattel
mortgage with Small Business Administration must be determined in accordance with local law).
See also Padbloc Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369, 377 n.3 (1963).
26. 382 U.S. 341 (1966), noted in 65 Mich. L. Rev. 359 (1966) and 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 712
(1966).
27. 382 U.S. at 349.
28. Id. at 352. One problem with Yazell is the materiality of the Court's observation that tile
contract was "negotiated with specific reference to Texas law" Id. at 346. Questions exist as to
what effect the case has where the contract is not drawn in this manner. The majority does state
that the fact that the contract was negotiated with regard to Texas law is a material factor in the
case. Id. The emphasis of the decision, however, is upon the fact that the contract was not a part
of a nationwide program of the government. Id. at 353-57. Yazell would therefore be applicable
to cases where the contract was not negotiated with specific reference to state law. Mr. Justice
Harlan drew a similar conclusion in his concurring opinion in Yazell: "[T]he conclusion that
Texas law governs the issue before us is amply justified by the Court's appraisal of the competing
state and federal interests at stake, irrespective of whether the parties negotiated with specific
reference to Texas law." Id. at 358 (Harlan, J., concurring); accord, Bumb v. United States, 276
F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960) (SBA chattel mortgage invalid under California law); cf. United States
v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962) (chattel mortgage as part of federal
farm program governed by West Virginia law); United States v. E.W. Savage & Son, Inc., 343
F. Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) (conversion of cattle securing
Farmer's Home Administration chattel mortgage). See also United States v. Martin, 344 F. Supp.
350 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (Louisiana law applies to substantive features and construction of Small
Business Administration loan contract).
29. 382 U.S. at 357.
30. A uniform federal approach may not always be appropriate. Congress may explicitly state
in its legislation that local law is to apply. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S.
204, 209-10 (1946) (federal legislation declared state tax schedules should apply). There are some
instances where Congress has foregone the opportunity to create a uniform federal rule preempt-
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that there is no significant need for a uniform rule where the government can
function effectively without one. 31 The second is that the area involved is one
in which the federal government has traditionally left control to the states.3 2
State law has long governed all issues relating to land located within that
state. 33 Even when the government is a party to the action, cases involving
real property interests generally have applied the law of the situs state rather
than a uniform "federal" law34 on the theory that the state's interest in
regulating property rights is superior to the interest of the federal government
in consistency and uniformity. Difficult questions arise, however, as to the
proper law to apply when the interest in realty is a leasehold to which the
government is a party. Leaseholds have been recognized to have a dual
aspect- a contract between the lessor and lessee and a conveyance of a limited
interest in realty.35 Most states subordinate the contract aspects to the realty
conveyance aspects. 36 However, in Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 37 the
government successfully maintained that because of the contractual aspects of
ing prior state regulation, implying that state law continues to control. Commissioner v. Stern,
357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958) (Congress had opportunity to create uniform tax collection procedure but
did not); see Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 149 (1944) (Emergency Price
Control Act did not define "utilities" so California definition applied); cf. Roecker v. United
States, 379 F.2d 400, 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967) (construction of federal
life insurance policy).
31. See Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1960); Hughes Transp., Inc.
v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 212, 219 (CL CI. 1954). See also Padbloc Co. v. United States,
161 CL Cl. 369, 377 n.3 (1963).
32. See Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1960) (chattel mortgage). Some
areas which traditionally have been left to the state courts are domestic relations (De Sylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1965) (definition of illegitimate child for federal statute is taken
from state law)); decedent's estates (Harris v. Zion's Say. Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 450
(1943) ("settlement and distribution of decedents' estates... are peculiarly matters of state law"));
and regulation of state penal institutions (Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 93 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) (administration of a state's penal system is exclusively a state function
within powers constitutionally reserved to the state)).
33. E.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (dictum); Davis v. Mason, 26 U.S. (I
Pet_) 503, 505 (1828) (action in ejectment governed by Kentucky law).
34. See United States v. 1,078.27 Acres, 446 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 936 (1972) (action to clear title governed by law of Texas); United States v. Williams,
441 F.2d 637, 643 (5th Cir. 1971) (boundary dispute in Georgia controlled by local law); Coos
County Sheep Co. v. United States, 331 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1964) (rights of government
under easement determined by Oregon law). See also Scully v. United States, 409 F.2d 1061,
1064 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 876 (1969) (Kansas law governs division of proceeds
between lessor and lessee pursuant to federal eminent domain); United States v. Becktold Co.,
129 F.2d 473, 477 (8th Cir. 1942) (Missouri law defines "realty" in federal condemnations).
35. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969) (warranty of
habitability); Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 301, 90 N.E.2d 468, 471
(1949) (security deposits); see J. Rasch, New York Landlord and Tenant Including Summary
Proceedings § 2, at 3 (1971).
36. W. Burby, Real Property § 43, at 111 (3d ed. 1965); SIC C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 202(3) (1968).
37. 149 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1945).
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the lease involved, "federal law (governed] the rights of the parties under a
lease executed by the United States." 38 Thus, federal courts have viewed
as
leaseholds to which the United States is a party in much the same manner
39
they have viewed contracts to which the United States is a party.
Once a federal court decides that a uniform rule is required, it becomes
incumbent upon the court to decide what the uniform rule ought to be.
Generally federal courts have chosen the view of the majority of state
jurisdictions on the question involved. Thus, in Security Life & Accident
Insurance Co. v. United States, 40 where the court faced the question of
whether the United States' holdover status subjected it to automatic renewal
view, which
of its lease of Alabama realty, the court adopted the 4Alabama
1
was also a general principle of landlord-tenant law.
This approach was followed in Keydata Corp. v. United States.4 2 There,
the Court of Claims faced a similar choice of law question in connection with
the duty of a lessor to deliver to the government possession of its leasehold
pursuant to a lease of Massachusetts realty. Keydata urged the court to apply
Massachusetts law, 43 the so-called American rule, under which the lessor
covenants only not to withhold possession. 44 The government favored, as a
matter of federal common law, the English rule which holds the landlord
liable if he is unable to deliver actual possession. 45 The court first addressed
the question of which rule it would adopt if it were free "to choose on the
merits of the competing principles, '46 and decided upon the English rule as
being " 'the best in modern decision and discussion.' -47
38. Id. at 874.
39. See Boccardo v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (federal law in lease
of realty to government); United States v. Morgan, 196 F. Supp. 345, 349 (D. Md. 1961), aff'd,
298 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1962) (federal law governs liability of holdover tenant of government);
Riverview Props., Inc. v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 934, 957 (M.D. Pa. 1952) (federal law
governs obligation of government as tenant to maintain leased premises); cf. American Houses,
Inc. v. Schneider, 211 F.2d 881, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1954) (federal law governs sublessee's rights
where government is lessee).
40. 357 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1966).
41. Id. at 148. For other instances of the court adopting the particular state's law, see
Thomas v. United States, 505 F.2d .1282 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (Pennsylvania law rather than federal law
governed determination that plaintiff had lost leasehold by assigning entire estate); Scully v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1061, 1064 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 876 (1969) (Kansas law
governs rights of lessor and lessee to eminent domain award); Werner v. United States, 10
F.R.D. 245, 247 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1951) (reformation of lease
governed by California law). While these cases opt for the law of the situs, at the expense of
uniformity, they are ambiguous as to whether the law of the situs applies cx proprio vigore or as a
matter of federal common law. The Supreme Court left this question open in United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966). See note 29 supra.
42. 504 F.2d 1115 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
43. Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 65-67, 144 N.E. 69, 71-72 (1924).
44. 504 F.2d at 1122. See generally, Comment, The Landlord's Duty to Place a Tenant into
Possession-Forcible-Entry and Unlawful-Detainer Statutes, 35 Tenn. L. Rev. 656 (1968).
45. See 504 F.2d at 1122.
46. Id.
47. Id., quoting Padbloc Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369, 377 (1963). However,
Professor Mishkin asserts that "a decision that state law governs of its own authority is made--at
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The court then determined that it was free to ignore the Massachusetts rule
in the interest of uniformity. Although the court conceded that the states
"have a considerable interest in the definition of the property interests within
their borders, ' 48 the court viewed the lease as essentially a contract and
therefore necessarily governed by uniform federal law:
The Federal Government's need for a uniform rule is strong. It ought to know in
advance what its rights are if the premises are not available on the due date. But there
are many jurisdictions in which it is not yet firmly established whether the "American"
or the "English" rule controls, and the Government
would either have to litigate or
49
take a substantial chance on its position.
The court distinguished Security Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. United
States,50 saying that the court there was justified in applying Alabama law
because it was "the accepted, general rule, not a special or unusual state
doctrine." 5 '
On the one hand, applying a uniform federal rule to government lease
situations is appropriate because it supplies the consistency for which the
government generally and understandably strives. Leases are contracts and
there are rarely difficulties involving third parties not in privity to the lease;
this contrasts with mortgages which may often affect outsiders and therefore
have been held to require the application of generally known state law.5 2 In
addition, no great difficulties arise when parties dealing with the government
are required to inform themselves of the special rules in effect when the
government is party to a lease.
On the other hand, while it is true that federal contracts are governed by a
uniform federal contract law, 5 3 Keydata seems more analogous to the situation in United States v. Yazell. 5 4 The lease in Keydata was an individually
negotiated federal contract, and was not made pursuant to a nationwide
federal program. The need for uniformity advanced by the Keydata court is
somewhat tenuous in this context.
least theoretically and generally in fact-without consideration of the substance of the particular
local rule .... ." Mishkin 805.
48. 504 F.2d at 1123.
49. Id. at 1124.
50. 357 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1966); see notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
51. 504 F.2d at 1123-24. It is not clear that the American rule, which governs in Massachusetts, is a "special or unusual state doctrine." While it is true that the English rule is applied
in a majority of jurisdictions, the American rule cannot be described as unusual since it applies in
seven American jurisdictions and was once the majority rule. Comment, The Landlord's Duty to
Place a Tenant into Possession-Forcible-Entry and Unlawful-Detainer Statutes, 35 Tenn. L.
Rev. 656, 659-62 (1968). See generally 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 217 (1970).
52. See United States v. Leckington & Sons, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 564 (D. Kan. 1965) (Kansas
law applied to waiver of redemption in Small Business Administration mortgage). See also
Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1960) (validity of chattel mortgage determined by law
of situs in suit to enforce federal tax lien); United States v. E.W. Savage & Son, Inc., 343 F.
Supp. 123 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) (law of situs governs rights to
collateral under chattel mortgage); Southland Financial Corp. v. Oil Screw Mary Evelyn, 248 F.
Supp. 520 (E.D. La. 1965) (Louisiana law applies to mortgage under Ship's Mortgage Act).
53. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
54. 382 U.S. 341 (1966); see text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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The more serious fault in the court's reasoning is its summary dismissal of
the state's property interest:
[T]he interest of the state in the landlord's obligation if the premises are unavailable
seem to us minor, and relatively unconnected with its concern with the definition of
property interest within its jurisdiction. It is submitted that the courts should reexamine the view that a uniform rule
is required where the federal government is a party to a lease. A tenant's
leasehold interest generally has been considered to be predominantly a "grant
of an estate in real property; '5 6 therefore, it seems that the state's interest in
the definition of property interests in realty within its borders, contrary to the
reasoning in Keydata, is a crucial factor in cases dealing with a federal lease.
It is also important to note that the government could have inquired as to the
conditions of the lease prior to its execution (in the same manner in which
other prospective lessees can inform themselves) and could have included a
lease provision varying the established Massachusetts law regarding a lessor's
duty to convey possession.5 7 The strong state interest, the possibility of
changing the lease provisions, and the fact that the contract was individually
negotiated and local in nature indicate that the Keydata approach should be
reappraised.
Madelyn Littman

Federal Procedure-Class Actions-District Court Rule Requiring
Court Approval of All Communication with Nonparty Class Members Is
Beyond Court's Rulemaking Power.-Rodgers and Turner, black
employees seeking injunctive relief and back pay to correct racial discrimination at the Homestead Works of the United States Steel Corporation, filed
suit, for themselves' and approximately 1200 other black workers at the same
55. 504 F.2d at 1124.
56. 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 202(3) (1968).
57. See N.R.M. Garage Corp. v. Morris Feig Garage Corp., 279 App. Div. 126, 129, 108
N.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 922, 105 N.E.2d 500 (1952) ("the rule that
the landlord is not bound to put his lessee into actual possession does not apply where the lease
contains an express undertaking on the part of the landlord to deliver possession to the tenant").
See also Fox Realty Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 F.2d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 1941)
(provision in lease guaranteeing exclusive possession given effect); SIC C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant §§ 309, 310 (1968).
1. Counsel for the plaintiffs were from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., a nonprofit corporation established in 1939 by the NAACP, now operating separately from
the NAACP. The primary purpose of the Fund is the elimination of racial discrimination in
education, housing, and employment, and it is frequently engaged in litigation toward that end.
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 156 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally
Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., A Report on Services to the People of the United States,
1970-1971.
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plant, in August, 1971, in the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. Rodgers and Turner sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19643 and named as defendants Local 1397, United Steelworkers of
America, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and the United
States Steel Corporation. Plaintiffs moved for a class action determination4 in
May, 1972, but the court did not act on their motion. Subsequently, in
September, 1973, plaintiffs moved for permission to communicate with
potential class members for discovery purposes but the court denied permission pursuant to local rule 34(d). 5 On April 12, 1974, the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the major steel companies, and the
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, filed consent decrees in the
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, providing back pay relief
to certain black employees in the steel industry including employees represented by Rodgers and Turner in their action. 6 The Alabama consent
decrees permitted defendants in the Pennsylvania case to communicate with
potential class members to solicit releases7 for obtaining the relief. Objecting
to the terms of these decrees, plaintiffs renewed the motion for a class action
determination, sought leave to notify class members of the pendency of the
class action, and moved for a protective order to prevent defendants from
communicating with stipulated potential class members. On April 24, 1974,
defendants agreed to let plaintiffs' counsel examine any written communications concerning the Alabama consent decrees. The plaintiffs withdrew their
motion for a protective order without prejudice and the court did not act on
2.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) provides that an action which has met the prerequisites of 23(a),

may be maintained as a class action when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole . .. ."
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970). Plaintiffs also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 185 (1970). The Third Circuit has recently examined related issues

under Title VII. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1975); Utility Contractors Ass'n v. Toops, 507 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1974); EEOC v. AT&T, S06 F.2d
735 (3d Cir. 1974).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides in part: "As soon as practicable after the commencement
of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained." The parties stipulated that for purposes of injunctive relief the class included all
blacks employed at the plant any time after August 24, 1971, in jobs in the unit represented by

Local 1397. For purposes of monetary relief the class included all black persons who have been or
would be employed in jobs at any time from August 24, 1971, until May 1, 1973, in the same unit.
508 F.2d at 155. Monetary relief can be sought in addition to injunctive relief without removing
the action from the (b)(2) category.
5. Local rule 34(d) of the Western District of Pennsylvania provides:
"No communication concerning such action shall be made in any way by any of the parties
thereto, or by their counsel, with any potential or actual class member, who is not a formal party
to the action, until such time as an order may be entered by the Court approving the
communication."
6. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., Civil No. 74-P-339-S (N.D. Ala., Apr.
12, 1974); see text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
7. 508 F.2d at 156.
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the motions for class action determination and notice. 8 In June, 1974,
plaintiffs renewed the motion to communicate with all potential class members and moved to compel answers to interrogatories and production of
documents. 9 The court ruled that all discovery would be stayed until January
15, 1975, and affirmed the ban on communications in order to prevent
discussion of the Alabama decrees. Plaintiffs then filed notice of appeal and
petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with respect to these orders
and the one postponing class action determination.' 0 Plaintiffs argued in the
alternative that all these orders were appealable as collaterally final, I I appealable as interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctive relief, 12 or
subject to review on petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. 13 The
Third Circuit dismissed the appeals 14 and denied the petition for writs
respecting the orders delaying class action determination and discovery proceedings until January 15, 1975, finding the orders within the discretion of the
district court. 15 However, the court granted a writ prohibiting enforcement of
the ban on communications with potential class members under local rule
34(d), 16 holding that the rule, as drawn, was beyond the discretionary power
of the court. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1975).

The Third Circuit examined both the procedural merits of plaintiffs'
request for review and the substantive merits of the plaintiffs' desire to
communicate with potential class members. The court found the appealability
of the order restricting plaintiffs' communication with potential class members
8. Although defendants were free to communicate with the potential class members, plaintiffs
and their attorneys were bound by the September 29, 1973, ban, preventing communication In
any form with the stipulated class members. See id.
9. Plaintiffs also moved for leave to communicate with six named members of the potential
class, and for permission for counsel to meet with the Homestead Chapter of NAACP. The court
forbade the attorneys' presence at the meeting; however, it granted the motion to communicate
with the named individuals, provided they signed affidavits that they had instituted the contact
with the attorneys. Id. at 156-57.
10. On August 22, 1974, plaintiffs moved before the court of appeals for a stay of the district
court orders. The court denied the motion because the orders and supporting reasons (lid not
appear in the record. The district court subsequently provided written orders and plaintiffs
renewed the motion for stay pending appeal which was again denied. Id. at 158-59, 165.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) provides in part: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where i
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
12. Id. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) provides: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . or of the
judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to
dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
13. Id. § 1651(a) (1970) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id. § 165 1(b) states: "An alternative writ or
rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction."
14. See notes 17-18 infra and accompanying text.
15. 508 F.2d at 161.
16. See note 5 supra.
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to be a close question. Rather than face the difficulties of a decision based
upon an interpretation of the statutes providing for appeal, the court dismissed the appeals under sections 1291'1 and 1292(a)(1),18 and reviewed the
problems of local rule 34(d) under section 165119 which "may be used to
confine the trial court to the'20proper sphere of its lawful power, or to correct a
clear abuse of discretion.
The substantive questions regarding plaintiffs' communication with potential class members illuminate the problems of district court rules which
regulate communications in class actions prior to the class action determination.
Communications with members of the class under rule 23 occur in two
contexts-before and after the class action determination. They may be
initiated by plaintiff or by defendant. Once the court has approved the class
action, 21 the class members may or may not receive notice of the pending
litigation, depending on the nature of the class action and the relief sought.
Members of rule 23(b)(1) class actions, 22 seeking one recovery based on highly
similar interests, and members of rule 23(b)(2) class actions,2 3 seeking injunctive or declaratory relief that will benefit everyone automatically, need not
receive notice. 24 Members of rule 23(b)(3) class actions, 25 bound together only
for convenience in litigating common questions of law or fact, with a variety
17. See note 11 supra. Before an order is appealable as collaterally final, it must be the
ultimate "rather than a provisional disposition of an issue." 508 F.2d at 159. The orders
preventing discovery and delaying class action determination were not final. However, the order
banning communications with potential class members was a more difficult question. Although
the ban did not appear to be more than a step in the process of determining whether the action
could be maintained as a class action, the ultimate effect might be to bar the class action since an
uninformed group might sign releases pursuant to the alternative consent decrees which would
then be pleaded in the present action. Id. at 159-60.
18. See note 12 supra. The court held that none of the orders operated as an injunction. A
violation of these orders would most likely result in a denial of class action treatment rather than
punishment for contempt. 508 F.2d at 160-61.
19. See note 13 supra.
20. 508 F.2d at 161 (footnotes omitted).
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) requires court approval of the class.
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) provides in part that an action having met the prerequisites of
23(a) may be maintained as a class action if- "the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications...
or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." See generally 7A C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1772-74 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wright &
Miller]; Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 539,
540-42 (1969).
23. See note 2 supra; Wright & Miller §§ 1775-76.
24. Wright & Miller § 1785, at 139.
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides that an action that has met the prerequisites of 23ta,
may be maintained as a class action if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." See Comment, supra note 22, at 545-55.
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of claims, facts, and defenses, must receive notice, 26 giving them an opporif they so choose, in order to avoid the
tunity to be heard, 2 7 and to opt out,
28
res judicata effect of the decision.
Notice to class members is also significant when a class action litigation
involving monetary relief ends with a settlement between the parties.29 Since
the parties are seeking a dismissal, the members of the class should have an
30
opportunity to question the settlement to insure the adequacy of recovery.
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(cX2) provides in part: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." The policy behind mandatory notice requirement for this form of class action
is to protect members when litigation on their behalf is started without their knowledge.
Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70
Mich. L. Rev. 338, 355-58 (1971). Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-75 (1974)
outlines the scope and stringency of 23(c)(2) notice. See also 43 Tul. L. Rev. 369 (1969).
27. " 'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.'"
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), quoting Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); see Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23
Notice, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 557, 560 (1969); Comment, Constitutional and Statutory
Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c)(2), 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 571, 574-76 (1969);
Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70
Mich. L. Rev. 338, 355-56 (1971).
28. "The object of (c)(2) is to give each notified member an opportunity to 'opt-out' if he does
not wish to be affected by the judgment." Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule,
71 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 637 (1971); Comment, Making the Class Determination in Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Actions, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 791, 792 (1974); Note, Requests for Information in Class
Actions, 83 Yale L.J. 602, 609 (1974). The court may also require members of this (b)(3) class to
file statements of claims in order to preserve the right of recovery and to indicate the scope of the
claims. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D. Minn. 1968) (class
action against steel companies); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391,
403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969) (class action against sellers and
distributors of liquid asphalt and other materials); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459-60 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (class action against sellers of brass milltubes and
pipe products); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966) (class action against
bankrupt savings bank).
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
30. "The reason for the requirement [of notice] is obvious. Because the rights of many persons
are at stake who are parties to the action only through their representative a settlement negotiated
between the named parties may not give due regard to the interests of those unnamed." Norman
v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); see Ace Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971) ($2 million settlement with nationwide
plumbers class); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (settlement with
securities purchasers class); Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 732 (M.D. Fla.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971) (settlement with locomotive firemen); Yaffe v. Detroit
Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (dismissal of stockholder class action). Notice of
settlement and dismissal is required even if it occurs prior to class action determination.
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Although in the past preparation 31 of and payment3 2 for notice in these
circumstances presented problems, it is now settled that the plaintiff must
prepare and pay for notice. 33 The court, however, does oversee this notice
34
process.
Communications with potential class members, other than the suggested or
required notice, by either defendants or plaintiffs, may constitute an abuse of
rule 23. 35 Defendants may attempt to undermine the potential class; plaintiffs
may attempt to solicit clients or encourage the institution of frivolous claims.
Rotzenburg v. Neenah Jt. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 181 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (putative class is viable
for purposes of rule 23(e) notice). However, advance notice of a consent decree is not required.
Cunningham v. English, 269 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 905 (1959) (consent
decree is not a dismissal); Wright & Miller § 1797, at 234-35.
31. Who should prepare the notice to the class members? See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). on remand, 53 FIR.D. 664
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (corporate defendant); School Dist. v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (the court); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (the plaintiff and the court together).
32.
The cost of sending notice to class members may be prohibitive in many situations so
there has been disagreement as to who should bear the cost. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.RD. 472,
498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant was suggested); Richland v. Cheatham, 272
F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiff should pay).
33. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
34. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D, 39, 44
(1967); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (1), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 398-99 (1967) ("[Clourt controlled notice is an
alternative to private activities that can be quite unpalatable."); Ward & Elliott, The Contents
and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 557. 561-64 (1969); cf. Wright &
Miller § 1797, at 238-39.
35. "Among the potential abuses of the class action processes are the following. (1) solicitation
of ...
legal representation of potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to
the class action; (2) solicitation of funds and agreements to pay fees and expenses. . . ; and (4) - , communications from counsel or a party, which may misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of
the action and of court orders .
1..."
I Pt. 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice, pt. 1, 1.4 1, at 27-28(2d
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Moore]; Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas.
93,321 (D.D.C. 1972) (defendant's solicitation of letters from potential class members); In re Int'l
House of Pancakes, 1972 Trade Cas.
73,864 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (defendant's attempt to negotiate
piecemeal settlement); Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237, 240 (N.D. Tex.
1972) (plaintiff's solicitation of person to be representative of the class); Simon v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1021 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (same); Weight
Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 647, modified, 55 F.R.D. 50
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant's communication
with potential class members); Taub v. Glickman, 14 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 847, 849 (S.D.NV.
1970) (dictum) (plaintiff's solicitation of potential class members); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor
Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiffs unauthorized communication with
notice to opt out); cf. Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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The common law prohibitions against barratry, 36 champerty, 37 and maintenance 38 have taken on new relevance in the class action context.
Unethical conduct of plaintiffs in communicating with members of the
potential class can be an important factor in a court's decision to deny class
status. In Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 39 the action
alleging misrepresentation in the sale of securities resulted from plaintiffs'
40
seeking out a person willing to have a class action instituted in his name. 4
The court characterized this activity as an abuse of the class action device. '
In Taub v. Glickman, 42 an action brought by securities purchasers alleging
misrepresentation in a prospectus, plaintiffs' attorney had mailed letters to
potential members of the class in an attempt to stir up litigation while the
class action determination was still pending. 43 Criticizing such conduct, the
court pointed out that "Rule 23 should neither be used 'as a device to enable
client solicitation, nor . . . permitted to be used for that purpose' ,44 In both
cases, class status was ultimately denied.
Unethical conduct of defendants in attempting to weaken the potential class
through communication with members also calls for use of the court's
discretionary power to remedy and prevent such abuse of rule 23. In Weight
Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers International,Inc., 45 soon after plaintiffs
had filed the complaint seeking damages on behalf of certain franchisees,
defendant-franchisor addressed a letter to its franchisees seeking their support
in defense of the action. 4 6 The district court issued a protective order
restraining defendant from further communication with franchisees without
court approval. 4 7 Defendants subsequently moved for a modification of this
order 8 in order to allow them to discuss the action in relation to contract
negotiations requested by the franchisees. The court, in granting the motion,
concluded that "the contemplated negotiations [would] not create any potential for abuse because all parties, including the plaintiffs and their respective
36. "Barratry-sometimes called common barratry-is the practice of exciting and stirring up
suits either at law or otherwise." R. Perkins, Criminal Law 523 (2d ed. 1969).
37. "Champerty is a bargain by a volunteer with a claimant or a person against whom a
claim has been asserted, that they will share the matter sued upon if they prevail at law,
whereupon the volunteer (champertor) is to carry on, or defend, the suit at his own expense." Id.
at 522.

38. "Maintenance is an officious intermeddling in a suit that in no way belongs to one, by
maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it." Id.
39.

16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1021 (N.D. Tex. 1972).

40.
41.

Id. at 1022.
Id.; accord, Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237, 240 (N.D. Tex. 1972).

42.
43.

14 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 847 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 849.

44.

Id., quoting Bain & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.

1970).

1956).

45. 53 F.R.D. 647, modified, 55 F.R.D. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 770
(2d Cir. 1972).
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 649.
Id. at 653.
55 F.R.D. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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counsel [would] be present at these meetings.
This decision afforded
counsel for plaintiffs and the class an opportunity to review the advantages
and disadvantages of the action and prevented defendants' abuse of the
ability to communicate with the class members.
Although not all communications involve an abuse of the class action
procedure, 5 0 the Manual for Complex Litigation s ' recommends that each
court adopt local rules to control improper communications. 5 2 In light of the
Supreme Court's position that "activity undertaken to obtain meaningful
access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment, '5 3 the Manual cautions that such rules should not create "a
permanent or an absolute prohibition of contact with actual or potential class
members, '5 4 since they were "not meant to thwart normal and ethically
proper processing of a case [nor to infringe on the constitutional rights of
55
counsel and class members]."
Fear of barratry, champerty, and maintenance must not lead to prohibition
of vigorous advocacy. In NAACP v. Button,5 6 the Supreme Court reviewed
Virginia statutes, enacted to prohibit barratry, champerty, and maintenance,
which had been applied to the activities of the NAACP in assisting and
financing certain kinds of litigation for the purpose of ending segregation. The
Court held the activities constitutionally protected:
[T]he activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are
modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend49. Id. at 51. Plaintiffs appealed from this order. The Second Circuit found the decision
unappealable as a "final decision" within 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) since it "makes no determination bearing upon [rights of the plaintiff and the class] in the slightest degree." 455 F.2d 770, 772
(2d Cir. 1972). The court treated plaintiffs' appeal as a motion for leave to file a petition for
mandamus, but denied that also since the order was within the discretion of the lower court. Id.
at 775.
50. Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972) (attorney's letter
to grocery store owners did not prejudice their rights); Bottino v. McDonald's Corp., 1973-2
Trade Cas.
95,619 (S.D. Fla.) (attorney's letter was necessary to prepare position on class
action issue).
51. 1 Pt. 2 Moore.
52. Id., pt. 1, 1.41, at 28. For a suggested local rule, see id. pt. 2, 1.41, at 188; cf. Wright
& Miller § 1797, at 239.
53. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
54. 1 PL 2 Moore, pt. 1
1.41, at 30.
55. Id.; see id. pt. 2,
1.41, at 189. See generally Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
56. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For full discussions of NAACP v. Button, see Moscone & Reed, The
Legal Profession on Trial: Group Legal Services, 2 Loyola U.L.A.L. Rev. 12, 27-30 (1969);
Comment, Group Legal Services and the New Code of Professional Resonsibility, 20 Buffalo L.
Rev. 507, 508-13 (1971); Comment, Advertising, Solicitation, and Prepaid Legal Services, 40
Tenn. L. Rev. 439, 441-49 (1973); Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to
Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 Yale L.J. 1181, 1185-91 (1972); 51 Texas L. Rev. 169, 173
(1972).
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ments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal
profession . . . . [U]nder the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be
the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances."1

In subsequent cases the Supreme Court reiterated its position that legal
advocacy enjoys the protection of the first amendment when there is no
58
danger of conflict of interests.
Within the framework of the first amendment, rule 23, and the fear of
abuse of the class action device, the Third Circuit, in Rodgers v. United
States Steel Corp., 59 examined local rule 34(d) of the Western District of
Pennsylvania and the district court's order preventing plaintiffs' communication with potential class members. The district court faced an unusual
situation. Plaintiffs desired to communicate with potential class members
about relief for their benefit to which defendants had acquiesced in a consent
decree with EEOC, plaintiff in another action in the Alabama district court
for the benefit of the same class. 60 Plaintiffs considered the relief provided by
the Alabama consent decree insufficient to compensate the workers and
wished to counsel them against signing releases to defendants. 6 I This motive
did not seem unreasonable for attorneys seeking the best for their clients,
particularly when attorneys were counsel from the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, which organization's prime concern is the protection
62
and litigation of civil rights in the area of minority discrimination.
The Pennsylvania district court, however, not wishing plaintiffs to discuss
the Alabama consent decree with the class members, employed local rule
34(d) to ban all communications by plaintiffs. 63 Plaintiffs sought intervention
in Alabama to contest the terms of the decree as well as a protective order in
Pennsylvania to prevent defendants from communicating with class members,
but they did not achieve complete success. The Alabama district court
granted intervention but rejected plaintiffs' objections to the terms of the
consent decree. 64 The Pennsylvania district court placed some limits on
defendants' communications, but not a complete ban. In effect, defendants
were free to solicit releases from plaintiffs' potential class members while
plaintiffs were prohibited from discussing the matter with those same persons.

65

57.
58.
Illinois
ex rel.
59.

371 U.S. at 428-30.
United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 582-84 (1971); United Mine Workers v.
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-25 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975).

60.

United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 74-P-339-S (N.D. Ala., Apr.

12, 1974).
61.
508 F.2d at 155.
62. See note 1 supra.
63. 508 F.2d at 155-56.
64. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1, 7-8 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (on

application for intervention).
65.

508 F.2d at 156-57.
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Although the intent behind local rule 34(d) was to prevent abuse of rule
23,66 its operation in this instance appeared to prevent plaintiffs and their
attorneys from acting in the best interests of the workers they sought to
represent. Instead of protecting the potential class members, rule 34(d)
appeared to operate in this case to prejudice their rights, particularly if the
relief sought in the Pennsylvania class action would be more beneficial than
that awarded under the Alabama consent decree. Defendants were in a
position to weaken the potential class by soliciting releases from potential
class members while plaintiffs could not advise these same individuals of the
advantages and disadvantages of signing the releases.
Plaintiffs argued, and the Third Circuit agreed, that the district court's
action conflicted with the first amendment, the statutory rulemaking power of
the district court, and the policies underlying rule 23, all of which must be
balanced against proper judicial administration of class actions to prevent
abuse. 67 Although the Third Circuit noted that local rule 34(d) operated in
two areas-before and after the class action determination-the court's concern in this instance was with the rule's operation before the class action
68
determination.

As regards the first amendment issue, the Third Circuit recognized that
communications by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund with
potential members of a class action involved rights of speech and association
similar to those involved in NAACP v. Button. 69 Although the court did not
detail the significance of preventing plaintiffs' communication with potential
class members regarding their civil rights, it appears that allowing such a ban
would work an injustice on the potential class members and would seriously
undermine the operations of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund. The court examined the constitutional overbreadth in the local rule
which prevented all forms of communication, "not merely communication
aimed at stirring up litigation. ' 70 The facts of the case revealed the inequities
of a blanket restraint. Plaintiffs were seeking legitimate advantages for the
potential class members rather than clients, funds, or personal benefits.
However, the local rule and the district court ignored this distinction.
The court's conclusion that local rule 34(d)'s blanket restraint would
jeopardize the first amendment rights of plaintiffs is understandable in light of
the Supreme Court's approval of vigorous advocacy where no danger of
unethical conduct exists, particularly in the area of civil rights.7t However,

plaintiffs in litigation not involving civil rights might not have such a strong
66.
67.
68.

See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
508 F.2d at 162-65.
Id. at 162. The majority recognized that after class action determination the operation of

local rule 34(d) could raise similar questions which might be resolved in a different manner. Id.
69. 371 U.S.
70. 508 F.2d
local rule 34(d).
71. See notes

415 (1963).
at 164. Judge Weis rested his concurrence solely on the overbroad wording of
Id. at 166.
56-58 supra and accompanying text.
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argument under the first amendment. 72 Perhaps it was for this reason the
court avoided a decision based on constitutional grounds and chose instead to
7
base its decision on the statutory rulemaking power of the district court. "
The statutory sources of the district court rulemaking power are Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83, 74 and 28 U.S.C. section 2071. 7 5 Since the
opportunities for unethical activities abound in the class action device of rule
2376 and since no federal common law offense of barratry exists, 77 the courts
might understandably seek to control unethical practices under rule 23
through the rulemaking power of these statutes.7 8 However, such rules must
not contravene the general policies behind the federal class action which
encourage common participation in lawsuits.
Local rule 34(d) was an attempt by the Western District of Pennsylvania to
eliminate abuses of rule 23. By prohibiting all communications of parties with
potential class members prior to the class action determination, the local rule
prevented unethical communications; however, it also prevented legitimate
communications resulting in prejudice to the very rights the local rule sought
to protect. The rulemaking power of the district court does not sanction a
prior judicial restraint on "communications seek[ing] to encourage common
participation in a lawsuit"; 79 consequently, the Third Circuit struck down
local rule 34(d) as drawn.8 0 Although the court used the statutory rather than
the constitutional basis for its decision, it appeared to lean heavily on first
amendment arguments in finding that the prohibition of communications with
potential class members was beyond the power of the district court.
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania will no doubt
72. 508 F.2d at 166 (Weis, J., concurring). "There is a distinction between litigation alleging
violations of civil rights and a routine damage suit, and that factor is troublesome here." Id.
73. Id. at 164.
74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 provides: "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges
thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with
these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon their
promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In all cases not provided
for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules."
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court."
76. See notes 35-52 supra and accompanying text.
77. 508 F.2d at 163.
78. The courts have exercised this rule-making power in other circumstances. Schlesinger v.
Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 141-42 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973) (rule establishing
guidelines for schedule of fees); see Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1968) (rule
limiting appearances by out-of-state attorneys held invalid); cf. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
307 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962) (no power to fine an attorney not
held in contempt).
79. 508 F.2d at 163-64; see Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1968) (local rule
not permitted to operate in such manner as to limit access to federal courts).
80. 508 F.2d at 164.
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adopt a new local rule as required by Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.
The need for control of activities before the class determination is apparent;
however, mindful of the problems of overbreadth, the district court should
enact a rule that will limit abuse of the class action device while, at the same
time, protecting proper communications with non-party class members.
Rose Afary Reilly

Patents-Antiradiation Agents Discovered Under Contract with AEC
Held Not Property of Government Under Section 152 of Atomic
Energy Act of 1954.-In the course of a contract between their employer,
Southern Research Institute, and the United States Arm) Medical Research
and Development Command, for the benefit of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), appellants Piper and Johnston developed certain chemical compounds potentially useful as antiradiation agents for which the), filed a patent
application.' Following the procedures under section 152 of the Atomic
Energy Act,? appellants filed a statement under oath describing the cir1. Patent application Serial No. 784,231 for "Antiradiation Agents," filed December 16, 1968.
Piper v. AEC, 502 F.2d 1393, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974). The application stated that such compounds could be useful in providing "protection against the harmful effects of X-ray radiation.
(and] other sources of harmful radiation such as may be encountered by personnel in the
[..
fringe areas of a nuclear explosion or by space travelers." Id.
2. Section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1970)
provides in pertinent part:
"Any invention or discovery, useful in the production or utilization of special nuclear material
or atomic energy, made or conceived in the course of or under any contract ... with or for the
benefit of the Commission, regardless of whether the contract . . . involved the expenditure of
funds by the Commission, shall be vested in, and be the property of, the Commission, except that
the Commission may waive its claim to any such invention or discovery under such circumstances
as the Commission may deem appropriate, consistent with the policy of this section. No patent
for any invention or discovery, useful in the production or utilization of special nuclear material
or atomic energy, shall be issued unless the applicant files with the application, or within thirty
days after request therefor by the Commissioner of Patents ... a statement under oath setting
forth the full facts surrounding the making or conception of the invention or discovery described
in the application and whether the invention or discovery was made or conceived in the course of
or under any contract ... with or for the benefit of the Commission, regardless of whether the
contract.., involved the expenditure of funds by the Commission. The Commissioner of Patents
shall as soon as the application is otherwise in condition for allowance forward copies of the
application and the statement to the Commission.
"The Commissioner of Patents may proceed with the application and issue the patent to the
applicant (if the invention or discovery is otherwise patentable) unless the Commission, within 90
days after receipt of copies of the application and statement, directs the Commissioner of Patents
to issue the patent to the Commission (if the invention or discovery is otherwise patentable) to be
held by the Commission as the agent of and on behalf of the United States.
"If the Commission files such a direction with the Commissioner of Patents, and if the
applicant's statement claims, and the applicant still believes, that the invention or discovery was
not made or conceived in the course of or under any contract ... entitling the Commission to the
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cumstances surrounding the discovery. The AEC responded by directing the
Commissioner of Patents to issue the patent to the AEC, as provided in the
statute, because the compounds involved were "useful in the production or
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy."' 4 At a hearing before
the Board of Patent Interferences, the Board held that the AEC was entitled
to have the patent issued to it because these protective agents were encompassed by the language of the statute. 5 On appeal to the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, 6 the Board decision was reversed-the
antiradiation agents were found not to be within the purview of section 152.
Piper v. AEC, 502 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Cases decided under section 152 have been few, 7 and as evidenced by the
title to the application or the patent, the applicant may, within 30 days after notification of the
filing of such a direction, request a hearing before a Board of Patent Interferences. The Board
shall have the power to hear and determine whether the Commission was entitled to the direction
filed with the Commissioner of Patents. The Board shall follow the rules and procedures
established for interference cases and an appeal may be taken by either the applicant or the
Commission from the final order of the Board to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals In
accordance with the procedures governing the appeals from the Board of Patent Interferences."
As provided in this section, the AEC has the right to waive any patent rights. See 10 C.F.R.
§§ 83.1-.2 (1974). For a comprehensive discussion of procedure under this statute, see
Rosenblum, Practice Before the Patent Office Under Section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act and
Section 305 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, 25 Fed. B.J. 74 (1965).
3. There is a statutory duty of full disclosure. 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1970). This is accomplished
by filing a report along with the patent application, or within 30 days, at the request of the
Commissioner of Patents, who forwards the information to the AEC. See Riesenfeld, Patent
Protection and Atomic Energy Legislation, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 55 & n.104 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Riesenfeld].
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1970).
5. Piper v. AEC, 502 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1970) specifically designates the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as
the proper forum for an appeal from a final order of the Board of Patent Interferences. See UMC
Indus., Inc. v. Seaborg, 439 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (decision of Board under
§ 2182 reviewable only in the designated forum and not in federal district court). When Congress
specifically names a forum, that forum is exclusive regardless of whether the word "exclusive" Is
used in the statute. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411,
422 (1965).
7. See Fitch v. AEC, 491 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (judicial interpretation of "in the course
of or under any contract" with the AEC); UMC Indus., Inc. v. Seaborg, 439 F.2d 953, 955 (9th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (section 152 provides an exclusive forum for appeal of final order of Board
of Patent Interferences); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. AEC, 344 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Il. 1972) (language
of section 152 creates a presumption in favor of the government's retention of ownership of
patent); Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) (Atomic Energy Act is valid exercise of authority of Congress to
promote and protect national safety under war powers); Consolidated Eng'r Corp. v. United
States, 127 F. Supp. 558 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 939 (1955) (Atomic Energy Act
eliminates private patents from atomic energy field).
Section 152 uses the phrase "made or conceived" under contract with the AEC. NASA takes
title under section 305 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2457(a) (1970),
when the invention is "made" under contract with NASA. "Made" is defined in section 3050)(3)
as "the conception or first actual reduction to practice of such invention." Id. § 2457(j)(3). For
decisions under this similar provision, see Hummer v. Administrator of NASA, 500 F.2d 1383
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court's opinion, offer little in the way of direct precedential value in resolving
the scope of the statutory language, "useful in the production or utilization of
. . . atomic energy." As a result, the court's decision was based almost
exclusively on statutory interpretation.
In enacting this section, Congress had a choice of two theories which come
into play in deciding where title to patentable material developed under
government contract should reside: the license theory and the title theory. 8
The license theory preserves the contractor's right to acquire patents for his
discoveries by vesting title in the contractor, but grants a royalty-free nonexclusive license to the government. 9 The proponents of this theory argue that a
nonexclusive license is all the government needs for its limited purposes and
that the title theory destroys inventor incentive.' 0
The basic premise of the title theory is that since government research
contracts are financed by the taxpayer, the public should own the inventions.'" This theory is actually a restatement of the common law rule that
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (camera was developed pursuant to contract with NASA even though NASA's
reduction to practice of the invention did not occur until after the contract had terminated);
Williams v. Administrator of NASA, 463 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S- 950
(1973) (test for "reduction to practice" is whether tests show that invention will serve purpose for
which it is intended so conclusively that practical men would put it into commercial use).
8. Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor New Approaches to Old Problems (pt.
1), 56 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 648, 652-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Orkin]. For an evaluation of the
relative merits of both theories, see Anderson, If There Is an Invention Under a Government
Contract-Who Should Get It?, 21 Fed. B.J. 64, 69-76 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Andersoni.
9. Anderson 64. The government's license theory is analogous to the common law "shop
right" concept. Under this doctrine, a non-exclusive, non-assignable, ro-alty-free license was
granted to the employer and the patent belonged to the employee if the invention was a result of
the contributions of both. A typical situation for the application of the "shop right" doctrine arises
where the employee's contract did not contemplate invention but the invention was made during
employment hours with the use of the employer's facilities. See United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933); Toner v. Sobelman, 86 F. Supp. 369, 377-78 (E.D.
Pa. 1949). See generally Orkin 649-50.
10. Anderson 69. The argument is also made by the licensing advocates that what the
government pays for in funding research and development is "a product and a license to use for
governmental purposes." Id. at 72. The counterargument that the government has paid for an
invention is perhaps equally persuasive. Id. It should be noted, however, that section 152 does
not require the expenditure of funds by the Commission. See note 2 supra. For the proposition
that there should be a uniform policy for all government agencies, see Watson, Research in
Patent Policies in Federal Research and Development Contracts, 21 Fed. B.J. 146 (1961).
11. Forman, Government Ownership of Patents and the Administration Thereof. 28 Tem.
L.Q. 31, 33 (1954). The leading spokesman for the title theory is Senator Russell B. Long. His
position is that the government should receive the benefits of any developments from research in
which it has invested large sums. If the government takes title and allows public use or licensing
of its patents, then the public, who paid for the research, would ultimately benefit from any
discoveries. See Long, A Government Patent Policy To Serve the Public Interest, 47 A.B.A.J.
675 (1961); Long, Federal Contract Patent Policy and the Public Interest, 21 Fed. B.J. 7 (1961).
For the argument that the government should take title only when public policy or national
security so requires, see Daddario, A Patent Policy for a Free Enterprise Economy, 47 A. B.A.J.
671 (1961). See also Note, Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions: Publication
versus Patenting, 55 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1088-91 (1967).
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"[a]n invention made by an employee in the course of his employment and in
fulfilment of his duties belongs to the employer .... ,,12
Of these two theories, it was the title theory which was adopted by section
152 of the Atomic Energy Act. However, Congress appears to have enacted
this section more in the interest of national security than for "benefit of the
public" reasons:
In considering the patent implications of these provisions [of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946], the committee concluded that private patents can play no role in fields of

activity reserved exclusively to the Government. For this reason, and to eliminate risks
of disclosure of restricted information, risks which would be certain to arise under
normal patent procedures, the bill provides
that inventions and discoveries in these
13
fields shall not be patentable matter.
Despite the statute's express sanction of the title theory, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in Piper had to decide how broad an interpretation to give the words " 'useful in the production or utilization of... atomic
energy.' ",14 The court was faced with the incongruity of legislative intent and
practical application. Although Congress stated, when amending section 152
to insert the first paragraph, 1 5 that "[t]he purpose of the . ..changes is to
more clearly define the applicability of section 152, ''1 6 the Board of Patent
Interferences noted that "the breadth of the statutory language 'is anything
but clearly delimited.' "17
The 1954 revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which added the
original section 152, had a two-fold purpose: "relaxation of the government
monopoly in the areas of production and utilization of atomic energy, coupled
with a corresponding expansion of the area in which private patents could be
obtained. '1 8 The Piper majority accepted section 152 as a component of
12. Meinhardt, The Employee as Inventor, 1971 J. Bus. L. 273 (1971). Another common law
rule in the United States is that the "employee has no right to special remuneration for inventions
made by him which belong to the employer." Id. at 27'.
13. S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 1946 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1327,
1335. In deciding that there was "no place" for private patents in the atomic energy field,
Congress was probably concerned with extreme situations such as war, where it would be
detrimental to have to deal with private individuals to acquire rights to use the patent. However,
the same safeguard could be provided by the license theory.
Another alternative to the complete elimination of inventor patents in the atomic energy field,
which might have been considered, is for information in the patent application to be kept secret
by the Patent Office to protect national security under The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35
U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1970). See Note, Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions:
Publication versus Patenting, 55 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1086-87 (1967).
14. 502 F.2d at 1396. As Judge Miller, writing for the majority, stated: "Obviously, they could
be so broadly construed as to include inventions relating to nuts and bolts on general purpose
machinery used in the production of atomic energy-an absurd result which is not to be attributed
to the Congress." Id. (emphasis deleted). But see id. at 1406 n.4 (Rich. J.,dissenting).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. 1961 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2601.
17. 502 F.2d at 1396, quoting the Board opinion.
18. Riesenfeld 46. This liberalization was recommended by President Eisenhower in his
message to Congress on February 17, 1954. See 502 F.2d at 1396, 1402. For a detailed
description of the legislative history of the 1954 revision, see Riesenfeld 45-50.
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Congress' liberalization plan. 1 9 However, as pointed out by the dissenting
opinion, since section 152 was an entirely new section (as of 1954), which
invested inventor status in the AEC, the liberalizing intent of Congress
applied only to other sections of the Atomic Energy
Act which were revised,
20
while section 152 made the Act more strict.
Due to the conflicting interpretations of the legislative history, the court had
to determine the meaning of "useful in." 2 1 Starting with the premise that
antiradiation agents are not directly involved, e.g., as a component, in the
production or utilization of atomic energy, the majority criticized the Board's
finding that the antiradiation agents were "proximately related" to the utilization of atomic energy. 22 Such an approach, the majority contended, would
limit the instances in which private patents could be issued. 2 3 However,
assuming the dissent's interpretation of congressional intent is the more
accurate (one cannot liberalize that which has not previously existed), 24 the
majority's approach is not consistent with the objective of section 152.25
The majority, in rejecting the Board's "proximate relationship" test as an
incorrect interpretation of the statutory language, substituted its own test of
"tessential or fundamental relationship ' 26 of the discovery, to the utilization of
atomic energy, and found that antiradiation agents failed to meet this test. 27
To make a decision on the basis of substitution of statutory language is to
devise a test to reach the desired result. Many inventions could be included
within the statutory scheme as being proximately related to the utilization of
atomic energy, just as many discoveries could be excluded by the use of more
stringent language. There are more compelling, as well as practical, arguments to be made for or against the coverage of antiradiation agents by the
statute.
Both the Board and the dissent believed that the compounds were covered
by the statute because they might serve as protective agents for those who are
19. 502 F.2d at 1396 & n.3.
20. Id. at 1402 (Rich, J., dissenting); see Riesenfeld 49-50. Ironically, section 152, an
"uncalled-for departure from one of the basic tenets of American patent law was railroaded into
the Act by its unwary author [Rep. Cole] in order to combat the purported un-Americanism of
compulsory licensing. .. ." Riesenfeld 55-56 (footnote omitted). See also 100 Cong. Rec. 11,658
(1954) (remarks of Rep. Cole).

21. This problem of statutory interpretation was inevitable. As predicted after the original
enactment of section 152, "there seems to be no escape from the fact that troubles... are bound
to arise, once government inventorship by statutory fiat is taken literally." Riesenfeld 56.
22. 502 F.2d at 1397.
23. Id. at 1396.
24. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
25. The dissent states that section 152 is not concerned with the issuance of patents, but deals
only with the question of in whom title to the patent vests. 502 F.2d at 1404 (Rich, J.,
dissenting). It is questionable, however, whether this view is totally accurate. Section 152
indirectly concerns the issuance of patents because, by denying title to the inventor, it destroys a
major incentive for private research, the source of many patent applications.
26. Id. at 1396.
27. Id. at 1396-97. It is interesting to note that the concurring opinion criticizes both the
majority and the dissent for their substitutions of language. Id. at 1399 (.\arkey. C.J.,
concurring).
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involved in the production or utilization of atomic energy. 28 The strongest
argument for inclusion of the drugs in the statutory language is that the AEC
could use these drugs to save lives. It is common knowledge that "nuclear
power production is extremely hazardous, and painstaking precautions are
'29
required to ensure the protection of health and safety and the environment.
Nuclear reactors release small amounts of radiation 30 and power plants
housing reactors release radioactive wastes. 31 The AEC remains responsible
for implementing and enforcing radiation emission standards and for complaints about high concentration emissions. 32 Arguably, the AEC should be
entitled to retain the benefits of federally-funded research on antiradiation
drugs if it is responsible to the public for minimizing the hazards of working
33
with nuclear material.
The arguments against the inclusion of antiradiation agents in the statutory
plan appear to be more persuasive. Such agents contribute in no way to the
production of atomic energy and can only be used in providing protection
against radiation during or after the utilization of atomic energy. But the
agents have more varied use 34-they can also be used to protect against
emissions from X-rays. 3s X-rays as a source of radiation have always been
under state and not federal control. 36 In addition, under section 274 of the
28. Id. at 1406 (Rich, J., dissenting).
29. Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful Atom: Participation in AEC Regulatory Proceedings,
52 Texas L. Rev. 466 (1974).
30. Id. at 474.
31. The AEC has exclusive power to regulate radioactive waste releases from nuclear power
plants. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S.
1035 (1972) (mem.), noted in 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 813 (1972); 22 Drake L. Rev. 194
(1972); 25 Vand. L. Rev. 418 (1972).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). See generally Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful Atom:
Participation in AEC Regulatory Proceedings, 52 Texas L. Rev. 466, 474-76 (1974).
33. The role of the federal government in radiation control and safety is much more extensive
than mere funding of research. For a breakdown of departmental involvement, see Report by
Comptroller Gen'l of U.S. to the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, "Opportunities for Improving
AEC's Administration of Agreements with States Regulating Users of Radioactive Materials"
(June 11, 1973), 15 Atomic Energy L.J. 63, 120-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Report].
34. A consideration of the varied uses of an invention could well be an essential part of the
test under section 152. See 502 F.2d 1396-97, 1406 n.4. The most persuasive argument for not
vesting title in the government is that the widest use of the antiradiation agents may not be in tile
area of atomic energy. For example, the drugs could be used in the field of medicine as protective
agents injected before exposure to X-ray radiation. The potential for extensive use in the
nongovernmental sector is such an important factor because, if title is vested in the government
under section 152, there is no assurance that the AEC will subsequently grant licenses for the use
of the invention. (Licenses are discretionary with the AEC under 42 U.S.C. § 2186 (1970)).
Perhaps future decisions under section 152 will be made by a balancing of governmental and
nongovernmental uses of the invention.
35. 502 F.2d at 1394.
36. Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations
Problem, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 72 (1961); Report 71; see 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). For an
analysis of the possible injuries resulting from radiation, see E. Stason, S. Estep & W. Pierce,
Atoms and the Law 3-35 (1959).

CASE NOTES

1103

37

Atomic Energy Act, radiation control over other nuclear materials may be
licensed to the states by the AEC. 38 The governor of a state may enter into
such a licensing agreement with the AEC if the state's regulatory program of
radiation control is compatible with the AEC's program and is adequate to
protect public health and safety. 39 By taking responsibility for radiation
control, the states somewhat relieve the AEC of its duty to protect the public.
As a result, the necessity of vesting title to patents involving antiradiation
agents in the federal government is diminished.
The argument has also been made that section 152 serves to discourage
private investment and initiative in the atomic energy field because of fear of
loss of a patent to the government. 40 In opting for the title theory in
enacting section 152, Congress was largely concerned with national security. 4
Assuming that relation to national security is one test under section 152,42 the
AEC would have to make a strong showing that giving Piper title to
antiradiation drugs would be detrimental to national security. However, the
court did not discuss the invention in relation to national security, 43 but
limited itself to a determination of whether the agents were useful in the
production or utilization of atomic energy. Both the majority and the dissent
neglected to consider this aspect of congressional intent. Any expansion of the
breadth of the statute to include discoveries not essential to national security
would only aggravate the discouragement of private investment and initiative:
Title to a patent . . . may therefore be safely left in the hands of appellant in full
compliance with the overall intent of Congress to encourage private industry. For the
AEC to take title to this particular invention is contrary to that intent. 44
The importance of the Piper decision-and especially the three separate
opinions-was recognized in the concurring opinion:
Each invention, and its use, must be independently analyzed, requiring that each case
involving that phrase in § 152, of which this is the first, be determined on its own
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1970).
38. Report 64. For discussions of the role of states in radiation control, both before and after
the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970), see Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation
Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 41 (1961); Franpton.
Radiation Exposure-The Need for a National Policy, I0 Stan. L. Rev. 7 (1957); Krebs &
Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21 Law & Contemp. Prob. 182 (1956);
Schwan & Urbach, The Suggested State Radiation Control Act, 50 Ky. L.J. 13 (1961). See
generally E. Stason, S. Estep & W. Pierce, Atoms and the Law 880-912 (1959).
39. Report 67; see 26 Fed. Reg. 2536-39 (1961).
40. Koris, Atomic Energy Patent Program, 41 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 34, 40 (1959).
41. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
42. For the tests applied by the majority and by the dissent, see text accompanying notes
22-27 supra.
43. Query whether vesting title in the government was necessary even where the invention
was directly useful in the production of atomic energy. The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35
U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1970), could be used to effectively protect any secret information, thereby
mitigating any national security problems. See note 13 supra.
44. 502 F.2d at 1400 (Markey, C.J., concurring).
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facts. The establishment of guidelines, or pigeon-holes
into which future inventions
45
may fall, must await delineation in future cases.
Since this is the first case in which an appeal was taken from the Board's final
order on the question of the nature of inventions covered by the statute, it
could have had strong precedential value by setting forth definite boundaries.
However, because the judges differed on statutory interpretations and
adopted differing tests for practical application, Piper suggests that each case
must be determined on an ad hoc basis. But perhaps this is best-the nature
of future inventions is uncertain and there is no need for judicial imposition of
narrowing phrases where Congress has employed language general enough to
withstand change in a rapidly developing field.
Claire V. Eagan

Trusts and Estates-Court Approved Reorganization of Charitable
Trust Does Not Revoke Trust-Residuary Bequest to Original Trust
Passes to New Trust.-Settlor, a prominent physician, created an irrevocable charitable inter vivos trust in 1956 for an express term of ten years for the
purpose of building, equipping and operating a laboratory for experimental
surgery at Harlem Hospital, I a municipal hospital owned by the City of New
York. Any unexpended principal and interest was to be paid to the hospital at
the expiration of the term. In 1961, settlor executed a will pouring his
residuary estate into the trust. 2 At the end of the ten-year term it became clear
45. Id. at 1398. The concurring opinion of Chief Judge Markey isolated several justifications
for not giving the patent to the AEC. He narrowly read each of the statutory terms, and
concluded:
"Hence I would find that chemical compounds which are used only in the bodies of persons
exposed to radiation, and only to counteract or preclude the effects of such radiation, are not so
'useful in the production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy' as to bring
such compounds within the purview of § 152." Id. at 1401.
1. The trust instrument recited: "This ... charitable trust, shall be known as the Godfrey
Nurse Fund. The sole purpose and objective of the Trust is to furnish and appropriate funds
necessary for the operation of the Godfrey Nurse Laboratory for Experimental Surgery at Harlem
Hospital . . . ." Estate of Nurse, 166 N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1971, at 10, col. 3 (Sur. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
43 App. Div. 2d 527, 349 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 381, 321 N.E.2d 537,
362 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1974). At the creation of the trust, the corpus amounted to $105,000 and the
trustees were instructed to pay up to $10,000 per year for accomplishment of the trust purposes.
In re Estate of Nurse, 35 N.Y.2d at 385, 321 N.E.2d at 538, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
2. "All the rest, residue and remainder of my property ... I give, devise, and bequeath unto
City Bank Farmers Trust (now First National City Trust Company), and Thomas B. Dyett, as
trustees of a certain inter vivos charitable trust made by me as settlor and dated 23rd day of May,
1956, and known as the Godfrey Nurse Fund . . . with direction to the Trustees to apply and
distribute the said funds in accordance with the provisions of the said trust." In re Estate of
Nurse, 35 N.Y.2d 381, 386, 321 N.E.2d 537, 539, 362 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (1974).

At the time of the execution of this will (June 16, 1961), there was no statutory authorization
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that the hospital would not establish the laboratory; the trustees petitioned in
state supreme court for instructions regarding disposition of the remaining
trust property, 3 some of which had been applied with the settlor's consent to
surgical projects, lectures and scientific activities. During the pendency of
that action, the trustees, the settlor, the state Attorney General and the city
Corporation Counsel executed a stipulation, which the court approved and
adopted in its order of May, 1967, providing for an alternative use of the trust
fund. 4 Upon settlor's death in 1968, the pour-over provision of the unamended 1961 will was challenged and the $250,000 residuary estate was
claimed by the settlor's intestate successors, who argued that the trust had
terminated prior to the settlor's death leaving no trust into which the
residuary estate could pour. Affirming a three to two decision of the Appellate
Division, the New York Court of Appeals held that the 1967 supreme court
order constituted a valid, consensual "modification" of the charitable trust
and was, therefore, an effective amendment of the trust instrument. Consequently, the court held that the 1956 trust was in existence at the time of the
testator's death, despite the expiration of the ten-year term, and that the
for such a pour-over from a will to a previously established inter vivos trust. Legislation
authorizing such a provision failed to pass in the 1960 New York Legislature, but eventually was
enacted as § 47-g of the Decedent Estate Law, effective June 1. 1966 [transferred, effective SepL
1, 1967, to N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 3-3.7 (McKinney 1967)]. See Second Rep. of the Temp. State
Comm'n on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, 1963 N.Y.
Legis. Doc. No. 19, Rep. 6.1B. Prior to this legislation there was much confusion in New York
due to the rejection by New York courts of the concept of "incorporation by reference." In
President & Dir. of the Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d
Dep't 1940), the court held that a pour-over trust arrangement constituted an unlawful incorporation by reference. Nevertheless, based on the reasoning of In re Will of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327,
179 N.E. 755 (1932) (Cardozo, C.J.), New York courts did allow pour-overs to charitable
foundations, In re Estate of Tiffany, 157 Misc. 873, 880, 285 N.Y.S. 971, 979-80, (Sur. CL
1935), to trustees of charitable foundations, In re Estate of Weber, 22 Misc. 2d 290, 195
N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sur. Ct. 1959), to an inter vivos trust that had not been amended since execution
of the will, In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sur. CL 1953), and to an amendable inter
vivos trust actually amended after the execution of the pour-over will, In re Will of Ivie, 4
N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958).
3. The trustees' petition asked for instructions" 'as to the proper disposition of the trust funds
to the end that the judgment to be entered herein will direct the administration and expenditure
of the trust funds in a manner which will most effectually accomplish the general purpose of the
trust.' " 35 N.Y.2d at 386, 321 N.E.2d at 539, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 444. This language clearly
paraphrased the language of the statute, presently N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967),
allowing a trustee to apply to the supreme court for exercise of its cy pres power. See notes 27-39
infra.
4. The parties agreed to transfer the funds to the City of New York to be administered by
three "directors" for life or until resignation, with provisions to name successors. "The Godfrey
Nurse Fund" was to be used to fund the Godfrey Nurse Lectures to be delivered at Harlem
Hospital by "'a surgeon or distinguished worker in surgery to be chosen by the Director of
Surgery at Harlem Hospital,' " the Godfrey Nurse Research and Travel Grants for which
" '[a]ny Negro engaged specifically in the field of surgery shall be eligible,'" and the Godfrey
Nurse Fellowship " 'to be granted to a Negro surgeon of pre-eminant [sic] distinction.'" 35
N.Y.2d at 386-87, 321 N.E.2d at 539, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 444-45.
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residuary clause of the will effectively poured the residuary estate into the
trust. In re Estate of Nurse, 35 N.Y.2d 381, 321 N.E.2d 537, 362 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1974).

Section 3-3.7 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) expressly
allows testamentary dispositions to a trustee under or in accordance with the
terms of a trust created "prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of
the will" and which is still in existence on the date of the testator's death. 5
The statute requires that the trust into which the testamentary disposition is
to pour be "evidenced by a written instrument" that has been "executed and
acknowledged . . . in the manner required . . . for the recording of a

conveyance of real property," and that such instrument be identified in the
will. 6 This last provision applies even if the "trust instrument is amendable or
revocable," or actually has been modified since the creation of the trust. 7 For
the amendment to satisfy the "identified writing" requirements of the section,
the amending document also must be in writing and proved in the same
manner as the original trust instrument. 8 If the trust has been revoked or
terminated before the testator-settlor's death, the pour-over disposition will
fail and the bequest will pass under intestacy unless the testator has made an
alternative disposition of the property.9
Generally, the settlor will fix the duration of a trust at the time of creation
by specifying a fixed term of years, a person's lifetime, or the accomplishment
of a certain trust purpose.10 The trust does not terminate automatically,
however, simply because the time or event by which its duration is measured
has occurred," or because the trustee believes that the purposes of the trust
have been fulfilled. Rather, the trustee first must account for and distribute
5.

N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 3-3.7(a) (McKinney 1967).

6. Id. Pour-over provisions today are covered by statute in virtually every state. E.g., Del.
Code Ann. tit. 12, § 111 (1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 736.17 (Supp. 1974); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 43a
(1965); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-47 (1966); Pa. Stat. Ann. it. 20, § 2515 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 2329 (1974); Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-73 (1973); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 11.12.250 (1967); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 701.09 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-53 (1957).
The Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act has been adopted by several states. E.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-141 (Supp. 1974); Cal. Prob. Code § 170 (West Supp. 1975); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-173a (1973); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 3A:3-16.1 to -16.5 (Supp. 1974). See
generally Note, Trusts-Pour-over from a Will to an Inter Vivos Trust, 8 Washburn L.J. 81
(1968).

7. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 3-3.7(b)(1) (McKinney 1967).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 3-3.7(e). In some states, courts have revived inter vivos trusts that settlors had
incorporated by reference into testamentary pour-over provisions but had revoked prior to death
without amending the testamentary disposition. Otherwise, the bequests would have passed
under intestacy. 1 A. Scott, Trusts § 54.3, at 403-04 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited by volume
as Scotti.
10. 4 Scott § 329A.
11. In most instances, the term of years will not itself be a material purpose of the trust.
There may be situations in which limitation of the duration of the trust is a material feature of the
settlor's scheme. For instance, the settlor may wish to provide income until the beneficiary
reaches a certain age or to fund a project for a certain initial period of time. Id. § 334.
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the trust res. For this purpose, the trustee may petition the court for an order

permitting termination of the trust' 2 and the court will decide whether
termination is warranted. If the court is satisfied that the material purposes
for which the trust was created have been accomplished, it will allow an
accounting and distribution by the trustee, thus causing the formal termination of the trust.13 In the case of certain charitable trusts intended to benefit
society generally, the court may exercise its discretionary power under the
doctrine of cy pres to order reapplication of the trust funds to the same or a
related purpose rather than permit termination.14
On the other hand, if the court finds that the material purposes have not
been accomplished, ordinarily it will not allow termination, even though the
term specified by the settlor has expired. 15 Instead, the New York court will
order the trust to continue according to the terms of the original trust
instrument or pursuant to a modification agreed to by all interested parties
under EPTL section 7-1.9.16 Only if the purposes have become illegal or
impossible to accomplish will the court allow termination under these circumstances,' 7 although application of cy pres jurisdiction may be ordered to
redirect the trust funds to a related purpose. 8
It is also generally accepted that a settlor may cause the termination of an
inter vivos trust by exercising an expressly reserved power to revoke, any
definite manifestation of revocatory intent being sufficient for this purpose.' 9
The power to revoke necessarily includes the power to amend or modify the
trust instrument.2 0 Absent such a reservation of power, the settlor may not
12. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 7-2.7(a) (McKinney 1967). In some cases, the trust instrument may
provide for discretionary termination by the trustee. 4 Scott § 334.1. In addition, by distributing
the trust res and securing releases from all parties interested in the trust, the trustee may
terminate without judicial intervention. Id. § 342.
13. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 7-2.2 (McKinney 1967); In re Will of Miller, 257 N.Y. 349, 355, 178
N.E. 555, 556 (1931) (administration of a trust over personalty is not complete until the trustee
actually has divided and distributed the property held in trust); Neary v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 260 App. Div. 791, 793, 24 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (2d Dep't 1940); 4 Scott § 344, at 2735
(a trust is "terminated only when the trustee has finally accounted and conveyed the trust
property to the persons entitled to it. .. "); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 344 & comment a
(1959); see In re Will of McManus, 282 N.Y. 420, 427, 26 N.E.2d 960, 963 (1940) (trustee who
has not completed performance of his duties is not justified in distributing corpus). Indeed, if !ill
the purposes of a trust have been accomplished, the trust will become a "dry trust." 1 Scott
§ 69.2. In such a case, the trustee's legal title .ill be transferred by operation of law to the
beneficial owners of the trust res and the trust will be considered terminated. See N.Y E.P.T.L.
§§ 7-1.1, -2.2 (McKinney 1967).
14. See notes 28-40 infra and accompanying text.
15. 4 Scott § 334, at 2639-40; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 334, comment a (19591. See
generally 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 70 (1975).
16. See notes 19-26 infra and accompanying text.
17. 4 Scott § 335; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 335 (1959).
18. See notes 27-35 infra and accompanying text.
19. 4 Scott § 330.
20. In re Trusts of Muller, 33 Misc. 2d 846, 219 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. CL 1961); accord,
Preston v. City Natl Bank, 294 So. 2d 11. 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See generally 4 Scott
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revoke unless he is the sole beneficiary" or unless all the beneficiaries consent
to the revocation or amendment. 22 Section 7-1.9 of the EPTL codifies and
extends this power, allowing the settlor to revoke or amend a trust, even if
the instrument expressly asserts irrevocability, by entering into a written
agreement with all interested parties.2 3 Any such agreement must be properly
executed and proved in a form sufficient to allow recordation of a deed to real
property.2 4 The rights under section 7-1.9 are implicit in all inter vivos
trusts, 25 including charitable trusts, 26 but obviously apply only during the

lifetime of the settlor. If revocation or modification has been perfected either
through exercise of a reserved power or by an agreement pursuant to section
7-1.9, it is effective without any court intervention.
In the case of charitable inter vivos or testamentary trusts, the trust
instrument may be modified by a court through the application of the cy pres
doctrine. 27 This may be done in a proceeding brought by the trustee specifically to request cy pres application 28 or by the court in an action brought for
another purpose. 29 Furthermore, the doctrine may be applied whether or not
an effective agreement to amend the trust pursuant to section 7-1.9 is in
existence. 30 New York has codified cy pres in section 8-1.1(c) of the EPTL,
which provides:
[W]henever it appears to [the] court that circumstances have so changed since the
execution of an instrument making a disposition for religious, charitable, educational
or benevolent purposes as to render impracticable or impossible a literal compliance
with the terms of such disposition, the court may, on application of the trustee . . .
make an order or decree directing that such disposition be administered and applied in
such manner as in the judgment of the court will most effectively accomplish its
§ 331.1; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331, comment g (1959). See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d
1412 (1958).
21. 4 Scott § 339.
22. Id. § 338.
23. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 7-1.9 (McKinney 1967).
24. Id. The statute is not clear as to whether two separate instruments are required-one
giving the consent of the interested parties and the other executed by the settlor making the actual
modification or revocation. There seems to be no reason why one instrument cannot serve both
functions. Cf. In re Trusts of Reilly, 21 Misc. 2d 597, 201 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (where
bo h settlor and beneficially interested parties agree on revocation, public policy favors facilitation
of their wishes); 61 N.Y. Jur. Trusts § 504, at 685-86 (1968).
25. Hanover Bank v. United Brethren's Church, 134 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Howe, 193 Misc. 640, 646, 86 N.Y.S.2d 808, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
26. Hanover Bank v. United Brethren's Church, 134 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
27. See generally E. Fisch, D. Freed & E. Schachter, Charities and Charitable Foundations
§§ 561, 567 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fisch ].
28. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967).
29. Cy pres also may be applied when the court action involves a proceeding to construe a
testamentary disposition, In re Will of Potter, 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E.2d 522 (1954), a suit for
instructions brought by a fiduciary, In re Estate of Bryant, 8 Misc. 2d 738, 168 N.Y.S.2d 21
(Sur. Ct. 1957), or a proceeding for termination or failure of a trust, on a party's or the court's
own motion, In re Herman, 177 Misc. 276, 30 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 1943); see Flsch § 585.
30. See notes 39-42 infra and accompanying text.
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general purposes, free from any specific restriction, limitation or direction contained
therein; provided, however, that any such order or decree is effective only with the
3
consent of the creator of the disposition if he is living. '

The rationale for the doctrine is that a settlor who had intended to effect a
charitable purpose for the benefit of society generally 32 would desire that the
property be applied to a similar purpose if the primary objective cannot be
carried out, rather than have the trust fail altogether. 33 Thus, cy pres is
inapplicable if the settlor has provided for an alternative disposition 34 or if the
court finds the settlor's intent
to have been specifically to effectuate a
35
particular charitable result.
In giving expression to the state's public policy, New York courts generally
will attempt to construe donative provisions so as to save charitable bequests. 36 In so doing, courts often go to great lengths to find that the donor
37
had entertained a "general," rather than a "specific" charitable intent,
employing a variety of presumptions and rules of construction. 38 It is gener31. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967).
32. This is commonly called the "general charitable intent" or "general intent." Fisch § 575;
see Rogers v. Attorney Gen., 347 Mass. 126, 131, 196 N.E.2d 855, 860 (1964); In re Syracuse
Univ. (Heffron), 3 N.Y.2d 665, 148 N.E.2d 671, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1958).
33. See N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967).
34. See In re Will of Fletcher, 280 N.Y. 86, 91, 19 N.E.2d 794, 795 (1939). See generally 4
Scott § 399.2, at 3095-98.
35. This is commonly denominated the "specific intent." In re Will of Merritt, 280 N.Y. 391,
399-400, 21 N.E.2d 365, 368-69 (1939). Compare In re Syracuse Univ. (Heffron), 3 N.Y.2d 665,
148 N.E.2d 671, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1958), with In re Syracuse Univ. (Hendricks), 4 N.Y.2d 744,
148 N.E.2d 911, 171 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1958) (mem.). Both cases dealt with bequests made to the
Syracuse University Medical School and the application of those bequests when the medical
school was taken over by the State University of New York. In the former case the court found
that a specific intent to benefit Syracuse University in the conduct of its medical program
precluded the application of cy pres. In the latter case the court found a general intent to benefit
humanity and, using cy pres, ordered the funds to be applied to the State University medical
facility.
36. "-[Vhere a testator has apparently sought to leave money for a charitable purpose, a
liberal construction is to be given to the terms of the will in order to uphold it and validate the
bequest." In re Will of Potter, 307 N.Y. 504, 517, 121 N.E.2d 522, 528 (1954); In re Syracuse
Univ. (Hendricks), 1 Misc. 2d 904, 148 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1955). affd mere., 3 App. Div.
2d 890, 161 N.Y.S.2d 855 (4th Dep't 1957), affd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 744, 148 N.E.2d 911, 171
N.Y.S.2d 863 (1958).
37. This judicial exercise was indirectly criticized in Lutheran Hosp. v. Goldstein, 182 Misc.
913, 918, 46 N.Y.S.2d 705, 709 (Sup. Ct. 1944). For a discussion of the various criteria
sometimes used to determine whether a general charitable intent exists see Fisch § 575, at 439-42.
Pennsylvania has abolished the requirement of finding a general charitable intent. Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 20, § 6110 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972). The United Kingdom has extensively modified its law and
relaxed the requirement in the Charities Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58, § 13(e).
38. New York courts often employ the "presumption against intestacy" to aid in upholding a
testamentary disposition. E.g., In re Estate of Dammann, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 504, 191 N.E.2d 452,
453, 240 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1963); In re Will of Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d 236, 243, 140 N.E.2d 269,
273, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184, 190 (1957); In re Estate of Hayes, 263 N.Y. 219, 225, 188 N.E. 716, 718
(1934).
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ally agreed that the exercise of cy pres jurisdiction "always involves a large
measure of discretion," 39 thus giving the court much leeway in deciding how
it will arrive at a substitute scheme:
Frequently the court will refer the matter to a master with directions to report a
scheme of application of the property to the court. The court may accept the scheme so
proposed or may reject or modify it. . . . [Tlhe court may frame a scheme itself or
adopt one proposed by the trustees.4 0
No reason appears why the court's cy pres powers should not include the
power to extend the duration of a trust by amendment of its terms when
necessary to prevent failure of the donor's purposes. 41 Interested parties may
suggest that the court apply cy pres in accordance with the terms of an
agreement reached privately. 42 By the terms of the statute, a living settlor is a
necessary party to such an agreement; a cy pres modification without his
consent is ineffective. 43 In addition, New York follows the almost universally
44
accepted view that the state attorney general also is a necessary party.
In In re Estate of Nurse45 the New York Court of Appeals was confronted
with the question whether the 1956 inter vivos trust had lapsed by its own
terms at the end of the specified ten-year period although the purpose for
which the trust was created had not yet been accomplished. 46 The answer
39. Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N.Y. 462, 473, 130 N.E. 613, 616 (1921); In re
Heckscher's Trust, 131 N.Y.S.2d 191, 194-95 (Sup. Ct. 1954); cf. In re Estate of Kittinger, 36
Misc. 2d 385, 232 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

40. 4 Scott § 399, at 3086-87; accord, G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 441,
at 474 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Bogert] ("[A] court may ratify [the plan of the
trustee] and treat the scheme of the trustee as a valid cy pres application.'); see Trustee of the
Rush Medical College v. University of Chicago, 312 Ill. 109, 143 N.E. 434 (1924) (trustee's plan);
In re Earl & Mabel Nellis Ath. Fund, 42 Misc. 2d 121, 247 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sur. Ct. 1964)
(legatee's plan). See also In re Will of Lawless, 194 Misc. 844, 859, 87 N.Y.S.2d 386, 403 (Sur.
Ct. 1949), aff'd mem., 277 App. Div. 1045, 100 N.Y.S.2d 537 (2d Dep't 1950).
41. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967) expresses no limitation that would preclude
the court from extending the duration of such a charitable trust to prevent its failure. See text
accompanying note 31 supra.
42. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hastings, 28 Misc. 2d 1089, 217 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
43. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967). See text accompanying note 31 supra. Bogert
§ 442, at 479, states the general rule that the donor should be consulted and his wishes given
consideration.
44. N.Y. E.P.T.L. §§ 8-1.1(0, -1.4(e)(1) (McKinney 1967); Bogert § 441, at 479; 4 Scott
§ 399, at 3087.
45. 35 N.Y.2d 381, 321 N.E.2d 537, 362 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1974).
46. Decedent's surviving kin argued that a new and separate trust was created by the
stipulation of 1967, drawing as its corpus the remainder of the 1956 inter vivos trust which, they
maintained, was terminated. If the trust in fact was terminated, the pour-over provision would
lapse and the residuary estate would pass by intestacy to the statutory distributees. 35 N.Y.Zd at
384-85, 321 N.E.2d at 538, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43 (citing N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 3-3.7(e) (McKinney
1967)); see N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 4-1.1(a)(7) (McKinney 1967). The Attorney General, joined by the
Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, argued that the supreme court decree amended
the original trust so that its existence continued, thus allowing the will to pour-over pursuant to
id. § 3-3.7(b)(1).
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depended on whether the trust had terminated prior to the 1967 state supreme
court judgment which the courts below had characterized as a cy pres action.
If the trust had terminated, the supreme court would have been without
jurisdiction to modify it 47 -even to extend its duration--and the pour-over
from the settlor's will into the trust would have been ineffective, causing the
residuary testamentary disposition to pass to the intestate distributees. 48
The court expressly employed a liberal construction both of the dispositive
instruments and of the statutes, thus reaffirming New York's strong public
policy of saving charitable bequests by liberal interpretation and by the use of
presumptions. 49 The majority concluded that since achievement of the primary purpose for the trust--creation and operation of a laboratory for experimental surgery-never had been undertaken, only two events could have
actually terminated the trust: cessation of operation of the laboratory, an
express condition for termination in the trust instrument; or actual payment of
the entire principal to the hospital at the end of the ten-year period, as
ordered in the instrument. The court reasoned that since the laboratory had
never begun to function, it could not have "ceased" to function. Moreover,
the trust property had not been paid over to the hospital.50 Rather, the
trustees had retained title and control of the trust property beyond May, 1966,
thus continuing the trust beyond the period specified in the creating instrument. 5t
The court's conclusion finds support in the authorities.5 2- Since the material
purposes of the trust were not accomplished within the designated period, the
trust could not terminate on the date fixed in the instrument. 53 Since the
trustees had made no conveyance to a remainderman, there was no action5 4by
the trustees upon which a finding of termination could be predicated.
Having established that the charitable trust had continued in existence after
May, 1966, the court characterized the trustee's petition to the state supreme
court in November, 1967, as a request for application of the cy pres
doctrine. 55 First, the court had to ascertain that the settlor had manifested a
The Surrogate agreed with the argument advanced principally by the Corporation Counsel and
concluded: "[I]t seems fair to describe the project as the constitution of an amendment to the
original trust rather than the creation of a wholly new enterprise. Under these circumstances
there was no necessity for revision of the will and the residuary gift provided for quite clearly
carried with it the testator's intention that the original trust as amended by the stipulation
embodied in the decree was to benefit by his testamentary generosity." Estate of Nurse, 166
N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1971, at 10 (Sur. CL), aff'd mem., 43 App. Div. 2d 527, 349 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1st
Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 381, 321 N.E.2d 537, 362 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1974).
47. Without a validly executed will or an existing trust, there is no valid disposition that the
court may alter. The court has no power to create a trust instrument where none legally exists.
48. See N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 3-3.7(e) (McKinney 1967).
49. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
50. 35 N.Y.2d at 388, 391, 321 N.E.2d at 540, 542, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 446, 448
51. Id. at 386, 321 N.E.2d at 539, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
52. See notes 11-19 supra and accompanying text.
53. 14 Scott § 334, at 2639-40.
54. See id. § 344.
55. 35 N.Y.2d at 389, 321 N.E.2d at 540, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 446; see note 3 supra.
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general charitable intent. Examining the purposes underlying the gift for the
proposed laboratory and noting the type of projects for which some of the7
interest earned on the corpus had been used with the consent of the settlor,
the court concluded that "the fund was consistently applied to advance the
growth of surgery at Harlem Hospital and the position of the Negro in the
field of surgery-aims which may be regarded as [a] 'general charitable intent
... ) "58 Thus, the general purpose could be effectuated without the creation
of the laboratory mentioned in the trust instrument. 59
Second, the court found that all the statutory requirements for application
of cy pres had been satisfied. 60 The substitute scheme had been developed
during the pendency of the trustee's action in state court by all the parties
interested in the charitable trust-the settlor, the trustee, the Attorney
General and the city Corporation Counsel. The resultant agreement formed
the basis for a stipulation 6' which the court had approved and incorporated
into its decree of May, 1967.62 Since the settlor had been a party to this
agreement, the court found the requisite consent of a living creator to the
changes, rendering it a valid cy pres modification, the effect of which was to
63
alter the terms and extend the duration of the trust.

The majority then considered whether the modification constituted an
effective "amendment" of the trust within the meaning of EPTL section 3-3.7,
the pour-over provision. 64 The court concluded that it was, stating:
56.

See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.

57. Some of the interest was applied to "surgical projects, lectures, scientific travel and
scientific activities." 35 N.Y.2d at 386, 321 N.E.2d at 539, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
58. Id. at 390, 321 N.E.2d at 541, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
59. Id., 321 N.E.2d at 541, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
60. At the time of the supreme court proceeding in early 1967, the cy pres doctrine was
codified in N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(2) (McKinney 1962), re-enacted as N.Y. E.P.T.L.
§ 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967), effective Sept. 1, 1967 with minor revisions in terminology. The
requirements are the same under both statutory provisions.
The court agreed there was no abuse of discretion by the state supreme court in finding that the
circumstances had so changed as to render literal compliance with the 1956 trust instrument
impossible. 35 N.Y.2d at 390, 321 N.Y.2d at 541, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 447. The petition for judicial
relief was filed by the trustee, and the attorney general was made a party pursuant to N.Y.
E.P.T.L. §§ 8-1.1(0, -1.4(e)(1) (McKinney 1967); see notes 4 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
61. For the provisions of the agreement see note 4 supra. See generally notes 3-5 supra and
accompanying text.
62. 35 N.Y.2d at 387, 321 N.E.2d at 539, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 445. The plan adopted by the
court provided for reapplication of the trust funds to a "second best" use while still promoting the
general intent of the settlor. The court has the power to so order pursuant to N.Y. E.P.T.L.
§ 8-1.1(c) (McKinney 1967). In addition the plan provided for the resignation of the original
trustees and the appointment of New York City, a municipal corporation, as the new trustee,
with three "directors" to administer the fund. The court may approve the resignation and
replacement of the trustee. See id. § 7-2.6 (McKinney 1967); Goldstein v. Trustees of the Sailors'
Snug Harbor, 277 App. Div. 269, 279-80, 98 N.Y.S.2d 544, 554 (1st Dep't 1950); 4 Scott § 388.
In New York the right of a municipal corporation to act as trustee of a charitable trust Is granted
by statute. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.2(b) (McKinney 1967).
63. See 35 N.Y.2d at 391-92, 321 N.E.2d at 541, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48.
64. See discussion of requirements at notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
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[Wihere a trust is so modified during the settlor's lifetime, by application of the ancient
doctrine of cy pres, the judgment permitting the modification constitutes an "amendment" within the meaning
of EPTL 3-3.7[(b)(1)] which preserves rather than termi65
nates the original trust.
Thus, as long as the amendatory instrument-here, the supreme court
order-was "recordable" within the meaning of the section, the trust instrument as amended was sufficient to allow the testamentary disposition to pour
into the trust. 66 The court noted that the purpose of the recordable document
requirement was not that there actually be a recording but rather that there
be a "safeguard against fraud and overreaching. '67 For this reason, the court
held that a judgment was a safeguard deemed appropriate by the legislature
to allow recordation of a deed to realty and, therefore, would be sufficient to
satisfy section 3-3.7.68 Since the "amendment" in this case took the form of a
court decree, the court found compliance with the "recordable" requirement
by virtue of section 297-b of the Real Property Law which allows any certified
copy of a "judgment, final order or decree ... rendered by a New York state
court of record ... affecting ... real property ... [to] be recorded ... in the

same manner as a conveyance duly acknowledged or proved and certified so
-69
as to entitle it to be recorded ....
By declaring that the 1967 supreme court decree had validly amended and
extended the trust instrument, the court found the final requirement of section
3-3.7-that the trust be in existence prior to or be executed contemporaneously with the will containing the pour-over provision-had been met. Since
the 1967 decree did not affect the existence of the trust created in 1956, the
reference to the earlier trust instrument in the settlor's 1961 %vill was held
70
sufficient to specify the trust into which the residuary estate would pour.
Chief Judge Breitel dissented from the majority's reasoning and conclusion,
arguing that the original trust simply had " 'expired' by the terms of the trust
instrument on May 23, 1966," ten years to the day after its creation. 7' Thus,
65. 35 N.Y.2d at 391, 321 N.E.2d at 542, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
66. Id. at 391-92, 321 N.E.2d at 542, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 448. The New York laws on recording
instruments affecting real property are found in N.Y. Real Prop. Law art. 9 (McKinney 1968).
67. 35 N.Y.2d at 391, 321 N.E.2d at 542, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 448; see In re Will of Rausch, 258
N.Y. 327, 333, 179 N.E. 755, 757 (1932) (Cardozo, C.J.) e'chicanery or mistake"); In re Will of
Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 233, 118 N.E. 611, 613 (1918) (prevent "fraud or mistake"). The court's
interpretation is supported by the legislative history of N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 3-3.7 (McKinney 1967):
"In order to remove th[e] possibility [of fraud or mistake] it has been suggested
. . that
amendments be acknowledged and delivered to the trustee, as well as the requirement for
perhaps two witnesses. It is believed that execution and acknowledgment as required for the
recordation of deeds is sufficient to prevent fraud or mistake." Second Rep. of the Temp. State
Comm'n on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, 1963 N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 19, at 226.
68. 35 N.Y.2d at 391-92, 321 N.E.2d at 542, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
69. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 297-b (McKinney 1968).
70. See 35 N.Y.2d at 393, 321 N.E.2d at 543, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
71. 35 N.Y.2d at 393-94, 321 N.E.2d at 543, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 450 (Brietel, C.J., dissenting).
Perhaps the real reason for the dissent lay in the fact that the record suggested that the settlor in
fact intended to amend his will and dispose of the residuary in another manner, but was
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he argued that the trust had not been in existence at the time of either the
1967 supreme court judgment or the settlor's death. However, the Chief
Judge erroneously premised his argument on the principle that "the expiration
of a stated period of time terminates a trust,172 because he ignored the
limitation that trusts do not terminate automatically at the end of a designated term when the trust purpose is not fully accomplished within the
period. 73
The dissent viewed the stipulation as an agreement to create a new fund
out of the remainder of the 1956 trust, rather than as an amendment of the
trust. 74 But, even though the terms of a revised instrument may be far
removed from the original purposes, the policy adopted by the legislature in
enacting section 7-1.9 of the EPTL allows the beneficially interested parties to
agree on a revision without any statutory limitation on the type of modification. Such an agreement-the later expression of the settlor's intent-should
be given effect whenever possible. Thus, it is incumbent upon a court to
interpret such an agreement to give it effect. The dissent's approach contravenes not only the strong public policy of New York that favors saving a
charitable bequest, but also ignores the settlor's latest intent. One of the
purposes underlying section 3-3.7(b)(1), which expressly allows a pour-over
into an amended trust, was to end the needless litigation and "lingering
doubts concerning the use of 'pour over' trusts" that were prevalent prior to
adoption of the statute. 75 The dissent's approach would engender litigation
whenever an inter vivos trust instrument was amended substantially without
corresponding amendment of testamentary pour-over provisions.
It is suggested that the fault with the majority's decision is not the result,
which is both correct and beneficial, but rather the fact that a more
straightforward approach to the issues in Nurse could have been employed.
Section 7-1.9 of the EPTL gives a settlor the statutory right to enter into an
agreement with all parties interested in the trust to revoke or amend the
instrument.76 Since the requirement for acknowledgement of the agreement in
the manner deemed proper for recording a conveyance of realty is identical
under both section 7-1.9 and section 3-3.7, the rule that an agreement
incorporated into a court judgment, final order or decree is a valid amendment for section 3-3.7 purposes is equally applicable to section 7-1.9 when
such agreements are not formally acknowledged or proved. A trust amendment perfected under section 7-1.9 satisfies the requirements of section 3-3.7
prevented from doing so when he suffered a stroke. See id. at 395-96, 321 N.E.2d at 544, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 451-52.
72. Id. at 398, 321 N.E.2d at 546, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (citations omitted).
73. 4 Scott § 334, at 2639-40; see notes 15 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
74. 35 N.Y.2d at 397, 321 N.E.2d at 545, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
75. Second Rep. of the Temp. State Comm'n on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, 1963 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 19, Rep. 6.1B, at 14.
76. A trust for a term of years may be extended by a "modification" of the trust instrument
pursuant to either a power reserved by the creator or to the provisions of N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 7-1.9
(McKinney 1967). See notes 20, 23-28 supra and accompanying text. The statutory power to
modify the instrument is unrestricted in scope once all parties consent: the trust may be shortened
or extended in duration or revoked entirely.
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to allow a pour-over to the trust so amended. Had the Nurse court approached the question presented by the 1967 supreme court proceeding in this
manner, there would have been no necessity for an extended inquiry into the
problems accompanying the application of cy pres. Moreover, this suggested
approach would have been more judicially economical.
The stipulation entered into by the interested parties in Nurse may be
viewed as an amendment pursuant to EPTL section 7-1.9. The petition of the
trustee to the supreme court could be interpreted as a "petition for instructions relating to the administration or use of [charitable trust] property or
income .... ,,77 The court order incorporating the stipulation and instructing
the trustee to proceed in accordance with that agreement would be recordable
under Real Property Law section 297-b as interpreted by the court in Nurse.
Since the agreement made between all the required parties was executed as a
stipulation, and the incorporation into a court order suffices in lieu of
acknowledgment, all the requirements of EPTL section 7-1.9 to create a valid
amendment are met. Since the amendment is valid under section 7-1.9 it is
valid under section 3-3.7, thus allowing the residuary bequest to pour into the
amended trust. The same result has been reached without employing the cy
pres doctrine and the complication of first establishing a general charitable
intent. Based upon the facts in Nurse the same result could have been reached
even if the settlor had evidenced a specific intent, precluding cy pres, by use
of the interpretation here suggested.
The court has made clear that it will determine what type of "amendment"
is sufficient effectively to modify a trust. It intimated that when there is a
"subsisting relation" between the original trust terms and the revised terms, it
will find an amendment rather than an entirely new arrangement. 78 Since the
court will continue to construe liberally all instruments concerning charitable
dispositions, the creator of a charitable trust must be especially mindful of
dealings and agreements with the parties beneficially interested in the trust.
Otherwise an agreement intended to be an informal understanding may
become the means to change the trust terms if enforced by a court decree and
then viewed as an amendment. This danger is especially acute after the death
of the settlor.
Gary B. Schmidt
77. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 8-1.4(e)(1)(A) (McKinney 1967). This section provides for the supervision of trustees of charitable trusts.
78. 35 N.Y.2d at 393; 321 N.E.2d at 543; 362 N.Y.S.2d at 449.

